Protecting Civilians in Uncivil Wars

"It is mainly civilians that die as a result of contemporary armed conflicts: most succumb to disease and the effects of malnutrition but a significant number are slaughtered or suffer other forms of violent death. Policies to protect civilians during warfare, however, remain incoherent conceptually and poorly implemented in practice. This working paper aims to advance debate in this area in three ways. First, it outlines a framework for thinking about the different dimensions that need to be addressed as part of a comprehensive and coherent civilian protection agenda: The nature of the threats facing civilians during armed conflict. Here we distinguish between direct and indirect forms of harm and identify four important types of actors which often harm civilians: local armed forces, nonstate armed actors, self-defence groups, and foreign peacekeepers, soldiers and contractors. The sources of the contemporary protection agenda stem from six interrelated streams of policy: 1) the development of international humanitarian law (IHL), 2) the adoption of protection agendas by humanitarian agencies, 3) the UN Security Council‘s focus on civilian protection, 4) the incorporation of protection mandates for peace operations, 5) the embracing of protection by some regional organizations, and 6) the political commitment to the Responsibility to Protect. The pillars upon which the protection agenda should rest. We argue that a unified and comprehensive conception of protection should rest on the three pillars: of physical protection from immediate harm, satisfaction of needs essential for the sustenance of life, and the freedom to exercise fundamental human rights. The principal agents of protection. These can be divided into five broad categories: states, local communities, humanitarian agencies, peacekeepers and international judicial institutions. While all these agents are potentially significant, to date, too little attention has been paid to understanding how to enhance the resilience of local communities. Second, it identifies some important gaps and tensions in the current agenda. The first and arguably most significant gap is that between expectations and capabilities. Profound gaps remain between what agents are expected to deliver (either by insiders or outsiders) and what they are capable of, or committed to, delivering. The second gap is the lack of operational guidance available for external agencies which wish to engage in civilian protection operations. A third problem is the lack of coherence and effective coordination between different actors. The fourth challenge is the tensions between self-protection activities of local communities and external agendas. Finally, there is a tension between the primary responsibility of the state and the way protection is commonly conceived and pursued. In particular, one of the least well understood elements of the ―responsibility to protect‖ principle is the question of what states need to do to meet their obligations. Taken together, these problems have left the protection agenda somewhat limited and contradictory in certain respects. Third, it emphasizes three issues that urgently require more detailed research: How to enhance state capacity in relevant areas? How to bolster the resilience of local communities at risk of harm? How to strengthen the ability of peace operations to carry out relevant protection tasks? When thinking about how to protect civilians in uncivil wars, political leaders should stop repeating the discredited cliché of ―never again‖ and instead start investing serious resources into figuring out ―who‘s next?‖ and how they might be protected."