

Unarmed civilians or military peacekeepers?

An assessment of peacekeeping tactics in South Sudan

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Introduction

In the 1950's, a new use of the military was introduced: the military as a peacekeeping force. The UN Peacekeeping homepage describes it as 'a technique to preserve the peace where the fighting has been halted' (2018). Since its foundation, it has been put into practice 71 times in various types of conflicts, and has become the method of choice to intervene where an escalation of violence or human suffering is taking place. At this moment, there are 14 missions all over the world: from Haiti, to Mali, to India (United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, 2008). However, a UN military intervention is not always possible wherever it is needed: peacekeeping through the use of military force is per definition a political act. Modern-day peacekeeping missions have become considerably more complex: most missions consist of an armed element, which forms a majority, a civilian element, formed by civilian experts and volunteers, and often a police element.

There is a wide array of academic literature on the concept of peacekeeping, that studies different methods of peacekeeping, past and current operations, and the organisation of missions. The field of armed peacekeeping is plagued by critiques from many different sides. Some missions have utterly failed: Somalia, Rwanda and Srebrenica being the most famous examples. Other critiques of UN missions are focused on internal issues: missions are often ineffective, plagued by UN bureaucracy and conflicting interests between participating countries (De Coning & Da Costa, 2015). Other critiques focus on effectiveness, and claim the current practice of peacekeeping does not actually achieve its goal: peace is enforced in an artificial manner, and is therefore not be durable. Armed Military Peacekeeping (AMP) is therefore not always the best solution in a conflict.

As the classical way of peacekeeping deploys a military force to preserve the peace, a different approach has gained ground over the years. Several organisations developed a practice of peacekeeping using unarmed civilians. This practice, called Unarmed Civilian Peacekeeping, (UCP) has been successful so far, because it works closely with the local community. By doing so, the organisations are able to really address the communities' needs (Julian & Schweitzer, 2015). By training people from the conflict region, they help build a more durable peace, as the local community is better able to deal with local conflicts on its own. As this is a relatively new topic, the academic literature is limited. Current literature is mostly concerned with establishing the concept of UCP, and demonstrating how the practice works.

Regarding peacekeeping as something essentially local, this thesis argues that Unarmed Civilian Peacekeeping can be more effective than Armed Military Peacekeeping. The practice of UCP as studied in this paper, is rooted in building trust and relationships with the local community.

Because of this, practitioners of UCP are able to assess the needs of the community and the security situation accurately. Based on this knowledge, a strategy of unarmed tactics is designed; which fits the needs of a community. Next, the unarmed peacekeeping practices that are used have a strong positive impact on the community, as they strengthen the community's resilience and prevent and reduce violence in the region.

To develop this argument, a case study is conducted of Unarmed and Armed Peacekeeping in South Sudan. In this young country, the NGO Nonviolent Peaceforce (NP) applies UCP on a large scale. This mission will be compared to the UN mission in South Sudan, UNMISS, which is a large-scale UN peacekeeping mission, deployed since 2011. A comparison between the two missions is difficult, as the operations are very different in size: the NP mission in South Sudan has -although a large-scale mission for UCP standards- 11 offices throughout the country (Appendix 5) and 170 personnel deployed; the UN mission has 18,000 personnel, of which 13,000 are uniformed personnel (United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, n.d.). Nevertheless, the effects of both missions can be shown, comparing their size and impact on the ground-level. This case study will show that UCP in South Sudan is more effective, because of its close connection with the community and its focus on protection: which makes it successful in reducing violence in the regions NP is deployed. Studying this case in detail will create a better understanding of how the concept of Unarmed Civilian Peacekeeping can be a more suitable fit than the armed variant.

First, the theoretical framework for this argument will be constructed, followed by the empirical part, the case study of South Sudan. In the first part, will address peacekeeping in theory, giving a historical and conceptual overview of the concept. Next, the concept of Unarmed Civilian Peacekeeping and its use are introduced, followed by a theoretical comparison of UCP and AMP. In the second part, peacekeeping in South Sudan will be analysed as a case study to the theoretical argument. The history of the conflict in the country will first be explained, followed by an analysis of both the UN and NP missions in South Sudan. Next, the methods and impact of these missions will be compared. Finally, the conclusion will summarize the findings and resume this thesis' argument for the use of UCP over AMP.

Peacekeeping in theory

I. A historical and conceptual overview

Strictly speaking, peacekeeping is nothing more than the maintenance of peace and the prevention of further fighting between hostile forces (Collins English Dictionary, 2018). In practice, it is a lot more difficult to give a comprehensive definition, as there is not one version of peacekeeping. Therefore, the historical context will be given next.

The use of the term of peacekeeping has its origins in the United Nations, shortly after the Second World War. The creation of the state of Israel, and the partition of India and Pakistan led to a major conflict in both areas, and resulted in the first two UN-led peace operations, which were both unarmed: the UN Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) and the UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP), in respectively 1948 and 1949 (Hanhimäki, 2008). A new concept was born: the UN peace operation. Numerous other operations would follow, till this very day. However, this UN Charter does not mention this concept; although its mandates are based on the Charter. In peacekeeping literature, mandates of operations can be distinguished as Chapter VI or Chapter VII operations, referring to the respective chapters of the UN Charter. The difference in these missions is their legal basis. Chapter VI is about the “Pacific Settlement of Disputes”, Chapter VII deals with “Action with Respect to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace and Acts of Aggression”. Traditionally, UN missions deployed on the basis of Chapter VI, but more recent missions deployed with a ‘Chapter VII-mandate’, as this chapter deals with the deployment of peacekeeping operations in situations where the state is unable to maintain security (United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, 2008).

The problem in defining peace operations is that they are too diverse composition and purpose to put in one single definition. Often, scholars define them by chronological order, like Hanhimäki (2008), who distinguishes four generations of peacekeeping. The first being the physical barrier between two warring parties, like the UN force that was deployed in response to the Suez crisis in 1956, which was the first armed mission. The second generation missions is aimed at implementing a complex peace agreement. The third generation is mainly peace enforcement missions, such as cease-fires. Finally, the fourth generation refers to delegated peacebuilding missions by regional organisations. However, this way of categorizing is problematic, as not all missions adhere to their generation. The UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali’s *An Agenda for Peace* (1992) brought a change in the conceptualization of peacekeeping: he listed it as one of the tools the UN could use to prevent and resolve conflict around the world (Bellamy & Williams, 2010). The other options are peacemaking, peacebuilding and preventive diplomacy. Some peace

operations can still be clearly categorized in one of these four types; but most current operations are complex and multidimensional missions: they are not just to maintain peace and security, but also to “facilitate the political process, protect civilians, assist in disarmament of former combatants, support the organization of elections, protect and promote human rights and assist in restoring the rule of law” (United Nations Peacekeeping, n.d.).

Based on current peacekeeping research, it can be concluded that peacekeeping operations do work. The circumstances and conditions differ, but there improvements in a region can be observed. Using an extensive literature review, Salvatore and Ruggeri (2017) find that peace operations “produce to a more durable peace, more geographically contained conflict, shorter episodes of local violence, higher odds of peacebuilding success, and lower odds of genocide in the long term”. However, UN peace operations also have to deal with serious limitations. The major problems are both internal and external problems. Internal problems are the difficulty to establish and manage a mission: many countries – especially those with high-skilled troops- are unwilling to support a mission in a country they have no interest in. In an active mission, the conflict between the UN and the troop providing countries causes problems as well: national governments hold the power over their troops, often in a way that disturbs the UN mission. The main external problems are the contact with the host government, which has to consent to the mission, and the management of expectations of the government, civilians and NGOs (Sloan, 2011).

Furthermore, the UN peacekeeping missions are often unable to keep the peace when conflict breaks out, due to understaffing or unwillingness to intervene; for example in the attacks on the POC sites in Malakal, South Sudan. Although UN peacekeepers were nearby, they waited hours to intervene, while some units even refused to go (Foltyn, 2016). These examples of UN peacekeeping failure, together with the structural problems many missions are plagued with, have made the call to change the peacekeeping practice stronger.

II. An alternative method: Unarmed Civilian Peacekeeping

One perspective on this, is to fundamentally change the approach of peacekeeping. There are many different types of peacekeeping, but generally speaking, they can be divided into two groups: armed and unarmed peacekeeping. Peace operations don't necessarily consist of only military personnel; civilian personnel can be deployed as well, although the military component often dominates. Deploying unarmed military forces or police is also a possibility. Peace operations are globally deployed nowadays: there are currently 14 peace operations led by the UN, sometimes in cooperation with the AU, EU or NATO. An upcoming trend in peace operations is the concept of civilian peacekeeping. Although relatively unknown, this concept has been around for a while.

There is no single definition of the term, but there are some common sources of inspiration. The first one is Ghandi's peace army, 'Shanti Sena': an unarmed defense against British colonial rule. Second, this concept was used by various Europeans citizens and organisations who tried to position themselves in the middle in conflict, but mostly failed. Thirdly, there are many volunteer services that work at reconciliation, often among youth. Finally, military peacekeeping has been a source of inspiration, especially unarmed missions (Julian & Schweitzer, 2015). With these different sources, civilian peacekeeping has developed in different directions and is used more and more by NGO's and institutions in the peacekeeping field: since 1990, around 50 organisations have used a certain variant of Unarmed Civilian Peacekeeping (Janzen, 2014).

Just like there is not one single concept of armed peacekeeping, there is no universal concept of unarmed civilian peacekeeping. There are many different methods that are used in civilian peacekeeping, but they are all centred around one goal: increasing safety and security. The four main methods are relationship building, capacity development, monitoring and proactive engagement (NP, 2015).

Relationship building

This category can be divided into two activities: confidence building and multi-track dialogue. The first, confidence building, means that the UCP team works to create confidence with the community: confidence in both the UCP team and between local actors. This is done by for example the multi-track dialogue, in which the peacekeepers create a place for dialogue between the local authorities, civilians and humanitarian agencies.

Capacity development

The activities for this method are the support of a self-sustaining local peacekeeping

infrastructure and training. Through this, the local community learns how to apply unarmed peacekeeping tactics themselves, which they can pass on to the others in the community.

Monitoring

This task, divided into conflict monitoring and rumour control (Early Response Early Warning) is a prominent strategy of UCP. Teams monitor the situation closely, at the local level: something the armed peacekeepers often can't. Rumour control is a useful tool to be aware of any changes in the security situation of a region: using the EWER system, the community is better able to respond to violence.

Proactive engagement

Most organisations applying UCP are active in this field. The teams work through protective presence, protective accompaniment and interpositioning: by just being present the organisations protect civilians, specifically vulnerable groups like women, children or human rights workers. In this field, Peace Brigades International (PBI) is active, one of the oldest practitioners of UCP that since 1981 carries out protective accompaniment, international observation, targeted advocacy and workshops and training (Peace Brigades International, n.d.) Other examples of organisations are Meta Peace Team (MPT) and International Solidarity Movement (ISM). The latter has a particular approach to UCP: although many organisations have non-partisanship is an essential value, the International Solidarity Movement openly chooses sides in their work in Gaza, participating in the Palestinian fight against Israel (International Solidarity Movement, n.d.).

Nonviolent Peaceforce, the organisation that applies all these methods in different fields and combinations, will be studied more in depth in this thesis. Founded in 2002, the organisation quickly became one of the main providers of unarmed civilian peacekeeping. NP protects civilians, especially minorities, in conflict areas by using the methods and activities as described above. The way these are applied, differ in every case; an assessment of what a community needs is made before deployment. NP does this in a unique way, as they deploy -for unarmed peacekeeping terms- larger-scale missions, for example in South Sudan. This case will be studied in the second part of this thesis.

III. Comparing UCP and AMP

To compare Unarmed Civilian Peacekeeping and Armed Military Peacekeeping, peacekeeping effectiveness has to be addressed first. There is a vast amount of literature on this subject, and as a result, no single view or practice of measuring the effectiveness of peacekeeping operations. First of all, this thesis will focus on the effectiveness of UN peacekeeping missions and UCP missions; it is not possible to include other peacekeeping operations in the limited space that is available. Next, in order to study these two types effectiveness', a couple of questions have to be answered. Firstly: what is effectiveness in peacekeeping? Second: how can this be studied? Using this knowledge, a framework for this thesis can be made, which will argue how the effectiveness of both UCP and AMP will be measured and compared.

What is effectiveness in peacekeeping?

Peacekeeping literature has changed significantly over the years. In the time period of the missions that are deemed 'failures', such as Rwanda and Somalia, peacekeeping literature focused strongly on the failure of peacekeeping, although there were successful missions in this time period. Later on, peacekeeping research took a positive turn: scholars started to study the topic in a more rigorous way than past research (Fortna & Howard, 2008). In this line of literature, the focus is on the international and national level of peace operations, and success or effectiveness is determined on those levels, remaining on the macro-level of analysis. Even in qualitative studies, little attention is paid to the micro-level of peace operations; the basic, day-to-day practice of peacekeeping. For this thesis however, the micro- level is very relevant, as it is difficult to measure the impact of unarmed civilian peacekeeping on the macro-level, due to the difference in the operations' size. This article will therefore focus on the micro-level and use the results on this level as the measure of success.

How can effectiveness be studied?

In order to measure this, first-hand sources from armed and unarmed peacekeepers will be used. Next to this, sources like the Nonviolent Peaceforce feasibility study and reports by NP of their work in South Sudan will be used. A lot more material can be found on the UN mission in South Sudan, so this will be used as well to study the effects and results of UNMISS on the beforementioned micro-level using the same type of sources, from the ground-level of the operation.

Why and when is UCP more effective than AMP?

To assess when the practice of Unarmed Civilian Peacekeeping is more effective than armed peacekeeping, the results of the two practices on the ground-level will be evaluated and compared. It is important to note that although unarmed peacekeeping can be an improvement, this article does not regard it as a replacement of armed peacekeeping. Second: in this case study, the results will be based on one context and country. In order to make the conclusion of this thesis less restricted to this specific case, the focus will be on the core practices of peacekeeping as much as possible.

To make the case for UCP over AMP, it is important to look at why UCP works, as applied by Nonviolent Peaceforce. There are three fields in which UCP has an advantage over AMP: in its approach to peacekeeping, the methods used and the durability of its approach. First of all, the approach. NP's external and internal reports and interviews with unarmed peacekeepers have pointed out the importance of building trust and relationships within and with the community. This is not just a part of UCP, but essential in all UCP activities; it is the foundation of the practice. Because of this, NP is able to assess the needs of the community and the conflict situation on a close level and, using their assessment, determine what unarmed strategies would fit the community best. When a situation changes, the assessment is adjusted as well.

Next, UCP has an advantage because of the methods that are applied; the peacekeeping activities have a positive effect on the community. First, the community is strengthened by various types of training (Appendix 2) and the improvement of dialogue the peacekeepers bring about. Trainings in conflict and child protection make a community more resilient and able to deal with violence. The teams' presence also prevents violence from escalating through the Early Warning Early Response-system, which gives them the possibility to react in the best way possible; whether this is by warning others or by providing space for dialogue to resolve a conflict. Next, NP helps the development of a region by creating a more secure situation and advocate at other humanitarian organisations to come to the region; as there are often not many NGOs in remote areas. All these methods actively contribute to a more secure situation in regions where security is very much needed.

Third, UCP is more effective because of the durability of its approach. Training civilians and teaching them unarmed tactics of peacekeeping makes them responsible for peacekeeping in their own community, instead of enforcing it on them. This way, the community is actively engaged in the peacekeeping process, which makes the effect of UCP durable and not solely depend on the presence of international peacekeepers.

Peacekeeping in South Sudan

I. A history of conflict

In its short existence, South Sudan has been plagued by conflict and violence, which roots can be found in the history of the region: as most conflicts are rooted in the historical context. To get an understanding of the complexity of South Sudan's conflict, a historical perspective on the country and its conflict is therefore essential; starting from the time Sudan came into existence.

Little is known about the region of Sudan before it came under Turkish / Egyptian rule that started in 1821. From this moment on, Sudan became one political entity, which it wasn't before: the North and the South developed separate from each other, because of geographical reasons. Once the South was 'discovered' by the Northern government, it was mainly used as a source of ivory and slaves. Years later, the division of North and South Sudan became more evident when European countries increased their activities in Africa, competing for the most resourceful regions of the continent. To prevent other countries from taking over Sudan, Britain conquered the region together with France, starting a period known as The Condominium; a period in which that Great-Britain would not rule directly, and left the administrative tasks to the Egyptians, while of course keeping a strong influence in the government (Sidahmed & Sidahmed, 2004). During this period, the North and South were divided into two territories. The British used the difference between the two territories to their advantage; by using the tactic of 'divide and rule', as it reduced the risk of a side becoming too powerful and revolting against the colonial rule; a tactic that worked well for colonial powers.

Starting with the Egyptian revolution of Nasser in 1952, Sudan gradually got more autonomy, leading to official independence at the first of January 1956 (Codesria, 2014). The many years of division between the North and South quickly became evident, as already a year later a war broke out between the government in the North and rebels in the South. This conflict dragged on – with some interruptions- till the cease-fire of 2005, the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). An essential part of this agreement was the referendum that would be held in South Sudan, with the topic of independence of the region. This referendum took place in 2011, where an overwhelming majority voted in favour of an independent South Sudan. On 9 July 2011, South Sudan became officially independent (Gettleman, 2011). Many hoped the independence would bring an end to the years of violence. However, in 2013, a civil war broke out in the young country. Although violence and conflict was widely spread throughout the country, the immediate cause for the civil war to break out was a power struggle within the Sudan Peoples' Liberation Movement. In the struggle for independence, three different blocs have developed within the SPLM: one in Greater

Bahr el-Ghazal, one in the eastern bank of the Nile and one in parts of the Greater Upper Nile. Most of the power had shifted to Greater Bahr el-Ghazal, where president Salva Kiir's support comes from, and to the Greater Upper Nile, where vice-president Riek Machar's base of support is. The power struggle within the SPLM escalated when certain leaders of the organisation, amongst others Riek Machar, declared to challenge the president in the 2015 elections (Rolandsen et al., 2015). After a period of conflict, president Salva Kiir dismissed and replaced his ministers, including vice-president Riek Machar. This split caused a division within the Sudan Peoples' Liberation Movement (SPLM) and Sudan Peoples' Liberation army (SPLA), the leading political and armed group of South Sudan. This resulted in the formation of the SPLM in opposition, led by former vice-president Machar (International Crisis Group, 2014).

The conflict within the SPLM is explained in both media and academic research as an ethnic conflict. Kiir is part of the powerful Dinka tribe, and Machar belongs to the -less powerful- Nuer tribe, and the conflict is between these two tribes and their allies (Omer, 2016). However, other academics have claimed that the conflict should not be explained as merely an ethnic conflict, but more as a clash between the new aristocracy that arose from the army, and the ordinary citizens (Pinaud, 2014). Furthermore, it is very difficult to make a clear division in the two sides; some researchers state that the government / opposition-divide is simply not correct (Le Riche, 2014).

The complexity of this conflict makes it difficult for any party to work with the South Sudanese government. The young country has little visible governance or public service infrastructure, and basic needs like access to healthcare, water and education are mostly delivered by NGO's (De Coning & Da Costa, 2015). Although the republic is in dire need of these basic needs, the government is mostly concerned with security issues and building up the military. Moreover, the government is plagued by corruption, internally divided and incapable of controlling its own forces, which makes it an unreliable partner. Talks between warring parties were initiated by the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) – a organisation of East-African countries-, but the talks did not produce any significant result.

The conflicts' complexity can not just be contributed to the internal actors, also external factors play an important role. The conflict in South Sudan has strong regional connections as well. So has, for example, Uganda since decades a very strong connection to the SPLA/M, and intervened at the escalation of violence in 2013. Another example is Egypt volunteering to deploy troops in the IGAD Protection and Deterrence Force (PDF), while it is in dispute with Ethiopia over the Nile (International Crisis Group, 2014). The civil war has had immense consequences for the civilians living in conflict areas. As of now, there are more than 1.9 million Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) inside the country, and more than 2 million refugees in the neighbouring countries Sudan, Egypt, Kenya and DRC (UNHCR, 2017).

II. Peacekeeping efforts in South Sudan

United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS)

On the 25th of August 2011, the UN General Assembly voted in favour of the admission of the Republic of South Sudan to membership in the United Nations (A/RES/65/208). The country was hopeful of a new, prosperous future, now that it was free and independent; hoping it could move on from the years of conflict after independence. However, when violence broke out quickly after the independence, the UN decided that the situation had escalated to such a degree that intervention was necessary. At the Security Council Meeting the 8th of July 2011, the UN Mission in the Republic of South Sudan was established for the initial period of one year, with the plan to renew if that would be required (S/RES/1996). Initially, the mission authorized up to 7000 military personnel, 900 civilian police personnel and appropriate civilian personnel (UNMISS, n.d.). The missions' first mandate had a strong focus on statebuilding and support of the Government of South Sudan, but this changed significantly over the years.

When violence surged in 2013 after the conflict between the president Kiir and vice-president Machar escalated, the UN decided that the mission needed reinforcements; especially because, although very uncommon, UNMISS had opened its compounds for thousands of civilians seeking refuge. The numbers of deployed personnel were raised and the missions' priority shifted to five topics: the protection of civilians; contributing to the creation of security conditions; supporting of human rights investigating and reporting; providing support to the monitoring and verification mechanism of IGAD (Intergovernmental Authority on Development); and protecting UN personnel and installations (S/2014/158). Furthermore, the mission opened five protection of civilians sites in 2014, which currently hold around 202,154 IDP's (internally displaced persons) (UNMISS, 2018). In 2016, another surge in violence took place: clashes broke out within the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) between followers of former vice-president Machar and president Kiir. In this violence, South Sudanese soldiers attacked the Protection of Civilians site in Malakal and another humanitarian compound; killing, looting and raping on their way. These horrific circumstances urged the UN to take action: again, the size of the mission was increased to 17,000 troops, including a 4000-strong Regional Protection Force, and once more the protection of civilians emphasized (S/RES/2327).

The missions mandate has undergone serious structural changes. Starting as a mission focused on state building and supporting the new government, it shifted its focus to the protection of civilians, which is therefore the first issue of the Missions' mandate. Other items are: the "monitoring and investigating of human rights; creating the conditions conducive to the delivery of humanitarian

assistance; supporting the Implementation of the Agreement; and to actively participate in and support the work of the JMEC (Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission)” (S/RES/2252). To achieve these goals, the mission is authorised use ‘all necessary means’, which makes it a very broad mandate for a UN peace operation. This fits into the trend of UN peace operations moving from ‘classical peacekeeping’, which was focused on positioning itself between the warring parties, to a more active role, where peace in a region can be enforced if necessary, and violence can be used. This type of peace operations is also called ‘Chapter VII-operations’, referring to the seventh chapter of the Charter of the United Nations on which peace enforcement is based.

The mission’s strategy on the protection of civilians is based on a three tier approach, which shows a lot of resemblance to the finalized UN mission in Sudan, UNMIS. This approach is structured as follows:

- Protection through political prevention (monitoring, verification and early warning, as well as conflict prevention through political advocacy and engagement with the government);
- Protection from physical violence (political mitigation and conflict-resolution initiatives supported by the projection of force);
- Establishment of a protective environment through advocacy, legal reform and capacity building of state institutions (Malan & Hunt, 2014).

The most visible effect of this strategy are the five Protection of Civilians (POC) sites. Although initially meant as a temporary measure, they have now developed into fully functioning semi-settlements, including markets and clinics (Murphy, 2018). However, the UN mission is barely able to perform its other tasks next to protection of the UN POC sites, due to a shortage of resources and personnel.

These are not the only problems UNMISS has to deal with. De Coning and Da Costa (2015) have indicated the four key operational challenges to the mission. First of all, the high vacancy rate; although it has improved, the mission has had high vacancy rates from the start; both in civilian and military posts. Second, the South Sudanese logistical environment is extremely challenging. In the rainy season, a lot of places are only accessible by helicopter. This leads directly to the third problem: the lack of boats and airplanes. Many of the logistical issues could have been solved by the use of helicopters, but their numbers are inadequate. The fourth challenge is the restrictive security agenda of the UN Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS). Because of these strict rules, UN personnel is not able to perform their duties in the way and fulfil the mandate.

Together, these four challenges make it extremely difficult for the peacekeepers in South Sudan to successfully protect the civilians in the way they are supposed to.

Mission impact of UNMISS

Measuring the impact of any UN peace operation is very difficult, especially the operation in South Sudan. First of all, the difficulty lies in the fact that there is no way of knowing what would have happened if the UN mission was not in place in South Sudan. Furthermore, it is hard to measure impact while violence still occurs throughout the country. This violence is caused by the many different actors in the country, that seem to be impossible to distinguish, making it extremely difficult to have a clear overview of the situation. As often in conflict, there are no clear sides; there are many different levels of conflict. First, there is the conflict between rebels, who control some parts of the country, and the government. Second, there are groups of militia roaming the country, not connected to any group but leaving a trail of violence. Third, the conflict between ethnic groups, mainly between the two largest ethnicities, Nuer and Dinka, plays an important role. Many outbreaks of violence are accompanied by ethnic cleansing. Fourth, the conflicts between clans - on a regional level- play an important role as well; these add to the complexity and continuation of violence in the region (Appendix 2).

Next to this, the mission struggles with a structural shortage in personnel and a lack of resources, which makes fulfilling the mandate nearly impossible. Because of this inability, the UN mission in South Sudan has received critique from all sides since its start in 2011. The South Sudanese government has criticized the UN mission for being biased and -against the government- and a vehicle for other countries to look after their own interests in South Sudan, especially the neighbouring countries that contribute troops to the mission (Malan & Hunt, 2014). Civil society organisations (CSO's) have criticised UNMISS for being too close to the government of South Sudan, and not strong enough in holding it accountable (De Coning & Da Costa, 2015). From multiple sides, there has been extensive critique that UNMISS fails to protect the citizens of South Sudan; especially after the peaks in violence that showed the UN's limitations.

In 2013, ethnic violence escalated after president Kiir deposed 13 ministers and his prime-minister, Machar; who in turn supported the violent uprising. In this period of violence, the UN mission decided to open its compounds to fleeing civilians; a daring move that quickly occupied all of the UN's attention, as civilians came rushing in. The compounds were not meant or designed for long-term occupation or the numbers of people they currently contain, but the ongoing violence turned the compounds into Protection of Civilians-sites, as the surrounding regions were still too dangerous to return to. However, these compounds are close to central points like cities, and are therefore easy targets for militants (Malan & Hunt, 2014). After a large-scale intervention by Ugandan forces, the crisis was resolved. This period did show the inability of UN forces to intervene when it was necessary. Important to note is the fact that UNMISS officials did not see

the outbreak of violence coming; it took them by surprise. A comparable outbreak of violence happened in 2016. This time, the Malakal UN Protection of Civilians site was attacked by dozens of armed men. Despite multiple calls for help and being just 1,2 kilometres away, the units in the nearby UN base refused to respond. When the Rwandan UN- unit responded 12 hours later, the attackers were repelled quickly (Foltyn, 2016). A report by Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) was very clear: UNMISS failed in its mission to protect civilians and should prevent this from happening in the future (MSF, 2016). This conclusion was shared by the Cammaert report that was published after an official investigation of the UN response to the attack (UN Independent Special Investigation, 2017). This attack was not the first time the UN has failed to protect the citizens of South Sudan, but painfully obvious showed the missions' inability to respond to crises.

These examples of the UN mission in South Sudan clearly show its struggle to successfully fulfil the mandate, as it is unable to sufficiently respond to outbreaks of violence. Next to this, the mission does not have the capacity or resources to provide basic facilities for the Protection of Civilians sites, where there are shortages of basic needs like water, food and electricity. Furthermore, the protection of the POC sites retract the UN resources and peacekeepers from their normal activities, which is to provide protection for the vast majority of the population, that does not live in a Protection of Civilians site.

However, the mission has brought about positive effects as well, although it is hard to distinguish these effects in a war-torn country. In Caruso et al. (2017) have concluded for example that the peacekeepers' presence has had a positive effect on the production of cereal in the country; something of vital importance in a country where food is scarce. Next to this, the mission has a positive impact by training security forces, providing medical aid and reconstructions of roads and buildings throughout the country (UNMISS News, n.d.). And, however limited, the POC-sites have proven to be effective in protecting the part of the community in need for direct protection (Murphy, 2017). The situation of UNMISS has been accurately described as 'too little resources, too much mandate' (Center for Civilians in Conflict, 2015). From various sides, there are differing expectations of what the mission should achieve, but they have one thing in common: the expectations are high, and maybe too high.

Nonviolent Peaceforce in South Sudan (NPSS)

At the invitation of the South Sudanese organisations IPCS (Institute for the Promotion of Civil Society) and SONAD (Sudanese Organisation for Nonviolence and Development), the NGO Nonviolent Peaceforce (NP) went to South Sudan to provide expertise in preventing violence during the 2011 elections and referendum. The operation of Nonviolent Peaceforce developed further from there, forming prevention teams of both local and international peacekeepers who work and live in the communities they protect. The mission currently has 11 offices spread throughout the country (Appendix 5) in districts where the risk of violence is especially high, with over 170 staff deployed (Nonviolent Peaceforce South Sudan, 2014).

The organisation works on three core principles: protection, prevention and peacebuilding. The number one priority is the protection of civilians from violence. The South Sudanese government is often unable to do so, and the UN mission lacks the manpower to protect all citizens. NP works in the local communities to establish safety and create space for dialogue. This can be done by training civilians in nonviolent tactics, but sometimes also armed and police personnel. The organization works closely with the other actors in the area: local authorities, police, government, NGO's and other organizations. Because NP's knowledge of the area comes directly from the local community, they are able to make a clear assessment of a region and can respond to conflicts appropriately. This knowledge is also vital for the second principle, prevention. By having a clear view of a situation, Nonviolent Peaceforce is able to prevent violence, as its close connection to the local community makes it possible to foresee an escalation of violence at an early stage. By intervening early, for example by talking to community leaders, violence can be prevented. Thirdly, the organisation is active in peacebuilding in the communities. By building relationships, training protection teams and facilitating dialogue between local authorities, international organisations and community leaders (NP, 2015). This creates stronger bonds between these actors, and makes a more effective development possible.

It is important to give an overview of what these principles are in practice, in order to get a realistic perspective on the work of Nonviolent Peaceforce. As stated before, the organisation deploys activities from the four main categories of UCP methods: relationship building, proactive engagement, monitoring and capacity development. Every category will be discussed, analysing NP's activities in that category.

Relationship building

As already stated, this is the core of NP's methodology: building trust and relationships; something that becomes very clear in both literature on UCP, but also the interviews with Rufus Moiseemah and Mel Duncan (Appendix 1 & 2). Good relationships are in particular important in for example

addressing the youth (Appendix 2), but also in dealing with local authorities and other actors. Next to this, Nonviolent Peaceforce organises community security meetings, in order to facilitate dialogue between protection actors and the community. As contact between these parties (that include the government, the military, UN peacekeepers and NGO's) is often limited, the meetings provide the opportunity for civilians to share information of the region, and express concerns. On the other hand, it gives protection actors the possibility to assess the security situation of an area and raise awareness to specific issues (NPSS, 2015) (Furnari, Oldenhuis, Julian, 2015).

Capacity development

In all the organisations' posts in South Sudan, NP trains teams civilians in unarmed peacekeeping tactics. For example, women protection teams are formed that train women how to promote peace in their own communities, and who provide accompaniment in areas where the risk of (sexual) violence is high. Other examples are trainings that are given by Rufus' team in Sobat, like an armed youth training program, GBV-training and EWER training (Appendix 2).

Monitoring

The Early Response Early Warning system is important in NP's work in monitoring the security situation. By setting up a phone tree, the community is warned early on if there is a threat; for example if a group of militia is entering the area (Appendix 1). This gives the NP team the ability to react, for example by going to areas where the risk of attacks or crimes is higher; and by being present, this can be prevented.

Proactive engagement

The latter example is one forms of proactive engagement, namely protective presence. Just the presence of an international body can be enough to prevent violence from happening. Other ways to do so is by intensive patrolling in areas vulnerable to attacks, and facilitating safe access or accompaniment of civilians to basic services and humanitarian aid.

Although Unarmed Civilian Peacekeeping has proven to be successful in South Sudan, it has its limitations. When large-scale attacks take place, the unarmed peacekeepers cannot immediately prevent this; an armed response would be necessary. Also, it takes time for a UCP mission in a region to be fully 'operational': as the concept is based on building relationships. A fast deployment therefore does not mean a fast result. NP's mission in South Sudan started with one team, slowly developing from that point to the current position of 11 offices and a Mobile Response Team since its first deployment in 2011. This leads up to the next limitation: the relatively small scale of the operation. Although Nonviolent Peaceforce is second to the UN's operation, it is still limited in its resources and staff, just like UNMISS. Another limitation of the UN mission is also shared: South Sudan's challenging logistical environment.

Mission impact of NPSS

Just like UNMISS' mission impact, it is difficult to measure the impact Nonviolent Peaceforce has in South Sudan. The organisation works in communities, training civilians in the use of nonviolent tactics in order to stabilise the situation. Next to this, NP facilitates dialogue between the community and protection actors in the area, to create a better understanding of security issues by all parties in the dialogue. So far, there have been no large-scale qualitative studies into the effectiveness and results of this operation, which is understandable. As the study of Nonviolent Peaceforce in Sri Lanka has shown, it takes a long time for UCP to influence a community in the long term (Schweitzer, 2012). As the work of NP in South Sudan is still quite recent, it is difficult to assess to what extent the operation has been successful. However, the direct impact of the mission can be measured, by the numbers of civilians that are extracted from conflicts, the settling of local conflicts; whether it is about ethnicity or cattle and the accompaniment of vulnerable civilians (NPSS, 2015).

NP documentation gives numerous examples of their practices and its effects. NP's strength lies in its approach to peacekeeping. Living and working in the community gives the unarmed civilian peacekeepers the ability to analyse changing situations and risks, using their knowledge of the community. Because of this, NP is sometimes able to prevent violence from happening or prevent further escalation. An example of this is NP's Early Warning, Early Response (EWER) training, where the local community is trained to sound an alarm as soon as local cattle herders were going to start a major fight. The NP team, formed out of local and an international peacekeeper, went to the camp where the fighting would take place, and could prevent conflict from happening, by being present and facilitating dialogue (Birkeland, 2016).

The tactics used and thought by NP have the possibility to change the way conflict is dealt with in a durable way. Armed peacekeepers mostly are present to 'keep the peace' and deal with immediate threats. This type of intervention is sometimes necessary, but there is a high risk that a country or region will relapse into violence, as soon as the peacekeepers have left the area. Nonviolent Peaceforce trains the local community and builds relations between the different actors, thus creating a safer space for dialogue. Furnari, Julian and Oldenhuis (2015) argue in their article 'Securing space for local peacebuilding' that unarmed civilian peacekeeping can have a bridging function between peacebuilding, peacemaking and peacekeeping, as is shown in the work of NP in South Sudan:

"It also shows that even though there may be an overarching conflict that affects all of South Sudan, states, counties and communities in South Sudan are differently affected by this conflict and have their own local conflicts. UCP focuses on the primacy of local actors and their needs, and it is sufficiently flexible to move between the different stages of the peace process and address the particular needs of communities." This approach makes Nonviolent Peaceforce successfully fulfil its mandate, within the limits of the resources and scale of the operation.

II. Comparing peacekeeping efforts in South Sudan

Comparing the UN and the NP missions is difficult, as the differences between the types of missions are vast in both approach and scale. In this section, the differences between both missions will be analysed and discussed, in order to answer the article's main question. Three issues will be addressed in this discussion where UCP has a possible advantage: the missions' approach, the methods used and lastly, the durability of its approach.

First of all, the missions' approach. This entails both the missions' origin and development, and the approach towards peacekeeping in general. Typically for a UN mission, UNMISS started after research by the Secretariat and approval of the Security Council. The resolution that established UNMISS, stated that the situation in South Sudan had become a substantial threat to the international and regional community, and intervention therefore was needed (S/RES/1996). This clearly shows the UN's approach of a peacekeeping mission: the Secretariat and the councils determine what is a threat to the international order and act upon this; a top-down approach. This entails a high risk of being out of touch with the actual needs of the citizens in the country the intervention takes place. For Nonviolent Peaceforce, it is the other way round: the organisation only deploys to a country after a request by a local organisation, as was the case in South Sudan. This also goes for the approach to peacekeeping, once deployed. With relationship and trust building at its core, UCP teams base their work on the needs of the local community, which makes them better able to shape and adjust their mission to what is needed.

The second difference between the two approaches that is important to note, is the used methods. As the ultimate goal, both missions' aim to create a lasting peace in the young country of South Sudan. This translates into the protection of civilians as the first priority of both NP and the UN - but with strongly differing methods - and both pay specific attention to vulnerable groups such as women and children. On the ground-level, this resemblance has a different meaning. The UN and the NP mission perform patrols in the region they are working, respectively armed patrols by soldiers and unarmed patrols by civilians. Other means of protecting civilians are quite different at the two organisations, as NPs only priority is protection, and the UN has multiple priorities. For example, Nonviolent Peaceforce uses the practice of accompaniment and training in nonviolence; whereas the United Nations mission is concerned with the development of infrastructure and distributing food. NP's dedication to protection makes it possible to completely focus on this issue, spending all its attention and resources to it. For the UN, this is not the case; which makes it difficult address all its activities in a sufficient manner; especially regarding the mission's lack of resources and personnel.

The third difference is the durability of the two approaches. The two methods, fundamentally different in their core, also have different effect in durability. The UN method of peacekeeping is focused on a sudden violent conflict that should be solved fast. After the initial restoration of the peace, the armed part of the mission will be run down, and civil society organisations will gradually take over the peacekeeping and -making activities (United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, 2008). This makes the deployment of armed personnel a provisional matter; all the more apparent by the six-month deployment circulation most army units work with. The frequently changing units and commanders, combined with the temporary character of the UN deployment makes it extremely difficult to implement a consistent, long-term strategy to build a durable peace.

In this respect, the NP mission has a very different approach. Firstly, the organisation leaves when it assesses the situation stable enough to leave, and its fieldworkers are deployed for longer periods of time. This enables them to build relationships, which of course takes time. This approach is the most important difference in these peacebuilding efforts: by focusing on relationships between NP fieldworkers and the local community, but also between local actors themselves, the organisation strives to build a durable peace (Furnari et al., 2016). This is enforced by the training of civilians in unarmed protection strategies, so that they can use these even when there is no active presence of Nonviolent Peaceforce in the region. However, it is not certain whether these trainings will have this effect; as the dynamics of a conflict are always changing and the presence of an international body in the form of Nonviolent Peaceforce is an important factor in the success of unarmed civilian peacekeeping. The question remains whether the unarmed tactics will be as effective when the NP presence is absent.

Conclusion

This thesis has studied how the practice of Unarmed Civilian Peacekeeping (UCP) can be more effective than Armed Military Peacekeeping (AMP), using the case of the United Nations Mission in South Sudan and the Nonviolent Peaceforce mission in South Sudan. Using both secondary literature and primary literature from South Sudan, a few conclusions can be drawn of in which cases UCP has an advantage over AMP.

The vast array of peacekeeping literature has shown that the concept of peacekeeping is very complex and entails more than a military or civilian intervention to restore the peace in a certain region. Furthermore, current UN peace operations are seriously affected by a lack of resources, personnel, conflicting interests between the UN and supporting countries, and the UN's complex bureaucratic culture. However, they are capable of making a difference in a crisis, although it is often not enough to obtain a durable peace. Unarmed civilian peacekeeping adds a new dimension to the spectrum of peacekeeping, showing how civilians can effectively do the job that is normally performed by the military. Furthermore, it gives a better understanding of how conflicts work and how this understanding can be successfully applied to the protection of civilians.

There are three areas within peacekeeping where UCP has an advantage over AMP: in its approach to peacekeeping, the methods used and the durability of its approach.

First, the approach to peacekeeping. As relationship and trust building are at the core of all NP's activities, it has a very close connection with the local community. This makes it possible to adjust their peacekeeping activities to the needs of this community; a fundamental advantage over UNMISS, which lacks this connection. Second, the methods used. By strengthening a community's through training and facilitating dialogue, engaging proactively by patrols and presence and monitoring the security situation closely, the organisation is able to increase safety and security in a region, and preventing violence. Third, the durability of its approach. By training and empowering the community, civilians can pass the gained knowledge on, and become responsible for peace and security in their community.

In these three fields, UCP has a strong advantage over AMP. The practice of UCP therefore important policy implications for UN (military) peacekeeping. First of all, there should be a stronger focus on providing security and safety. By focusing on this and leaving leaving humanitarian tasks as much to the INGOs and government as possible, UN peacekeepers can use their resources and personnel on protecting civilians; creating a safer situation for humanitarian work as well. Second, AMP should focus more on building relationships with the local community. This attribute, essential in unarmed peacekeeping, is an important driver of success of the

concept. Third, there should be more focus on the durability of peace by strengthening the local community. Peacekeepers will eventually leave, leaving it to the government and its citizens to keep the peace.

In showing the effectiveness of UCP in this case study, this thesis strives to contribute to the growing academic literature on UCP. As it is a relatively new concept, the literature and its reputation are limited. Furthermore, practitioners of UCP have to fight the presumption that armed conflict can be solely solved by an armed response. It is important for both researchers and fieldworkers to show and prove the possibilities and effectiveness of UCP, in order to further develop this concept.

The unarmed approach of peacekeeping can truly contribute to the complex issue of peacekeeping and, more important: it has the potential to save many civilian lives. In a world full of conflict and violence, an unarmed answer to violence is sorely needed.

Appendices

Appendix 1: Interview with Mel Duncan

Appendix 2: Interview with Rufus Moiseemah

Appendix 3: Map of South Sudan

Appendix 4: Map of UNMISS

Appendix 5: Map of Nonviolent Peaceforce in South Sudan

Appendix 1

Interview Mel Duncan, Founder of Nonviolent Peaceforce

June 4, 2018

After a short introduction and network check, the interview started.

Could you tell me a bit more about your job at Nonviolent Peaceforce?

Currently, I am NP's director for advocacy and outreach, and working on teaching the concept of UCP at the UN, and to get into policies, reports and resolutions. Soon, I will start another project, which is to lead to a UCP 'good practices process'. As of now, there are 41 organisations using some type of UCP, but they don't talk to each other, while IDP problems grow and grow, as there are more and more IDP's. We have to look at ways that it is scalable, of civilians protecting civilians. This scalable aspect is important. We're gathering practitioners of UCP at the moment, to come together for 2,5 days to discuss UCP.

What are the different techniques of UCP?

UCP works on the concept of capacity recognition, instead of capacity building. We help the local community to empower itself, instead of viewing the community as a blank slate. Every site uses a different combination of methods, which is based on ongoing analysis. The methods used and the proportion of methods are always different.

How is the balance between UCP and AMP in the field?

There is of course a large unbalance between AMP and UCP. There are 17000 armed military peacekeepers, and 170 unarmed civilian peacekeepers. This is because the UN privilege a military response. They have the tendency to securitize problems and militarize solutions. The UN need to be more creative, but their mindset is a military response, they are addicted to a military response. Next, the response of the UN came when violence came to Juba and threatened Westerners. Then, in August 2016, the Regional Protection Force was deployed.

In the field, there is an unbalance. Take Bentiu as an example: the largest POC site. There are 113.000 people living there. Many women of the POC were routinely raped while collecting firewood. NP started to do firewood patrols with 3 unarmed protectors accompanying the women. The attacks stopped. But the UN, with all its personnel, won't go further than 2 km outside the camp.

How NP and the UN work together:

There are good and bad examples. A good one is from Junglei. In Kantako, there were 17 reports of rape per month. We set up a phone tree – a list of people who contact others if something happens by phone, or using a cell tower nearby. Most of the rapes took place at the community garden, firewood gathering or water point. When the phone tree was activated, the UCP team would go there. Also, they set up community patrols. They convinced the Blue helmets to drive slowly through the village, and talk to people. As a result, the rapes stopped. This type of community engagement could happen a lot more.

A remark: I am not against the UN; it is better to have the UN peacekeepers than not. They have tremendous flaws, but it's the only one we got. A bad example of NP and the UN in the field is from Bentiu, a year ago in February. An NP team saw Blue Helmets push a 12 year old boy in armoured personnel carrier, because he would have thrown a rock. The boy was hit in the head twice, but was let go when the NP team arrived. Whether or not the boy threw the rock: that is not the way to create a more peaceful situation. The NP teams often have a better relation with UNPOL, they have a different mentality than military.

How do you measure impact of missions?

This is done by external reviews, which are often qualitative analysis. We also try to get quantitative analysis, as this shows significant differences. Dr. Julian has done a study of 10 different organisations, comparing UCP practices. NP has baselines on all projects now, to better measure impact. Maybe quantitative analysis is fake holy grail in this, maybe. There are so many variables that change all of the time. However, we do feel the need to study what works and what doesn't.

Generalizing UCP – how could this be done on a larger scale?

We would need a systems approach. Some practices work in multiple settings. There are multiple approaches, that have to be adapted to current conditions. This is replicable to the extent that people can use these methods. You start with a community's situation, apply it to a situation to see what works.

Partisanship is difficult in an asymmetrical situation, for example in Palestine and the conflict at Standing Rock. But it is necessary in South Sudan. UNMISS is seen as partisan, but is not, or tries not to be. It was partisan at first, because it had statebuilding in its mandate. A certain distance to UNMISS has to be maintained, but we still do joined activities.

It is difficult for us to live in a POC area. There, we live in a humanitarian hub, walled and wired off from rest of the POC; making it difficult for us to connect to the citizens.

When scaling up, we would have to look at UNPOL, and working with community liaison offices, to do for example firewood patrols. We would also have to look at more remote, static placement and how to authentically place yourself there.

Maybe we could train UN personnel in community engagement. As of now, 50 per cent of the personnel protects the POC's, 20/30 per cent protects their own compound and just 20/30 per cent can protect the rest of society. That balance needs to change. The fact that soldiers cycle on 6 month basis makes that a lot more difficult.

The UN needs to move away from militarised protection and start at community engagement. They also should scale up HR officers and liaison people, we need more of them.

Appendix 2

Interview Rufus, NP Team Leader South Sudan

June 7, 2018

Rufus' role in South Sudan

Rufus is a team leader for NP in South Sudan. His role is leading a team of 3 internationals, 11/12 South Sudanese citizens, implementing a project in the 4 counties of Sobot state. Rebel controlled area. His mission is to cover the 4 counties, providing general protection for civilians.

Techniques / tactics used in Sobot

- Analysis: The team goes in every village, gathers information of those areas, including the level of health, water, medical situation, food, animal health, women issues, child protection and the level of conflict in the area. They gather data, analyse it and forward this info to other humanitarian agencies. They try to gather as many info as possible.

- Training: the team gives many different trainings in the area. These are: gender based violence training, child protection training, early warning/ response training, UCP training, which are listed here.

Types of training

Training for armed youth

They have a unique training program for armed youth; they are vulnerable, angry and dangerous at the same time, and for a legitimate reason: self-defence. Sometimes, government forces come in and kill them. However, they are under 18. NP has a youth engagement program, which teaches about violence, anger, aggression, conflict and anger management.

When engaging the youth, it is very sensitive. By doing this, you touch their source of power. It takes a long time and needs relationship building, which is very important. You can gain their trust by living with them for a long time. NP teaches them the responsible way to use their weapons; for example 'don't shoot randomly'. If you 'get' the youth, you reduce violence. The team uses sport as an entry point: the kids like it, so the team uses it to carry on awareness. NP takes the lead in this and unites other humanitarian organisations.

Gender Based Violence- prevention and response.

The community is dominated by men. Early child marriages are an issue, for example. Women don't go to school, they see it as not relevant for women. NP trains women what GBV is, what different forms there are. Teach civilians why it is a woman should not do this or this, explain how

society is made by men, and its advantages and disadvantages. Teach what can women bring to community, and for example that it can be rape if your wife doesn't consent.

Child protection training

This training explains who is a child, what their rights are, why they are their rights, and discusses abuses and different types of abuse. Furthermore, it explains what the consequences of abuse, or neglect of children are, how it affects the children and how children get into armed conflict, when they are not supposed to.

Early Warning Early Response training.

This training discusses different kinds of threats that affect the community. For example, they discuss what the civilians can do to stay safe if the government comes. Mapping of route: where to run. They also teach to prepare their children what to do when there is an attack: Which house do they go to when they flee? A practical use is the quick-run bag. This is a bag that has everything in it: rice, oil, salt, sheet, mosquito net, and is always at the ready. The NP team itself has it as well: with also medication, travel documents, a flashlight, matches and a mosquito net.

UCP training.

This training discusses what is violence, what is a conflict and what the different options / levels of conflict are.

Other activities:

- Assessment: NP mobilises all other humanitarian agencies in a joint rapid need assessment. Normally UNOCHA coordinates this, but that doesn't have representatives in Sobat. NP sends their reports to UN.
- Monitoring of security: NP coordinates in issues of security concern between agencies and the local community or authorities. The community tells NP threats or developments, which NP reports to other agencies.
- Organise women's groups; NP trains women protecting teams that engage in community protection.
- Conflict dialogue and mitigation, a very sensitive topic.

There are different levels of conflict in Sobat:

1. conflict with government.
- 2: some armed groups move everywhere, enemy of everyone, take children, kidnap people, target women and children when getting firewood.
- 3: conflict between different ethnic groups in state.

4: conflicts between clans. If youth come to other clan and does a crime, the clan will response with violence, reprisals etc.

- Set up an early warning system. This alarms as soon as possible and contacts authorities.

- Mediation: NP provides space. Advocates quickly to reduce crime. When an escalation between two clans is about to happen, sometimes authorities call NP, because they don't trust the other clan. In these cases, NP mediates. Again: trust and relationships are vital in this. Through NP's mediation, the clans reach an agreement.

What are the main difficulties in your work you come across?

All tasks are difficult, of course. Two main points of difficulty.

1: Building community relationships and trust. The work is very unique and different from other organisations: NP gives no material help, so training seems ridiculous then. It takes a lot of effort to get people to cooperate.

2: logistics are difficult, the region is far away and rebel controlled. Because of this, the government blocks logistics. The team lives in tents, which makes it difficult for the team, physically and emotionally. The helicopter comes once a week, so you have to wait a week if you miss it. There is no hospital, just a medical post. But: it is worth it, it makes you stronger.

These points are at the same time the unique selling points of NP.

First: you have to build a strong community relationship.

Second: You have to live side by side with the people *over time*. You have to be strong physically and mentally to endure the hardship. There is no normal.

Third: you have to live according to your code of conduct.

The UN is not in Sobat, but come sometimes on patrol. The authorities don't trust the UN, say it is biased; which makes it uncomfortable for the UN to be there. Sometimes when the UN wants to enter the area, for example with IDPs who want to return to the area, authorities refuse because they don't trust them. NP mediates here as well between authorities and the UN, or the UN goes through NP to come there. This works because of NP's relationship with the community. The UN is now aware of that it works.

How do you measure the impact of the mission?

That is not difficult, we have made a good impact. In Sobat, 2 years ago there were 4/5 agencies. The region was too remote, too demanding, too much harassment and armed youth, as well as constant revenge killing.


NP started building relationships with commanders, authorities, and make organisations come to Sobat. They needed support of community, that started to understand the issues NP advocated for. Then, they could advocate at other agencies. NP needed full support, otherwise it wouldn't work. Authorities discussed it at their own internal meetings, and agencies started to come there. Harassment dropped, agencies were respected. Now there are 14 agencies in Sobat and more are coming.

Generalizing UCP – how to do this on a larger scale?

Rufus would like to see that; UCP can break the ice. It is dangerous work, risky, but brings sustainable peace to a community. It starts at root causes of a conflict, so makes the solution sustainable. Also, you can scare people with guns, as there is a huge resentment and revenge against that. When you live with the civilians, you understand their problems. This should be integrated in UN peacekeeping program. You protect civilians, but they protect you as well. You understand what they need. You can't know from an office, you have to know it from them.

Appendix 3

Map of South Sudan (UNOCHA)




Appendix 4

Map of UNMISS

MAP 2

UNMISS in South Sudan



SOURCE: Heritage Foundation research.

BG3202 heritage.org

Appendix 5

Map of Nonviolent Peaceforce South Sudan



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