International Institute of Social Studies

Dealing with new dynamics of post-war violence: The Role of United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) during July 2016 crisis

A Research Paper presented by:

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(Peru)

in partial fulfilment of the requirements for obtaining the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS IN DEVELOPMENT STUDIES

Major:

Human Rights, Gender, and Conflict Studies: Social Justice

(SJP)

Specialization:

Conflict and Peace Studies

(CPS)

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December 2019

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List of Acronyms

ARCSS	Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan
AU	African Union
CPA	Comprehensive Peace Agreement
GA	General Assembly
PKOs/PKO	Peacekeeping operations/Peacekeeping operation
PoC	Protection of civilians
R-ARCSS	Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan
SC	Security Council
SG	Secretary General
SPLM/A	Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army
SPLM/A-IO	Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army in Opposition
SRSG	Special Representative of the Secretary-General
SS	South Sudan
UN	United Nations
UN Charter	The Charter of United Nations
UNMISS	United Nations Mission in South Sudan

Abstract

During the last years peacekeeping operations have largely increased, especially in Africa. They are becoming complex operations due to a numbers of factors such institution building prejudges state-building; cultural gaps; bureaucracy; global economy crisis; and appearance of new dynamics of violent conflicts. Currently, most peacekeeping operations are multidimensional, which means that their tasks is not only focus on the maintenance of peace and security, but also in protecting civilians; assisting in the political process; protecting and promoting human rights; and assisting in restoring the rule of law; therefore, it includes components of peacebuilding and peacekeeping. In a multidimensional operation both peace operations activities are interrelated and this nexus also created conflict between each other. UNMISS is a multidimensional peacekeeping operation that carry out peacekeeping and peacebuilding activities in a fragile country and with a history of violence.

This study seeks to explore, analysing a violent conflict during July 2016, how UNMISS contribute to peacekeeping and peacebuilding in the complex context of post-war violence in South Sudan by analysing a violent conflict, by looking from three different perspectives: its mandate implementation; the situation in the host country and the actual resources and capabilities. The methodology used in this study is basically qualitative approach in-depth through primary and secondary data. A key finding of this research is that the peculiarities and circumstances (including contextual and operational factors), in which UNMISS operates, makes it difficult to fulfill its tasks and; therefore, it affects the achievement of its short -term and long-term goals peacebuilding in South Sudan.

Relevance to Development Studies

Peacekeeping is the most significant form of intervention of UN. It is one of the tools that UN uses to assist countries in their transition to conflict from peace. The two important peace operations activities such peacebuilding and peacekeeping has contributed to maintain international peace and security but also has contributed to build sustainable peace, which is the key to achieve positive peace and development.

Keywords

South Sudan, United Nations, violence, civil war, peacekeeping, peacebuilding.

Chapter 1
Introduction

United Nations (UN) uses a number of interventions such as conflict prevention and mediation, peacemaking, peace-enforcement, peacebuilding and peacekeeping to maintain international peace and security throughout the world. One of the most significant form of such interventions is peacekeeping, this is considered the most visible activity and the most important contribution "to maintain international peace and security" (UN 1945: art.1). Peacekeeping is primarily an intervention conducted by UN and has proven to be the most effective tool of the UN to assist countries in their difficult transitions from conflict to peace. In the words of Bellamy and Williams:

> "peace operations are therefore one general type of activity that can be used to prevent, limit and manage violent conflict as well as rebuild in its aftermath. Other part of the toolkit include conflict prevention, peacemaking and peacebuilding, which involve the use of civilians, agencies and NGOs in the reconstruction of polities, economies and societies (Bellamy and Williams 2010: 18).

The United Nations Charter (UN Charter) does not provide a definition of peacekeeping. The word 'peacekeeping' is not in the UN Charter, however, this intervention is considered to be covered under Chapter VI: Pacific Settlement Disputes; that is the reason, why 'peacekeeping' has been defined by various scholars, practitioners and organizations. The original mandate of traditional Peacekeeping Operations (PKOs), which is the core of the peacekeeping, is defined by Paul Diehl as follows:

> "Peacekeeping is…the imposition of neutral and lightly armed interposition forces following a cessation of armed hostilities, and with the permission of the state on whose territory these forces are deployed, in order to discourage a renewal of military conflict and promote an environment under which the underlying dispute can be resolved" (as quoted in Bellamy and Williams 2010: 16).

This definition outlines the three founding principles of traditional peacekeeping: impartiality, the non-use of force (except in self-defense) and the consent of parties (Hoeffler 2014). During early times, the main aim of peacekeeping was "conflict control and the insulation of regional conflicts" (Koops et al. 2015: 2), however, over time those principles and aims have evolved. In relation to consent, UN peacekeepers require permission of the host government to deploy, however, they do not always require consent from insurgents and rebel militias. With respect to impartiality, initially UN peacekeepers were required to remain neutral, nonetheless, since the 1990s, they are expected to act as impartial referees in order to ensure that conflict parties respect the rules of the peace process and the norms established in the UN Charter and the laws of the armed conflict. Finally, in relation to the use of force, it goes from being authorized the use of force only in self-defense to use force in defense of the mission mandate (Koops et al. 2015: 2-3).

Although, PKOs were authorized exclusively by the UN Security Council (SC) under Charters VI: Pacific Settlement of Disputes and VII: Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace and Acts of Aggression, of the UN Charter, this had not always been the case. The General Assembly (GA) has also taken a leading role in the creation of PKOs. Article 10 of the UN Charter points out that the GA may discuss any questions or any matters within the scope of the Charter and Article 11 states that the GA may consider the general principles of co-operation in the maintenance of international peace and security, and it may make recommendations to any Member State or to the SC. In addition to that,

Article 14 of the UN Charter refers to the role of the GA in relation to international peace and security, as follows:

> "the General Assembly may recommend measures for the peaceful adjustment of any situation, regardless of origin, which it deems likely to impair the general welfare or friendly relations among nations, including situations resulting from a violation of the provisions of the present Charter setting forth the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations".

Likewise, according to Article 99 of the UN Charter, the Secretary General (SG) may bring to the attention of the SC any matter that may threaten the maintenance of international peace and security, which means that the SG is not able to establish a peacekeeping operation (PKO) of a military nature unless authorized to do so by the SC, "even when the force's function is limited to observation" (Katayanagi 2002: 32). In the same way, it is important to highlight that Chapter VIII: Regional Arrangements of the UN Charter also opens the possibility to regional arrangements or agencies to establish a PKO for dealing with issues relating to the maintenance of peace and security consistent with the purposes and principles of the UN (Katayanagi 2002: 33).

Since 1948, UN has undertaken 71 peacekeeping operations (PKOs). In the last decades, the UN has deployed a large number of PKOs around the world. Next, figure 1 presents the distribution of the currently 14 United Peacekeeping operations around the world.

Map 1: Peacekeeping operations in the world

Source: United Nations Peacekeeping website: https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/pk_factsheet_07_19_eng_1.pdf

There are currently 14 PKOs (Haiti, Mali, Golan, Abyei, India and Pakistan, Western Sahara, D.R of the Congo, Cyprus, Kosovo, Middle East, Central African Republic, Darfur, Lebanon and South Sudan) deployed in four continents. As of 31 July 2019, 121 countries contribute with uniformed personnel and 99,663 personnel are serving in 14 PKOs. 85,397 uniformed personnel; 4,539 international civilian personnel, as of May 2018; 8,393 local civilian personnel, as of 31 May 2018; and 1,334 UN volunteers. 3,868 fatalities have occurred in all peace operations since 1948 (UNPKO, 2019).

Peacekeeping has unique strengths and has the ability to deploy and sustain troops, police and civilian peacekeepers. It is important to highlight, that the term 'peacekeeping' is not only related to the use of armed military personnel, it can include unarmed civilians (Julian and Gasser 2019: 45). Peacekeeping is about helping people and rebuild their lives, is about empowering war-torn countries and to build a lasting peace. PKOs are actively engaged in transforming conflict and bring durable peace (Hoeffler 2014). Some PKOs like in El Salvador, Sierra Leona and Mozambique were regarded as a success while others such as Rwanda and Somalia were regarded as a failure. In relation to the factors for success and failure, Jair Van der Lijn described nine factors for success and failure of PKOs: 1) the willing of the parties to cooperate; 2) the ability to provide security to the parties; 3) attention for the causes of the conflict; 4) cooperation from outside actors and parties; 5) a PKO's deployment in a timely and right time; 6) a PKO with competent personnel, under competent leadership and clear command; 7) a PKO which is part of a long term approach; 8) policy tools duly coordinated; and 9) a PKO which provides ownership (Van der Lijn 2010: 30-32). Those factors according to the author described the recent developments in relation to durable and peace process.

Since its creation, three generations of PKOs have been operated. PKOs have been classified by researchers in three or four generations, however, researchers are not all agree on the same fourfold classification. This particular research is built on the first three generations of PKOs as highlighted by Katayanagi. In the first-generation, missions were lightly armed and military observation were unarmed. Its mandate was focused on observation, interposition and supervision. Steven R. Ratner, defines first-generation peacekeeping as follows, "First generation operations represent those where a political organ of the UN deploys a military force between two or more armies, with their consent, pending, and in the absence of, a political settlement" (as quoted in Katayanagi, 2002: 43). According to Katayanagi, the concept of peacekeeping during the first-generation contains five principles: 1) consent of the parties; 2) non-use of force except in self-defence; 3) voluntary contributions of contingents; 4) impartiality and non-intervention; and 5) day to day control of peace-keeping operations by the Secretary General (2002: 43-44). Even though principles 1, 2 and 4 have been essential principles, it does not mean that all the principles are satisfied for every case of peacekeeping (Katayanagi 2002: 44).

In the second-generation, missions were tasked with increasingly complex mandates in internal struggles and civil wars; this period expanded the mandate of PKOs from peacekeeping to peacebuilding. Likewise, some missions were deployed under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, which authorizes the use of force against warring parties and without consent (Hoeffler 2014). Ratner, defines second-generation peacekeeping from a political view point, "Second-generation operations, or "the new peace-keeping," are best defined as UN operations, authorized by political organs or the Secretary-General, responsible for overseeing or executing the political solution of an interstate or internal conflict, with the consent of the parties" (as quoted in Katayanagi 2002: 45). According to Ratner, this generation of peacekeeping has the following characteristics: 1) it aims to assist to a state in executing an agreement to a conflict; 2) it has a non-military mandate and composition; 3) it has complex agendas; 4) it is related not only to interstate conflicts but also to intrastate conflicts; 4) it involves different types of actors; and 5) the mandate may be adjusted to the political situation on the ground (Ratner 1995: 22-24).

Finally, the third-generation is what has been called multidimensional peacekeeping and peace support operations. In this generation, researchers make it difficult to draw a clear line between peacekeeping and enforcement action, due to particular factors: 1) peacekeeping is not rely on explicit provisions on the UN Charter to define it; 2) due to the absence of the agreements in relation to article 43 of the UN Charter, the SC has employed an alternative

procedure that authorize states voluntarily to carry out enforcement operations; 3) UN resolutions tend not to identify any specific article in which they are based; and 4) it is common for the mandate of a peacekeeping mission to be expanded according to the particular situation (Katayanagi 2002: 60). In this regard, Katayanagi argued that third-generation peacekeeping identifies itself with peace-enforcement. She claimed that "If we consider that peace-enforcement is one category of peacekeeping, then one of the main traditional principles, limitation of the use of force to self-defence is not valid anymore." (Katayanagi 2002: 60).

Additionally, some scholars have emphasized that peacekeeping and peace-enforcement should be distinguished. For instance, Rossalyn Higgins states that "Enforcement should remain clearly differentiated from peacekeeping. Peacekeeping mandate should not contain an enforcement function. To speak of the need for more "muscular peacekeeping" simply evidences that the wrong mandate has been chosen ab initio." (as quoted in Katayanagi 2002: 61). Likewise, Malanczuk asserts that "'Mixed peace-keeping' trying to incorporate enforcement elements confuses the different legal basis and functions of enforcement action, on the one hand, and peacekeeping, on the other. The two forms of UN action should remain clearly differentiated" (quoted in Katayanagi 2002: 61).

Currently, most UN missions are multidimensional. According to UN:

"Today's multidimensional peacekeeping operations are called upon not only to maintain peace and security, but also to facilitate the political process, protect civilians, assist in the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of former combatants, support the organizations of elections, protect and promote humans rights and assist in restoring the rule of law" (UNPKO: no page).

There are several scholars and studies that have analyzed the success and failure of PKOs. The main question raised on those studies is whether peacekeeping operations contribute to durable peace, and their factors for success and failures (Van der Lijn 2010). However, due to the particular characteristics of the conflict and situation in each mission, some PKOs failure in its response to manage a conflict, and as a result this failure has an impact in its goals and more important in its duty to protect civilians from atrocities that resulted in a large number of fatalities, as the 2005 UN Responsibility to Protect doctrine demands. PKOs in Rwanda and Somalia are cases in point. In this research, I will focus in particular on the PKO in South Sudan, the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS), which in my view falls under the third generation PKOs literature, in order to attempt to identify potential new dynamics in upcoming analysis that might be helpful to address, considering UNMISS as a complex PKO that operates in an environment full of challenges and with a history of violence, where the conflict is constant and dynamic.

Chapter 2 Contextualizing the research problem

This chapter contextualizes the research problem. First, the statement of the research problem will be presented; second, the research question and two sub-questions will be proposed; third, the justification, relevance and positionality will be explained; fourth, the methodologies and methods will be described and lastly, the scope and limitation will be clarified.

2.1   Statement of the research problem

PKOs are increasingly becoming complex operations due to a number of challenges such as institution building prejudges state-building of the host government; different approaches saddling between stability *vs.* rule of law; cultural gaps between the mission and the context of operations, and bureaucracy; global economic crisis, which has led to cut down on funding of the PKOs; lack of knowledge of the particular characteristics of the conflict (historical and cultural factors); new dynamics of violent conflicts that usually resist termination and sporadic outburst of violent episodes; and due to the nature of the violent conflicts and their dynamics that are fast changing and limit their mandate.

UNMISS has demonstrated its weakness to address violent crisis events. On this issue, the Office of Internal Oversight Services notes that UNMISS has the lowest rate of immediate response to threats to civilians and has been noted as having a pattern of 'non-intervention' (UN 2014: paras 19 and 70). Since its independence many short-term violent crisis events have erupted in South Sudan. In December 2013 a large-scale violence erupted in the midst of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) all which happened in the presence of UNMISS. Likewise, in July 2016 another large-scale violence erupted in South Sudan being in the midst of the Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (ARCSS). This latter episode of violence, is considered the second major violent conflict erupted after its independence mainly due to the loss of casualties and violations against civilians and humanitarian aid workers; therefore, it is important to understand the role the mission played and how they responded more in detail taking into consideration the diversity of factors and the particular characteristics of UNMISS. This is particularly relevant, considering probable events that may occur in the future and also because it is expected that the leader of the SPLM/A-IO, Riek Machar will come back to South Sudan in order to form the transitional power sharing government, as stated in the Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (R-ARCSS) signed in September 2018.

In this research, I propose to analyze the response of the UNMISS in relation to a particular event that occurred in July 2016, in Juba, which resulted in a gross violation of human rights and international humanitarian law, as well as, the dismissal of the commander of the UN force in South Sudan, Lt Gen Johnson Mogoa Kimani Ondieki, followed of an special investigation ordered by the SC and lead by Major General Patrick Cammaert (retired) in which, it was found that UNMISS did not respond effectively to the violence.

This research will help to identify how UNMISS responded to the fore mentioned scenario of violence. The findings will help understand the challenges encountered by a third generation PKO and the ways in which the responses to such events are formed when operating in complex countries that have an impact in the fulfilment of mandates such as: a) protection of civilians, b) monitoring, and investigating human rights, c) creating conditions conducive to the delivery of humanitarian assistance, and d) supporting the implementation of peace agreement.

2.2 Research objective, question and sub-questions

The objective of this proposed research is to understand the role of PKOs in situations of crisis and sporadic large-scale violence and how these specific time-bound responses impact PKOs long-term peacebuilding goals. Therefore, the main question is as follows: How does UNMISS contribute to peacekeeping and peacebuilding in the complex context of post-war violence in South Sudan?. In order to answer that question, two sub-questions are proposed in relation to the violence that broke out in July 2016: 1) What are the contextual and operational factors that shaped the mission's response?, and 2) How do the mission's responses to July 2016 violent outbreak impact missions achieving's short term goals and long term goals of peacebuilding in South Sudan?.

2.3 Justification, relevance and positionality

Justification and relevance

PKOs play an important role to the maintenance of international peace and security, they provide support through its different tasks established in their mandates for instance, facilitating the political process, protecting civilians, assisting in the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of former combatants, supporting the process of elections, protecting and promoting human rights and assisting in restoring the rule of law, which help countries to transition from conflict to peace. However, due to their particular characteristics that vary according to each one of PKOs, they face many challenges, which surpasses their original mandates, and as a result, they failed in the fulfilment of their goals.

The conflict erupted in July 2016 is considered the second biggest conflict in South Sudan after the one occurred in December 2013. In July 2016 more than 36,000 civilians sought refuge in UN and aid organization compounds, hundreds of people were killed (included civilians, two UN peacekeepers and one Nuer journalist), 217 incidents of sexual violence were perpetrated (against civilians and foreign aid workers). Having said that, I consider important to carry out a thorough examination of this particular conflict in order to provide an analysis of the factors that contributed to its occurrence and to identify the weakness and challenges that UNMISS had to deal with, and how the mission's responses impact in achieving its mandate, goals in long and short term.

South Sudan is a complex country, it is a country with the most volatile and fragile state scenario and UNMISS is one of the most complex and largest contemporary missions. Consequently, this PKO is highly likely to face constant crisis of violence, like in other operational context such as Mali, Democratic Republic of the Congo, India and Pakistan, Darfur and Central African Republic. Besides, under the current UN SG there is an interest in reforms to various arms of the UN dealing with conflicts, which includes peacekeeping operations. Therefore, the result of this study can be useful for contribute to this on-going plans of the UN and the debates on UN reforms in general and on future role of UN PKOs.

Positionality

The purpose of a researcher's positionality is to provide a focused reflection in relation to the researcher's identity, social location and positionality and how these internal and external aspects affect or influence the process of the research (Ravitich and Carl, 2015). The main goal of it is to relate aspects of the identity of the researcher to the topic that somehow will help to clarify the understanding of the topic and the design process (Ravitich and Carl 2015).

"Positionality is thus determined by where one stands in relation to "the other"" (Merriam et al. 2001: 411).

In light of the above, I consider important to develop some reflection in relation to my positionality, that will help to clarify to the reader a better understanding of the chosen topic in relation to myself as the researcher. I grew up in Peru, in a country with an internal armed conflict that lasted 20 years. Even though, I was not a direct victim of the conflict during my childhood I lived under a scenario of terror and fear in Lima. During my youth, while studying law, I witnessed how the rule of law in my country was openly violated, that was one of the main reasons why after finishing my studies I decided to work on human rights.

The topic of my research comes to my mind due to my background as a human rights lawyer. I have dedicated most of my professional life to 'fieldwork' in complex and difficult countries, such as Peru, Colombia, Honduras and South Sudan. In Peru as human rights lawyer at governmental and non-governmental organizations, in Honduras as an international assistant on human rights at United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), and in Colombia and South Sudan as human rights officer at the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) and at UNMISS. Therefore, I decided to write this research mainly because it is rooted in my professional experience (from August 2015 to April 2016) and because I have a particular interest in Africa due to its history and culture, and especially because of the dynamics of how PKOs operates in volatile countries such as those located in East African states in a completely different context than Latin America.

One of my main task as a human rights officer at UNMISS involved monitoring, fact-finding and investigating serious allegations of international human rights and humanitarian law violations in Central Equatorial State. A very significant part of my job entailed identifying and interviewing victims, witnesses, and possible perpetrators, including different kinds of authorities, with the aim of identifying trends and patterns of violations and the dynamics in which operates the conflict. This professional experience marked my pathway to know more about violent, conflict and peace. I was very involved into human rights from a legal perspective that it did not allow me to put attention to other areas in order to understand conflict as a universal phenomenon. Therefore, grounded in my first-hand professional experience I decided to research in a topic that will increase my motivation to understand more about conflict, peace and its implications for human rights and justice.

Last but not least, I also consider that I am biased because I have worked in UNMISS, but also because of my background as a human rights lawyer/officer/adviser in difficult and conflict situations, however, as a person familiar with the context as an insider, it will advantageous in conducting the proposed research. Nevertheless, as a person with an academic purpose I will consider myself as an outsider and I will maintain objectivity during the process of making this research and its analysis.

2.4 Methodology and methods

The methodology proposed in this study is basically qualitative approach in-depth. O'Leary states that a case study "is the study of elements of the social through comprehensive description and analysis of a single situation or case" (O'Leary 2018: 143). In this research, I will describe and analyse a single situation (a conflict erupted in July 2016 in South Sudan); therefore, a case study approach will be used as qualitative technique. I chose this specific situation because I believe that the study of this particular event will reveal new understandings of the dynamic of violence and conflict in South Sudan, and these findings could bring new insights and a better understanding of the challenges faced by PKOs.

The criteria applied for choosing this particular event took into consideration the following characteristics: 1) its relevance, this event is considered the second major conflict erupted in South Sudan after its independence; 2) the number of victims (civilians and peacekeepers), this conflict is considered the second one to have the largest numbers of victims; 3) the time frame, it occurred after three years of the independence of South Sudan, after one year of the Agreement on the Resolution of Conflict in South Sudan (ARCSS) in which they agree to form the Transitional Government Unity in April 2016 and at the moment in which the leader of the Sudan People's Liberation Movement in Opposition (SPLM-IO) came back to South Sudan; and 4) the location, it occurred in the capital of South Sudan, Juba. In this sense, considering these particular characteristics I will be able to explore the different factors and the challenges that contribute to the continuous occurrence of violence in South Sudan.

In order to be able to carry out this research, I will base my analysis mainly in primary and secondary data. In relation to primary data, I interviewed a number of six (06) professionals on PKOs at UNMISS by means of structured interviews with open-ended questions, (04) current civilians peacekeepers and (02) ex-civilians peacekeepers from different areas such as Human Rights Division, Political Affairs Division, Office of the Gender Adviser and Civilian Affairs Division as part of the primary data resource. Those interviews were aimed at obtaining both grass roots information as well as the views of people who are working or had worked at UNMISS or have some deep knowledge about peacekeeping operations. All interviews were carried out by phone calls and all interviewees according to their request were identified by a code. This exercise provided to the research inputs from different perspectives and; therefore, it allowed me to have a better understanding and in this way to provide a better analysis.

On the other hand, in relation to secondary data, I did textual and document analysis of the existing data and online generated data; all these secondary data were accurate, valid and reliable. These sources came from academic research papers; UN documents, such as SC resolutions, GA resolutions, reports of the SG, and reports from different agencies of UN including the data base on PKOs, UNMISS, and the Commission on Human Rights in South Sudan; reports from international non-governmental organizations and local non-governmental organizations (NGOs) involved with human rights issues in South Sudan or in peacekeeping operations; information of national and international press; and last but not least books from recognized legal scholars.

2.5 Scope and limitations

South Sudan is a country that is in constant violent; therefore, there was a real restriction on my ability to access to the specific region due to security risks. Having considered this and in order to overcome these obstacles, this research considered other ways of resources. In that sense, I focused this research according to my ability to access to primary and secondary data. In relation to primary data this research presented the analysis of the situation from the perspective of ex-peacekeepers and current peacekeepers (civilians). Even though, I planned to interview some people from UN Police Division and UN Military Division, those interviews could not be carried out due to their personal reasons. Thus, it is also important to take into consideration that this study is based mainly from the perspective of civilian peacekeepers. Finally, in relation to secondary data, since there is a lack of official information based on local and national sources from governmental institutions, I relied basically on accessible information through libraries and online websites.

Chapter 3 Theoretical framework

Oliver P. Richmond, states that by the latter part of the 20th century, a range of processes directed to manage, resolve and transform conflict have been created (Richmond 2014: 90). He identifies four different generation of approaches to make peace: a) a first generation approach, more focused on a neutral military intervention at a negative peace; b) a second generation, more focused on social reconciliation at a positive peace; c) a third generation, focused on building liberal peace through "development, peacekeeping, peacebuilding, state-building, democratization, creating a rule of law, promoting human rights, civil society, and capitalism." (Richmond 2014: 90); and, d) a fourth generation, which combines liberal peace with local and contextual peace (Richmond 2014: 90-91).

UNMISS is a PKO that belongs to the third generation because those components such as peacekeeping, peacebuilding, rule of law and human rights are the key issues in a multidimensional PKO. According to Da Costa and De Coning, UNMISS is a PKO that "has openly embraced the nexus between peacekeeping and peacebuilding" (2015: 832). The original mandate of UNMISS was focus primarily in peacebuilding and after the crisis in December 2013, its mandate was expanded into peacekeeping. Having considered this, in order to understand how and when a peacekeeping operates, it is important to know how it relates and differs from the rest of peace operations. The following figure shows the spectrum of peace and security activities.

Figure 1: Linkages and grey areas between peace operations

Source: United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, Principles and guidelines (2008) website: https://www.un.org/ruleoflaw/files/Capstone_Doctrine_ENG.pdf

According to UN, there are five peace and security activities: conflict prevention, "involves the application of structural or diplomatic measures to keep intra-state or inter-state tensions and disputes from escalating into violent conflict" (UN 2008: 17); peacemaking, "includes measures to address conflicts in progress and usually involves diplomatic action to bring hostile parties to a negotiated agreement" (UN 2008: 17); peacekeeping, "is a technique designed to preserve the peace, however fragile, where fighting has been halted, and to assist in implementing agreements achieved by the peacemakers" (UN 2008: 18); peace-enforcement, "involves the application, with the authorization of the Security Council, of a range of

coercive measures, including the use of military force" (UN 2008: 18); and peacebuilding "involves a range of measures targeted to reduce the risk of lapsing into conflict by strengthening national capacities at all levels for conflict management, and to lay de foundation for sustainable peace and development" (UN 2008: 18).

As can be seen from Figure 2, peace operations are rarely limited to one type of activity. For instance, in the case of peacekeeping operation, they are often deployed to support the implementation of a cease-fire or peace agreement, but also they are often required to be involved in peacebuilding activities. With the exception of conflict prevention, peace operations are somehow interrelated to each other. Nowadays, most of the missions operate under the umbrella of multidimensional PKOs; therefore, at least two or three peace operations activities are mutually reinforced, because if it is only focus in one activity, it could fail to provide a comprehensive approach to address the conflict.

In the case of UNMISS, its mandate was originally of peacebuilding, because the mission was designed for a scenario of peace, where the violence was under control, and also where it was supposed to be the willing of the host country. It seems that UN, while establishing UNMISS, underestimated the possibility of the occurrence of violence, considering even more that South Sudan was established as a new country after years of violence and two civil wars with the Northern. After the conflict in December 2013, UNMISS's mandate was expanded into peacekeeping activities, consequently, this misinterpretation of the context and the lack of preparedness for countering violence created a challenge environment for UNMISS. If we look at the figure 2, in the case of UNMISS by expanding its mandate to peacekeeping activities, it went further the linear that divides conflict and cease-fire or peace agreement, it created gaps in the international response because of the particular challenging environment that UNMISS faces. Therefore, the reality is more complex. According to Giffen, "the lack of an assessment and planning process based on risk factors for atrocities" (2016: 870), showed its failure to anticipate and prevent atrocities.

In this chapter, I will introduce peacekeeping and peacebuilding as key pillars on which UNMISS is built on. Likewise, I will discuss theories, the theoretical content and assumptions underpinning peace operations. Theories are applied to understand and analyze the causes and factors of successes but also the causes and factors of failures.

3.1 Peacekeeping and peacebuilding

Peacekeeping

As alluded to earlier on, peacekeeping even though not mentioned in the UN Charter is the most innovative conflict management approach. Although, peacekeeping has been defined by various scholars, practitioners and organizations, as noted by Oldrich Bures, the various definitions of peacekeeping represents the first major obstacle to set down into a genuine theory of international peacekeeping (Bures 2007: 412).

Since its creation, several generations of UN peacekeeping operations have been carried out, from very limited operations to complex and multidimensional operations. The early form of peacekeeping involved four principles: "that the force should be defensive rather than offensive; that it should not include troops drawn from major powers (to enhance its neutrality); that it should be impartial; and that it should have consent and not intervene in the dispute." (Richmond 2014: 93). Those peacekeeping operations were mainly observers or disengagement missions. In addition to that, they were aimed at providing conditions of stability in colonial territories and at preventing small wars. Then, the second generation focused on the rights and needs of citizens rather than states; therefore, it highlighted human

security rather than state security. Lastly, the third generation was influenced by conflict transformation approach to cross cultural peacebuilding theory which according to Richmond, he points out that "what it is necessary to make peace is a process that transforms the relationships, interests, nature of state and society which feeds the conflict." (Richmond 2014: 96-97). The shifting of PKOs was necessary due to the constant evolution of conflict transformation, which involved the different large global contextual changes after the War World II and the post-Cold War period.

In relation to peacekeeping theories there is a lot of what has been written. Durch, Berdal and Economides, Bellamy and Williams have claimed "that plenty of work on peace operation has had theoretical content" (Bellamy and Williams 2010: 19). However, A.B Featherston have argued that "in essence we are still largely in the dark in terms of improving analysis, effectiveness and success of peacekeeping. This can be attributed directly to the lack of theoretical underpinning for the field." (as quoted in Bures 2007: 407).

Paul Diehl was one of the first authors who attempted to develop some of the theoretical gaps in the understanding of international peacekeeping operations, his primary focus was the understanding of why and how those operations are successful or not (Bures 2007: 413). Diehl considered three factors in order to explain the success of peacekeeping operations: 1) the characteristic of the force itself (internal, operational and locus of deployment); 2 the characteristics of the mission authorization; and 3) the political and military context, however, his criteria was criticized because it measured peacekeeping against an ideal state of peace and against an ideal form of conflict resolution (Bures 2007: 414). In this respect, Bures refers to the other criteria that have been put forward for evaluating PKOs, which include: 1) whether the purpose of the mandate was fulfilled; 2) the impact of the operation in the local population, 3) the manner in which the mission accomplishment has been achieved; and 4) the contribution of peacekeeping to larger values rather than to self-serving gains (Bures 2007: 414-415).

In his book "Understanding Peacekeeping", Bellamy and Williams (2010) mentioned four theories relevant to understand peace operations, liberal peace theory, global cultural theory, cosmopolitanism and critical theory. In relation to liberal peace theory, they claimed that democratic states do not wage war on states that they regard as being democratic (Bellamy and Williams 2010: 23). Likewise, by promoting and defending the principles of liberal peace, peace operations have tried to create stable peace (Bellamy and Williams 2010: 24). Even though, this theory is the more dominant, Morphet argued that China and states of the global South claimed that "peace operations should be limited to assisting states and other actors to resolve their differences and should not be used to impose a particular ideology" (as quoted in Bellamy and Williams 2010: 25). In regard to global cultural theory, Roland Paris claimed that it comprises formal and informal social rules that guide international life (Bellamy and Williams 2010: 25). In words of Paris:

> "the design and conduct of peacekeeping missions reflect not only the interest of the key parties and the perceived lessons of previous operations, but also the prevailing norms of global culture, which legitimize certain kinds of peacekeeping policies and delegitimize others" (as quoted in Bellamy and Williams, 2010: 25).

The forth theory, cosmopolitanism states that the maintenance of stable international peace and security requires "a particular way of understanding, organizing and conducting peace operation" (Bellamy and Williams 2010: 26). In this regard, Tom Woodhouse and Oliver Ramsbotham claimed that peace operations need to be conducted by a body, which they call UN Emergency Peace Service (UNPS) integrated by military and civilian personnel, also capable to protect civilians and to implement the UN human security agenda (Bellamy and Williams 2010: 26). Finally, the critical theory points out that theory is never politically

neutral, "it is always for someone and for some purpose" (Bellamy and Williams 2010: 27). The four theoretical approaches provide different ways to understand peace operations.

There is, however, another study carried out by Sebastiaan Rietjens and Chiara Ruffa, which shown that coherence is a core objective in most multinational interventions with particular relevance in UN peacekeeping missions that operates in an environment of complexity and multidimensionality. They state that coherence needs to be study through three dimensions: strategic and organizational fit, cultural and human fit and operational fit[1] (Rietjens and Ruffa 2019). The evidence from this study suggest that those dimensions will allow to detect and to categorize not only the structure and organizations constraints but also how the different components of the mission understand those constraints (Rietjens and Ruffa 2019).

Peacebuilding

Third generation PKOs are multidimensional because it includes peacekeeping and peacebuilding activities, they need to operate together as they reinforce each other; therefore, looking at the theoretical literature on peacebuilding is equally important in order to comprehend how they are connected theoretically and what analytical insights it can lend for the analysis of UNMISS as a multidimensional peace operation. A considerable amount of literature has been written about peacebuilding. In 1970, the term 'peacebuilding' surfaced for the first time by Johan Galtung to describe efforts for transition to war to peace (Ylönen 2016: 214), he encouraged the creation of peacebuilding structures to promote sustainable peace (UN 2010: 5). Later on, UN began to use the term to describe such activities that generate conditions to conducive to more durable peace. It was defined in 1992 by former UN SG Boutros Boutrus- Ghali in his report "An Agenda for Peace", where he points out peacebuilding as "an action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict" (as quoted in Da Costa and Karlsrud 2012: 55). Then, the Brahimi report from 2000 defined peacebuilding as "activities undertaken on the fair side of conflict to reassemble the foundations of peace and provide the tools for building on those foundations something that is more than just the absence of war." (UN 2010: 5). Later, in 2007 the UN Secretary-General's Policy Committee described peacebuilding as:

> "A range of measures targeted to reduce the risk of lapsing or relapsing into conflict by strengthening national capacities at all levels for conflict management. Peacebuilding strategies must be coherent and tailored to specific needs of the country concerned, based on national ownership, and should comprise a carefully prioritized, sequenced, and relatively narrow set of activities aimed at achieving the above objectives"(UN 2010: 5)

However, in the words of Richmond this definition is limited by the need to consider sovereign states and their right to non-intervention as well as its claim that peace should be built according to a universal formula. Newman, Paris and Richmond note that "due the scope and breadth of peacebuilding activities – and the emphasis on building institutions based upon market economics and democracy – contemporary peacebuilding is often described as "liberal peacebuilding"" (Newman et al. 2009: 10- 11), and this how liberal peacebuilding become dominant, because it links peace and security with development, democracy, rule of law, human rights and civil society. By merging security and development concepts, peacebuilding was considered to provide a more holistic approach, promoting human rights, rule of law, democracy and good governance, human security, sustainable development, equal access to resources and environmental issues (Ylönen, 2016: 214).

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[1] "Fit is the degree of match between what is required by the mandate, on the one hand, and institutional set-up and the implemented practices, on the other." (Rietjens and Ruffa 2019: 383).

In his writing "The Moral Imagination" Lederach points out that the integrated framework for peacebuilding requires "a capacity to understand the patterns of the present, imagine a desired future, and design change processes." (Lederach 2005: 138). His framework proposes a capacity to imagine the future by flowing towards the past as a way of exploring a more holistic understanding of the settings of cycles of violent conflict (Lederach 2005: 141). He highlights that one way to understand the cycles of violence and protracted conflict is to visualize them as a narrative broken (Lederach 2005: 146).

Other authors such as Lisa Schirch claims that, peacebuilding requires different approaches because of the many actors engaged. She states that peacebuilding is a process of building relationships and institutions. She states that the cycle of peacebuilding revolves around 1) advocate for change: advocates and activists seek to gain support for change; 2) reducing direct violence: intervenors seek to reduce direct violence; 3) transforming relationships: intervenors aim to transform destructive relationships; and 4) capacity building: intervenors aim to enhance existing capacities to meet needs and rights and prevent violence (Schirch 2008: 8-9).

However, liberal peacebuilding has also become target of criticism whose claim that those peace operations have done more harm than good and also because of its influence in western and liberal imperialism that seeks to exploit the societies (Paris 2010: 338). Nonetheless, the liberal peacebuilding has been criticized for being illiberal, and inefficient because it does not pay attention to local preferences and needs but also because the success of peacebuilding depends also on political decisions of those involved, particularly from governments, UN SC and donors (Richmond 2014: 101).

Theories around peacekeeping and peacebuilding adopt different approaches and arguments but ultimately both provide a general overview about the theoretical content on peace operations necessarily to analyze the role of peacekeeping operations in supporting long-term peacebuilding processes. As Bellamy and Williams (2010) pointed out, theories help us to identified what to look for, what actors are important and what knowledge is valid in order to make sense of complex situations and interactions. By looking at peacekeeping and peacebuilding it makes clear the necessary relation of each other, but also to reflect on how difficult is for them to integrate each other and how those theories are difficult to implement in each case. There is no one general formula, because each mission has to overcome its own peculiarities, meanwhile, both peacekeeping and peacebuilding have to find their best way to integrate each other.

Nexus between peacekeeping and peacebuilding

Peacebuilding literature comes from two different strands, one based in international relations, top down and the other one based on critical theory, bottom up literature, in this thesis I will focus on the latter using Lederach's work because of the integrated framework that he proposes through which, the different techniques of peacebuilding should be linked to the different levels of actors. As it was mentioned before, a peace operation is rarely limited to one type of activity it necessarily needs different approaches. In his writing of "Building Peace" John Paul Lederach's work on 'the integrated framework for peacebuilding' states that "techniques of peacebuilding should be developed and thereby embedded in the localities in which they are employed." (Fetherston 2000: 204). In that sense, he envisions a nested paradigm beginning with the issue, moving into relationship, subsystem and final system levels, that link to the levels of actors in his peacebuilding pyramid or peacebuilding triangle (Fetherson 2000: 205) in which he proposes that there are three different levels of leadership (top leadership: military, political and religious; middle range leadership: ethnic or religious, academic or intellectual, humanitarian of major NGOs; and grassroot leadership: local leaders, leaders of indigenous NGOs, community developers) involved in any conflict and different approaches to building peace that are appropriate to use each level. And that is

necessary because most of the peacebuilding activities require an engagement in conflict analysis exercise "in order to identify both the structural causes of the conflict, and (which may be different) the current triggers – or accelerators – of potential renewed conflict" (UN 2010: 14 and 16). As Galtung mentioned, an adequate understanding of violence is required in order to understand and define peace.

Peacekeeping has evolved from focus on traditional cease-fire operations to focus on complex conflict scenarios which requires wider responses that include peacebuilding activities (ACCORD, 2011). It occurs because "the priority is not only to keep the peace and halt violence, but also to ensure that issues of gross human rights violations, weak infrastructure, unemployment, poverty, trauma and weak state authority are addressed." (ACCORD, 2011: 4). On the other hand, peacebuilding is complex and it involves a long process that addresses the structural causes of the conflict in a comprehensive manner. However, the nexus between peacekeeping and peacebuilding is not easy. According to Christine Chinkin and Mary Kaldor peacekeeping is designed to "uphold peace agreements and remains within the discourse of war and conflict, while peacebuilding, quite apart from any flaws in the design of policies, faces insurmountable obstacles posed by the framework of peace agreements and peacekeeping" (Chinkin and Kaldor 2017: 376).

In this respect, Fetherson suggest two key points. Firstly, any expansion needs to be accompanied by systematic theoretical thinking and secondly, using military peacekeepers on missions which required skills of peacebuilding without preparation comes to be problematic (Fetherson, 2000); and here it is where challenges emerges due to the nature of the PKOs, which have to carry out peacekeeping and peacebuilding activities at the same time, and due to the limitation of deciding what to do according to the budgets, which necessarily has an impact in the way how the mandates are carried out effectively. In his report "Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding Nexus", ACCORD highlights a number of implications when considering the nexus between peacekeeping and peacebuilding such as local ownership; provision of peacebuilding expertise within peacekeeping operations; and clarity on strategies for peacekeeping transition.

As Jan Pronk points out "The increasing complexity of conflicts requires that peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations are designed in a comprehensive way," (Pronk, 2012: no page), which is also advocated by other scholars, for instance, on this point Rietjens and Ruffa mention that the core objective in a peacekeeping operation is coherence, because it implies that the whole actors involved have to work in a functionally and logically way to achieve their goals, which are known at UN circles as 'coordinated effort', 'integrated approach' or 'comprehensive approach' (Rietjens and Ruffa 2019: 384) This comprehensive approach is also advocated by Sirch who claims that peacebuilding requires different approaches due to the many actors involved (Sirch 2008: 8). In summary, the nexus between peacekeeping and peacebuilding have to be built in a strong and consistent way, especially in the design and implementation of the mandate (ACCORD 2011, 11).

3.2 Analytical framework

As it was observed, there is plenty of work on peace operations that has theoretical content, for the purpose of this research I will focus my analysis by looking at the different levels proposed by Bellamy and Williams that suggest that peace operations should be studied from five different levels: 1) local, 2) national, 3) regional, 4) global, 5) macro/structural (Bellamy and Williams 2010: 21).

Figure 2: Levels of analysis in a peacekeeping operation

Local
National
Regional
Global
Macro/Structural

Source: (Bellamy and Williams 2010: 21)

By doing the analysis through these different levels it will help to identify some important issues that are not seen while only focus in one level. In addition to that, I will do this analysis based on the instrumentalist approach which is concerned with problem-solving. This approach is based on different assumptions, focus on identifying and classifying the functional activities by peacekeepers and proposing solutions to the problems they encounter (Bellamy 2004: 23).

Chapter 4 Peacekeeping operations in context

The purpose of this chapter is first, to provide an overview of the regional context regarding peacekeeping operations in East-Central Africa in order to have a better understanding of the regional dynamics of peacekeeping operations and second, to introduce South Sudan's historical and cultural background in which UNMISS operates.

4.1 Peacekeeping operations in East- Central Africa

Officially known as the Republic of South Sudan, it is located in East-Central Africa. It is bordered by Sudan to the north, Ethiopia to the east, Kenya to the southeast, Uganda to the south, the Democratic Republic of the Congo to the southwest and the Central African Republic to the west; therefore, six countries adjoin South Sudan. All these countries have been experienced violence and conflict; consequently, it is clear to suggest that South Sudan is placed geographically in an area of violence. During the last years and up until now those countries have experienced the deployment of UN peacekeepers.

Map 2: Map of the Republic of South Sudan

Source: United Nations website: https://www.un.org/Depts/Cartographic/map/profile/southsudan.pdf

By way of examples, in relation with the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the first deployment of UN peacekeepers was at the United Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC). It was established in July 1960 and lasted until June 1964. This PKO was deployed to manage the international conflict between Congo and Belgium, however, it started to face a complex civil conflict (Koops et al. 2015: 117), that is why after eighteen months the SC passed Resolution 161, in which for the first time permitted the "use of force if necessary, in the last resort". As Koop et al. claimed, ONUC challenge and transform the original mandate

of PKO (Koops et al. 2015: 118). The second deployment of UN peacekeepers was the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC), considered as a complex mission with numerous goals and tasks. It was established in November 1999. This mission passed through three phases. First, it was focused on the 1999 Lukasa Ceasefire Agreement. Second, its focus shifted on the implementation of transitional governance arrangements. And third, it focused on assisting the post-electoral stabilization of the country. It is also important to emphasize that MONUC had assume responsibilities that, were not within its authority and capacity, especially in relation to the protection of civilians (Doss 2015: 668). Finally, the third deployment of UN peacekeepers in this country was the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO), this mission was established in May 2010, with the aim of completing the tasks of MONUC, especially in relation to civilian protection and the stabilization of eastern Congo and launch a peace consolidation in the west of the country (Doss 2015: 803).

In relation to Uganda, the United Nations Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda (UNOMUR) was established to monitor the supplies going to the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) across the 150 kilometers border with Uganda, this UN Observer Mission has few military observer and no equipment for aerial surveillances (Melvern 2015: 463).

Regarding Central African Republic, the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic (MINURCA) was established in response to an internal crisis in the country in 1996. This mission replicated the mandate of the Inter-African Mission to Monitor the Implementation of the Bangui Agreements (MISAB) on issues of stabilization and supervision, however, MINURCA was provided with a more political role. The word of 'peacebuilding' was seen as a key element of the mission (Esmenjaud 2015: 591). As Esmenjaud has concluded MINURCA reflects three trends in the field of peace operation. First, the collaboration between UN and regional actors. Second, the tendency of the SC to engage in domestic governance issues. And third, the disconnect between the decision-makers' motivation and the situation on the ground (Esmenjaud 2015: 594). Later on, this mission turned into the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA).

Concerning Ethiopia, the United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE) was established on June 2000, in response to the parties' request in the Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities (ACH) with the aim to the cessation of hostilities, the redeployment of forces and the Temporary Security Zone (TSZ) but also it was tasked to other activities such as de-mining, humanitarian and human rights work (Cammaert and Sugar 2015).

With regard to Sudan, the United Nation Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) was established after three months the CPA was signed in March 2005. Some of its achievements related with its mandate implementation were possible due two factors: the will of the parties to implement the CPA and the acceptance of UNMIS. (Hansen 2015: 748). Likewise, another success was his support to the Southern Sudan referendum. However, this mission was criticized because of its lack of protection of civilians. Later on, this mission supported the deployment of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation (UNAMID), the United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA), and UNMISS. Later on, UNAMID was established in July 2007, this mission was the continuity of the AU Mission in Sudan (AMIS) due to the inability of the AMIS to prevent abuses against civilians. UNAMID's success was limited and one of the main reasons was limited number of military personnel (Lanz 2015: 785).

All PKOs beforementioned have experienced some achievements but also some challenges, however, before engaging with the key issues of the particular PKO relevant for the present research paper, it is worthwhile reflecting on some of the challenges experiences by

those PKOs, by doing that, it will be more easy to understand the dynamics of UNMISS through similar challenges experienced by PKOs of the same area. First, it is clear that a PKO needs to have enough human and funding resources to function properly, because the fact of minimizing costs could affect the fulfilment of its mandate. Second, since the introduction of 'peacebuilding' as a key element in the operation of PKOs, they have the tendency to be more involved in domestic governance issues; therefore, to build a solid relation with the host country is also a key factor. Third, some PKOs assume responsibilities that originally were not established in its mandate that could affect the fulfilment of its mandate and in this way determine its failure or success. Fourth, the role of regional arrangements or agencies. This role is established under Chapter VII of the UN Charter through which regional arrangements or agencies may undertake efforts towards the pacific settlement of local disputes (UN 1945: art. 52). According to Boutellis and Williams the partnerships between UN and the African Union (AU) has been the most dynamic in the area of peace operations (2013: 9). In the 1990s, most of the large operations were conducted by the UN and the ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States). During the 2000s due to the increasing of UN PKOs in Africa, the majority of UN peacekeepers were deployed to the largest missions in Africa. Boutellis and Williams shed light on the advantages of operating in African contexts of the AU over the UN: a) the deployment of troops is quicker and cheaper; b) AU-mandated troops can carry out peace enforcement tasks in the absence of a ceasefire agreement, contrary to UN that would be reluctant to send troops; and c) AU is seem with more political legitimacy especially in countries where the host country have reluctance to the presence of UN (2013: 12). However, on the other hand there are also some disadvantages, and the most important is the capacity of troops to respond in difficult scenarios because mainly they do not have the same resources as UN but also due to the lack of training of their troops and in some countries due to the barrier of the language that limit their operation. And lastly, the effectiveness and success of a PKO also depends primarily in the will of the parties to fulfil and implement the peace agreements; therefore, it is very important the commitment of the parties as a key issue in a peace operation.

4.2 South Sudan's background

In 2005, in order to formally ends the civil war between the Government of Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A), the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) was signed between both parties. As a consequence, the Government of Southern Sudan was formed and as agreed in the CPA, a referendum was carried out in order to define the independence of the Southern Sudan. In January 2011, Southern Sudanese voted in favour of its independence, therefore, after six months Southern Sudan seceded from the Northern Sudan.

On 9 July 2011, South Sudan became an independent country and the newest country in the world. Followed by this, UNMISS was established acting on the recommendation of the Secretary-General, SC Resolution 1996 (2011) for an initial period of one year, with the intention of having renewable periods. UNMISS's objective was focus on to consolidate peace and security and besides, to establish conditions for development in the Republic of South Sudan, with the aim to strength its capacity to govern effectively and democratically.

Since the signing of the CPA until the outbreak of the first fighting in South Sudan in December 2013, the international community provided to South Sudan economic support in terms of humanitarian aid, development and for building new state institutions (Moro et al. 2017). However, the lack of accountability, transparency and democracy has prevented the country its formation as a legitimate state. According to Idris, "there were many reasons

that led South Sudan to fall apart: lack of vision and statesmen, absence of an inclusive constitution, unequal distribution of national wealth, dictatorial tendencies among political leaders, politicization of ethnicity, rampant corruption and others factors." (Idris 2018: xii).

Likewise, "the long history of oppression and exploitation of Southern Sudanese by Khartoum-based regimes" (Moro et al. 2017: 5) has contributed to its failure as a state, years of marginalization and repression by Khartoum. This country has not been able to address historical challenges; therefore, it has not been able to realize the political and economic aspirations of its people (Idris, 2018).

In his essay "Unpacking South Sudan's political violence: history, identity, and citizenship", Idris argues that the ethnicised nature of South Sudan in its post-independence, has contributed to the failure of this country from a transition to a state and nation. He based his argument into the broader history and politics of the former Sudan, what he calls *"the colonial paradigm"*, which refers to the division of Sudan into two regions (Arab North vs. African South) (Idris 2018: 2). He stresses that this division created a practice of enslavement that contributed to South Sudanese to be engaged in violent interactions. On the other hand, in the essay "The curse of elitism: South Sudan's failure to transition to statehood and nationhood" by Nyaba, he argues that the dominance of Dinka in the liberation movement contributed to the Dinka ethnic in its nationalism and hegemony domination (Nyaba 2018: 19). He argues that this creates a kind of elite politics in South Sudan that focus on accumulate wealth in a kleptocratic and totalitarian way. Nyaba has pointed out that four factors have contributed to the failure of South Sudan: a) colonial legacy, b) ethnic multiplicity, c) absence of ideology, and d) corruption and tribalism (Nyaba 2018: 26).

It is clear so far that this country has not yet addressed the fundamental challenges necessary for its viability as a new state such as lack of democratic political parties, absence of law and order, interethnic conflicts and weakness of national belonging (Idris 2018). Thus, internal wars, poverty and famine are the main factors that make the future of this country not promising and bring the country to a complete state out of order (Idris 2018).

Since its independence in 2011, the country has experienced many violent outburst albeit the presence of UNMISS. On 15 December 2013, violence broke out in Juba and quickly spread to other areas that resulted in the worst political and security crisis since its creation. Clashes between the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA), led by President Salva Kiir and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army in Opposition (SPLM/A-IO), led by Vice President Riek Machar, even though, it was rooted in issues related to power struggle, this quickly took the form of violence along ethnic lines (CCC 2016: 14), Dinka from the side of President Kiir and Nuer from the side of Vice President Machar. This violence had negative consequences for the human rights situation in the country.

Following this event, the Secretary-General suggested that UNMISS should reprioritize its activities and shift from peacebuilding, state-building and the extension to state authority, to the protection of civilians, human rights and humanitarian assistance by SC Resolution (SCR) 2155 (2014). After this, many resolutions have been passed. In this research SC Resolution 2252 (2015) will be taking into account for the purpose of analysis (resolution that was in force when the conflict in July 2016 erupted). This SC Resolution prioritizes as its main tasks: a) protection of civilians, b) monitoring, and investigating human rights, c) creating conditions conducive to the delivery of humanitarian assistance, and d) supporting the implementation of agreement.

In August 2015, the warring parties signed the Agreement on the Resolution of Conflict in South Sudan (ARCSS) with the compromise to create the Transitional Government of National Unity in April 2016. Vice President Machar returned to Juba to implement this compromise in April 2016. However, in June 2016 some clashes occurred in some counties that originated that violence broke out in Juba in July 2016. From 8 to 11 July, numerous

civilians and two peacekeepers were killed in fours intense days of violence and human rights violations.

Since then, not much have changed in South Sudan. By September 2018, and after many attempts at cease-fires and peace deals that failed, a peace agreement was signed (Reuters 2018). The R-ARCSS builds upon many of ARCSS's provisions, including a transitional power sharing government. According to the Peace Research Institute of Oslo:

> "the signatories have made some progress on important issues such as maintaining the cease-fire, releasing prisoners and ratifying the agreement. However, there has been little progress on important security reforms, such as police and military reforms, and the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DRR) program" (PRIO 2019: 2).

Therefore, since December 2013, South Sudan is plunged into a bloody internal war targeting deliberately civilians, where the most horrendous crimes against war and crimes against humanity have been committed including killings, sexual violence, abductions, forced displacement and destruction of homes and crops (CCC 2016).

In conclusion, as it can be observed, South Sudan is located in a highly volatile area, surrounded by countries that have experienced violence and conflict. All of them have experienced the deployment of UN peacekeepers within their territory and have had to deal with similar challenges. The deployment of UNMISS in South Sudan was thought to support the government to consolidate peace and security and to govern effectively and democratically, however, the formula in which this peace operation was created did not take into consideration that the basis of peace and security were not strong enough to build a nation. The dominant model that liberal peacebuilding promotes, which points out that long-lasting peace only works by having democratic elections after a peace agreement and by creating a foundation for a market economy (Ylönen 2012: 29) is far away from reality because it involves western ideologies to be applied in contexts completely different.

Chapter 5 Keeping peace in South Sudan. A difficult task for UNMISS?

This chapter provides a detailed discussion and analysis of the incident that occurred in July 2016. Based on this assessment, this chapter aims to explore in a broad sense, how does UNMISS contribute to peacekeeping and peacebuilding in the complex context of post-war violence in South Sudan. I will answer that question by exploring also the two sub-questions 1) what are the contextual and operational factors that shaped the mission's response?, and 2) how do the mission's responses to July 2016 violent outbreak impact missions achieving's short term goals and long term goals of peacebuilding in South Sudan?.

South Sudan is a country plagued with continuous conflicts (Idris 2018). Two civil wars preceded South Sudan's independence in 2011. Despite the many attempts of the peace agreements, the cycle of violence in South Sudan is permanent until now. Figure 4 shows the main events that occurred from 2011 to 2016 in order to make it clear, while analyzing the findings, that South Sudan is a fragile country deeply entrenched in violence.

Figure 3: Timeline of the conflict in South Sudan (2011 to 2016)

Source: Illustration elaborated by the author

When the violence broke out in Juba, in July 2016, the SC Resolution 2252 (2015), as of 15 December 2015 was in force. This resolution prioritizes as its main tasks, in the same way as the SC Resolution 2255 (2014): a) protection of civilians; b) monitoring, and investigating human rights; and c) creating the conditions conducive to the delivery of humanitarian assistance. The only difference is that SC 2252 (2015) included a new task: d) supporting the implementation of the ARCSS. Furthermore, this resolution increased the force levels of UNMISS due to the ongoing violence in the country. Even thought, the troop had increased its personnel other contextual scenarios contributed to the break out of this crisis. Firstly, the implementation of the ARCSS created an environment of tension between the two warrying parties, especially in relation to the formation of the unity government. And secondly, the returning of the former Vice-president Riek Machar to Juba together with his 1,200 armed fighters (opposition soldiers) also created an atmosphere of tension in Juba because those 1,200 armed fighters were placed less than a kilometer from UN House, where the

PoC sites are located, despite the security risks and the objections of the Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) for South Sudan, Margrete Løj, the international security advisers and the generals in the Government army, who stated that the fact of placing the opposition soldiers in that particular area could put the internally displaced persons and the UN personnel in a crossfire in case a fight breaks out (UN SC 2016: para. 4).

Consequently, on 7 July 2016, a fight, erupted in Juba between the President of South Sudan, Salva Kiir and his former Vice-President Riek Machar. The intense fights took place in Juba from 8 to 11 July and brought unrestrained violence to the capital of South Sudan that later spread to some other counties of the country. This fight it is considered the second crisis of large-scale in South Sudan after its independence in 2011. This crisis meant the collapse of the fragile ARCSS signed in 2015, which means that it dissolved the only working consensus on how to resolve South Sudan's conflict; furthermore, just like it happened in the crisis in December 2013, the break out of this conflict altered the achievement of the objectives of UNMISS's mandate, while peacekeeping activities had to be prioritized, peacebuilding activities were on hold; and it opened the door for the commission of gross human rights violations. During those days of fights, the parties of the conflict inflicted serious harms on many civilians and two peacekeepers, which resulted in dozens of casualties. According to UN:

> "more than 36,000 civilians sought refuge in United Nations and aid organizations compounds; hundreds of people were killed, including civilians and two United Nations peacekeepers. UNMISS reported more than 217 incidents of sexual violence perpetrated by the warring parties during the four days of fighting" (UN HRC, 2017: para. 15).

Likewise, on 11 July, the SPLA forces attacked the Terrain Hotel which houses international humanitarian aid workers. During the attack civilians "were subjected to and witnessed gross human rights violations, including murder, intimidation, sexual violence and acts amount to torture perpetrated by armed Government soldiers" (UN SC) (2016: para. 11)

## 5.1 Challenges in maneuvering UNMISS as a whole

It is clear so far that according to SC Resolution 2252 (2015), UNMISS was assigned with an actionable mandate, in order to address the core issues of the conflict in South Sudan, with a special focus on the protection of civilians, authorizing the mission to 'use all necessary means' to perform its tasks. However, the continuous violence that broke out in South Sudan since its independence and in particular the one that occurred in July 2016 reveals that some contextual and operational factors affected the ability of UNMISS to fulfil its mandate, which raised the research question of my study: How does UNMISS contribute to peacekeeping and peacebuilding in the complex context of post-war violence in South Sudan?.

To answer that question, first of all, it is important to remind that UNMISS is a peacekeeping operation that according to its mandate it is assigned to carry out peacebuilding and peacekeeping activities through the different levels of engagement such as, protecting of civilians; monitoring and investigating human rights; providing humanitarian assistance; and supporting the peace process. So under this frame, 'Yes', UNMISS contributes to peacekeeping and peacebuilding, however, there are various peculiarities and circumstances that makes it difficult for UNMISS to fulfill its mandate. Interviewee CR5 reflects on that by noting that UNMISS contribute to peacekeeping and peacebuilding "by balancing the needs on the ground and the resources that the mission has, including use of others supports from regional actors(…) but in practice it has been covered by lot of challenges"; thus, the mandate is

expressed and implemented according to different settings and dynamics. Likewise, I will expand my research question by answering the two sub-questions accordingly.

Figure 5 shows the environment in which a peace operation functions; therefore, UNMISS has to be seen from those three different perspectives: its mandate implementation, according to its strategic intent; the situation in the host country; and the actual resources and capabilities.

Figure 4: UNMISS's mandate according to different settings

Source: EPON Analytical Framework (EPON, 2019: 27)

It is not my intention to provide a long list of those peculiarities and circumstances, rather I will highlight the most relevant findings identified as part of my research, divided in the three above mentioned different perspectives.

5.1.1 Mandate

A broad mandate

UNMISS was established under the SG SC Resolution 1996 (2011), as of 8 July 2011, for an initial period of one year, with the intention of renewing further periods as required. Its original mandate established that,

> "the mandate of UNMISS shall be to consolidate peace and security, and to help establish the conditions for development in the Republic of South Sudan, with a view to strengthening the capacity of the Government of the Republic of South Sudan to govern effectively and democratically and establish good relations with its neighbors" (UN SC 2011: para. 3).

Likewise, the UN SC tasked UNMISS to support the government to fulfill its responsibility to protect by "Advising and assisting the Government of the Republic of South Sudan, including military and police at national and local levels as appropriate, in fulfilling its responsibility to protect civilians, in compliance with international humanitarian, human rights, and refugee law." (UN SC 2011: para. 3b(iv)). It was the first time that the UN SC included this objective in a peacekeeping operation which was considered as an important development.

After, violence broke out in South Sudan on 15 December 2013 and due to the large-scale of the violence that rapidly deteriorated the situation of security and humanitarian assistance in South Sudan, the SC by its Resolution 2132 (2013), as of 24 December 2013,

increased the military and police components (UN SC 2013: para. 4). Likewise, in light of the latest escalations of violence, the SC adopted its Resolution 2155 (2014), as of 27 May 2014, reprioritizing the activities of UNMISS from peacebuilding to peacekeeping and in addition to that, it includes for the first time the clause to 'use all necessary means' to perform: a) protection of civilians; b) monitoring and investigating human rights; c) creating the conditions for delivery of humanitarian assistance; and d) supporting the implementation of the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement, as of 23 January 2014 (UN SC 2014: para. 4). This is the starting point where the nexus of peacebuilding and peacekeeping activities at UNMISS embrace each other, it goes on to perform peacebuilding activities to perform peacekeeping activities, which generate that the mission became more complex. In this regard, the interviewee CR6 argues that:

> "in December 2013, UNMISS decided to open the gates of its compounds to protect civilians, who were fleeing from violence and killings against them. This was the first time in the history of UN, that UN opens its doors of their camps to receive people who were being killed in cold blood. This situation originated that the mandate of UNMISS to change and made UNMISS's tasks much more complex. Suddenly UNMISS had civilians inside to protect and then UNMISS had civilians outside to protect".

This switch from peacebuilding to peacekeeping not only made the peace operation more difficult but also creates adjustment in the distribution of resources which affected the fulfillment of its tasks. UNMISS in itself is a complex peacekeeping operation, interviewee CR1 points out that:

> "UNMISS (…) it has worked across so many issues, you have the peacekeeping operation as such, that goes with the peacekeeping protection of civilians, human rights, humanitarian assistance, conflicts, emergency, lot of local issues, the implementation of the peace agreement itself, that it is a huge task".

Similarly, interviewee CR5 made it clear that "the military component and the civilian component" make this peace operation complex. It cannot be denied that a broader mandate is also problematic in the sense that it leaves too much room for interpretation on the ground, but also at the moment of prioritizing which activities need more attention. So a broader sense is good but in practice to carry out peacekeeping and peacebuilding activities is very difficult and created dynamics on ground based on the way in which they are operationalized. For instance interviewee CR2 points out that "there are too many things in the mandate and when they put too many things in one box in my view, they could not achieve anything, and then it becomes difficult. So I think one of the weakness is that everything is on the mandate". Likewise, interviewee CR2 reflects on the way in which peacekeeping and peacebuilding activities contradict each other, for example the fact of doing peacebuilding when you are with uniformed people, it creates tensions and makes that UNMISS will not be perceived as a neutral entity.

Based on this previous assessment, I will try to explore more on the situation of the host country perspective by looking at the 'operational factors' that shaped the mission's response to July 2016 crisis.

5.1.1.1 Operational factors

Lack of understanding on Chapter VII of UN Charter
Interviewee CR5 indicates that "there is lack of clear guideline on the Chapter VII, the implementation, for example, there are troops that are supposed to operate under Chapter VII but the suggestion indicates that there is no clear rule of engagement (…)". The violence that broke out in July 2016 indicates that there is no clear rule of engagement, it suggests lack of

control and lack of clear guidelines. As it was mentioned before, UNMISS is considered to have the lowest rate of immediate response to threats to civilians and has been noted as having a pattern of "non-intervention" (UN 2014: paras 19 and 70). On the other hand, interviewee CR2 suggests that there is a limit understanding of what protection of civilians means:

> "I fell UNMISS is a mission where there is limited understanding of what protection of civilians means and it is very much dominated by this uniformed idea of what is PoC (…) Protection has to be done, not only by showing that you are there, but also it has to be accompany with other mechanisms of protection, that include the community, the community has to trust UNMISS more".

This interviewee sets as example how the patrol is carried out, the interviewee makes it clear that it is not just about go there and come back. The patrol has to be carried out with minimum standards of control, for instance, in cases of sexual violence, a patrol has to be carried out with at least a female peacekeeper and an interpreter.

Lack of cohesion mandate

According to Rietjens and Ruffa "both policy and academic debates on peace and stability have a lenght advocated the importance of coherence in peacekeeping operations, as situations in which all actors involved would work functionally and logically to achieve a common goal" (Rietjens and Ruffa, 2019: 384). The lack of coordination between the mission and the country team results in that they work at their own pace.[2] Interviewee CR2 reflects on it by noting that:

> "one of the key issues in a multidimensional peacekeeping such as UNMISS is a cohesion mandate. This is on the weakness that I see in UNMISS, there are many sections, components (…) a more efficient structure it is necessary to improve systems of uniform and civilians components working together".

Lack of care in relation to early warnings

Regarding the incident of July 2016, there were indications that the negotiations of the peace agreement was not going effectively, as well as, there were indications that forces from both sides were hostile to each other.[3] As stated in the report of the independent special investigation:

> "In the weeks prior to the violence, UNMISS and the humanitarian community saw timely and accurate warning signs of the resumption of hostilities in Juba between the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) and the Sudan People's Liberation Army in Opposition (SPLA-IO). Notwithstanding the early warning that fighting would take place near UN House, the Mission did not properly prepare for three critical and foreseeable scenarios" (UN 2016: para. 5).

5.1.2 Situation of the host country

A fragile state

UNMISS was established in a country without having the minimal elements of a formal democracy, in a country without a culture of democracy and political plurality. Interviewee CR3 argues that UNMISS was established in a country where its main characteristic was the "fragility of the state itself" not only because of having gone through a process of independence

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[2] Interviewee CR4.
[3] Interviewee CR5.

with the Republic of Sudan but also because of "the improvised way to form a State". Likewise, interviewee CR3 reflects by saying that:

"I do not know whether in another country a component of United Nations can face the challenges of building a country from zero, from below, usually missions arrive in a country where at least there is already an institutional background, a legal framework from where to start operating".

So without the solid basis to create a State, South Sudan was prone to become a fragile state and; therefore, to end as a failed State. According to the Fragile States Index in 2019 by the Fund for Peace, South Sudan is ranked on place third of 178 counties and 'Not Free' by Freedom House's Freedom in the World 2019 Report. Of the 50 countries designated as 'Not Free', South Sudan has one of the most worst aggregate scores for political rights and civil liberties (Freedom House 2019: 15). As EPON points out "The institutions of the State are nascent and often ill-governed, while patronage and flagrant corruption remain dominant modes of governance at all levels" (EPON, 2019: 44).

UN missions are deployed at the request and in agreement with the legitimate state, however, when the legitimacy is questioned by many violent actors, and the state does not have the monopoly of violence as in a typical case of a well-functioning state, the state's challenges comes from many non-state actors, which was the case faced by UNMISS, and at the end it causes the mission to operate smoothly, as expected. Since its creation UNMISS has not had an easy task, UNMISS was established in a very difficult scenario, fragile and prone to be broken out in conflict at any time.

A country with a history of violence

The history of South Sudan has been that of conflicts and civil wars with the Republic of Sudan and with itself after its independence (Zambakari, 2019: 6). Interviewee CR3 reflects on it by stating that "South Sudan is a country that the only history it has, it is about fights, wars and civil wars". Likewise, interviewee CR3 notes that:

"to build something from zero, it is a challenge, however, I think the biggest challenge is in the minds of people who the only thing they have in their history is war, let's say people who spent 30 or 40 years fighting, so all they know is to shoot, and then suddenly they are in charge of an institution or as a governors of a region and they do not know what to do, they are people that the only thing they know is to give orders and they did not know absolutely nothing about what to do and neither is in their formation to know to listen to other people, to listen to the population, because what they are used to is to kill and oppress the one who does not listen to them".

In this regard, as Giffen mentions the highest officials in South Sudan, were former enemies and commanders of armed parties who had committed abuses and crimes during the second civil war (Giffen 2016: 860). On the other hand interviewee CR1 also makes reference to the intercommunal violence such as the cattle raiding[4], which is also a major motivation for the mobilization of armed youth (Giffen 2016: 861). According to Reeve Richard, it is also considered an manifestation of inter-tribal and inter-clan rivalry due to the violence between communities (as quoted in Giffen 2016: 861). So having this background of history of violence but also considering how violence is rooted in people. UNMISS had and has to operate in a difficult contextual environment which makes its operation more difficult and prone to break out in conflict.

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[4] "Cattle is considered in South Sudan as the main source of wealth among pastoralist and cattle raiding has been a long-running tradition in South Sudan." (Giffen, 2016: 861)

The unwillingness of the host government

The conflict in South Sudan involves many actors that includes the host government itself. The political environment has not been in favour of UNMISS interventions. Interviewee CR1 notes that one of external factor is:

> "the political unwillingness of the State to support the peacekeeping and peacebuilding initiatives, as you know, the conflict involves different actors that includes the host government itself, so the unwillingness of the host government is the main obstacle for the mission".

In this regard, it is important to remember the mission concept under which UNMISS was created. In 2011, the mission concept did not consider that the government could be a potential perpetrator or be a warrying party. The mission concept was planned for a government with whom to work together in order to consolidate peace (Giffen 2016: 866). However, the shift of the mandate meant that the government was considered as a major threat to the civilians (EPON 2019: 16). One of the key issues for a peacekeeping mission to operate successfully is the willing of the government to support the entire process of peacekeeping, peacebuilding and humanitarian assistance.[5] As noted by interviewee CR1"without the support of the host government, the peacekeeping and peacebuilding operation is always a challenge", because it constraints the ability of the mission to implement its mandate.

A dynamic environment

This mission operates in a country where the environment is dynamic. The conflict dynamics in South Sudan are complex and interdependent. According to EPON the conflict has to be seen under its different perspectives: 1) intercommunal tensions, 2) political violence of the civil war, 3) large-scale population movements, and 4) activities of regional actors (EPON, 2019: 71). Interviewee CR5 reflects on it by claiming that "the operation environment is dynamic, because it involves multiple armed groups, multiple opposition groups, multiple armed communal youth armed groups, which in some instances has some associations with the parties in conflict". The proliferation of multiple armed groups is caused due to the fragility of the state, due to the absence of a formal state, due the lack of formal institutions, necessary in a state to form its rule of law's architecture (Giffen 2016: 861), without the establishment of formal institutions, the state is adrift.

A very difficult terrain

UNMISS operates in a country which is largely inaccessible (EPON, 2019: 44) because most of South Sudan especially in the lengthy rainy season, is inaccessible and it is considered the country with the worst infrastructure in the world (EPON, 2019: 13). As noted by interviewee CR1 "South Sudan is in a place that when it rains, you cannot move so far; therefore, it limits the capability of the mission to respond".

Based on this previous assessment, I will try to explore more on the situation of the host country perspective by looking at the 'contextual factor' that shaped the mission's response to July 2016 crisis.

5.1.2.1 Contextual factor

The inevitable collapse of the ARCSS

Since its inception the ARCSS was weak and very prone to fail. The Addis Ababa peace process and the peace agreement itself were deeply flawed. Firstly, because unlike R-ARCSS, the ARCSS was an agreement in which it only involved the two main leaders of the warrying parties, it did not involve the community. Secondly, because the leader of the SPLM/A and

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[5] Interviewees CR1, CR2 and CR4.

its supporters showed resistances to the agreement. Mainly, because of their unwillingness to give up the monopoly of the power (Boswell 2017).

Signs of resumptions of hostilities. In 2016 the atmosphere in South Sudan was very prone to the occurrence of a conflict. The tensions in Malakal in February 2016, escalated to a boiling point which resulted in casualties inside the PoC site (CNN 2016). Likewise, weeks prior to the violence that broke out in July 2016, UMISS and the humanitarian community warned signs of resumption of hostilities in Juba between the two main warring parties (UN SC 2016: para. 5). However, even though the early warning signs of the resumptions of hostilities, UNMISS did not properly prepare for critical and foreseeable scenarios (UN SC 2016: para. 5).

5.1.3 Resources and capabilities

Lack of human capacity and resources

UNMISS as a multidimensional peacekeeping has to respond to all aspects of peacekeeping and peacebuilding activities in a huge country such as South Sudan; therefore, as reflected by interviewee CR1 "the main challenge is the capacity of the mission to respond to all aspects of peacekeeping and peacebuilding (…) responding to a huge conflict in South Sudan such as the one in July 2016 required more human resources". Whereas, in 2011 UNMISS consisted of up to 7,000 military personnel and 900 civilian police personnel, in 2015 the SC decides to increase the force levels of UNMISS up to a ceiling of 13,000 troops and 2,001 police personnel. However, considering such a huge country, it is difficult to cover the whole territory. As noted by Hultman Kathman and Shannon "Greater capacity allows UN missions to reduce battlefield violence because larger deployments increase the credibility of the UN's commitment" and "large numbers of personnel offer better physical barriers to violence." (Hultman et al. 2014: 743). So it is argued that a UN mission requires stronger mission capacity in order to be engage in its actions to be able to perform effectively its tasks (Hultman et al. 2014). UNMISS's resources were modest from the outset; therefore, the failure to respond is somehow attributed to the lack of allocation of resources.

By looking at how UNMISS's has evolved since its establishment, it makes to think over about the politics of peacekeeping behind the creation of each specific mandate. By focusing on this, Susan H. Allen and Amy T. Yuen in their article "The Politics of Peacekeeping: UN Security Council Oversight Across Peacekeeping Missions" raised a question: "Why are some peacekeeping mandates broad and expansive while others are narrow and well defined" (Allen and Yuen 2014: 621), in which they reflect between the needs inherent to resolve the conflict or the political interest of powerful states. They argued that the needs argument focuses on aspects of the conflict (for instance, high loss of casualties) whereas the political argument focuses on the influence in the UN SC. They conclude that the argument of politics influences the conduct of the mission and consequently it influences the outcome of the mission (Allen and Yuen 2014), which in practice is what it occurs because the budget of a peacekeeping, the number of the troops and the content of the mandate are decided mainly by those who have interest of the drive decision at UN SC (Allen and Yuen 2014).

In summary the difficult settings full of challenges and diverse dynamics in which UNMISS operates, as well as, those contextual and operational factors including the lack of leadership, preparedness and integrations among the various components of the mission (EURONEWS 2016) affected the response of UNMISS in the crisis of July 2016. UNMISS "clearly underperformed in fulfilling core parts of its mandate, including the protection of civilians both inside and outside the PoC sites" (CCC, 2016: 5). This underperformance originated that the SG Ban Ki-moon ordered an Independent Special Investigation led by Major

General Patrick Cammaert (retired) in order to review the actions of UNMISS that took place in the aftermath of the unrestrained violence that occurred from 7 to 25 July 2016, against civilians and UN staffs, in relation to the sexual violence and violence against civilians and the Terrain camp incident, where a Nuer journalist was killed and several foreign aid workers were robbed, beaten and raped by armed soldiers (UN SC 2016). The outcome of the special investigation found that "a lack of leadership on the part of the key senior Mission personnel had culminated in a chaotic and ineffective response to the violence" (UN SC 2016: para. 7). This investigation also highlights that on the civilian side, the response was poor before and during the crisis, which contributed to a fragmented security response (UN SC 2016: para. 8) and on the uniformed side, the Force did not operate under a unified command, resulting in conflicting orders to the four troop contingents from China, Ethiopia, India and Nepal, "the lack of leadership on the ground, contributed to incidents of poor performance among the military and police contingents" (UN SC 2016: para. 9). Likewise, in relation to the events that occurred in the Terrain camp, the investigation found that the mission failed to respond. Besides, the investigation suggested the poor performance by peacekeepers in protecting civilians from sexual violence near the PoC sites (UN SC 2016: para. 14). In summary, the investigation found that:

> "the lack of preparedness, ineffective command and control and a risk-averse or "inward-looking" posture resulted in a loss of trust and confidence, particularly by the local population and humanitarian agencies, in the will and skill of UNMISS military and police to be proactive and show a determined posture to protect civilians under threat, including from sexual violence and humans rights violations" (UN SC 2016: para. 18)

Undoubtedly, there was no clear guidance with respect to the implementation of the mandate, the rules of the engagement and the use of force and that was the reason why the UN Commander Lt Gen Johnson M Kimani Ondieki was sacked by UN Chief Ban Ki-Moon for failure to protect civilians in Juba.

After exploring how UNMISS contribute to peacekeeping and peacebuilding in the complex of post-war violence in South Sudan and some of the contextual and operational factors that drove the conflict, the second sub-question: How do the mission's responses to July 2016 violent outbreak impact missions short term goals and long term goals of peacebuilding in South Sudan? raises. As mentioned before, UNMISS has the lowest rate of immediate response to threats to civilians and has been noted as having a pattern of "non-intervention". Undoubtedly, the underperformance of UNMISS in July 2016 impacted in the short-term and long-term goals of peacebuilding in South Sudan because it affected the whole operational system of UNMISS and; therefore, the achievement of its main tasks, mainly the protection of civilians. The protection of civilians at UNMISS is more focus on the PoC sites rather than focus on the civilians outside and it occurred because of the special circumstances in which the PoC sites were created. It cannot be denied the special role that UNMISS played in the crisis in 2013 when for the first time in the history of UN, a peacekeeping mission open its gates to protect civilians as it also occurred in the crisis in July 2016. However it is also true that there were some failures. From my point of view, what happened in July 2016 was the result of a mix of lack of clarity on the PoC mandate itself, lack of a cohesion mandate and lack of human capacities and resources, which goes together with all the peculiarities and circumstances in which UNMISS operates, that resulted in a chaotic and ineffective response to the violence.

In the case of UNMISS, it can be concluded that when UNMISS was created, it was under the umbrella of peacebuilding activities, in a country recently independent, with a focus on strengthening the government through capacity building and on advising and assisting the government in fulfilling its responsibility to protect civilians. However, when the conflict broke out in December 2013, the mandate of the mission changed and; therefore,

peacekeeping activities were included in the mandate, mainly the protection of civilians. By looking at Figure 2, it can be observed that peacekeeping operates within the area of ceasefire and peacebuilding operates within the area of ceasefire and conflict, this is what theory shows.

With the expansion of UNMISS's mandate, peacekeeping started to operate within the area of conflict, which created gaps in the international response, because peacekeeping is a technique designed to preserve peace, when fighting has been halted, and to assist to implement agreements achieved by peacemakers, which in the particular case did not correspond. First, because there is no peace, how peace could be preserved if there is no peace?. Secondly, the fighting has not been halted, South Sudan is a country with a continuous occurrence of violence, it is a no viable state. And lastly, how UNMISS could assist to implement agreements if there is no willing of the supposed 'peacemakers'. Figure 6 shows how UNMISS operates in practice.

Figure 5: UNMISS in practice

Source: Illustration elaborated by the author

For a multidimensional peacekeeping operation such as UNMISS both forms of peace operations are necessary, they need each other. However, the complexity in which they function, makes their operation difficult. In that sense, as Pronk claimed, peacebuilding and peacekeeping has to be designed in a comprehensive way. Likewise, based on the integrated framework for peacebuilding proposed by Lederach, it requires a capacity to understand the present, imagine the future and design change processes, because the great challenge of peacebuilding as Lederach wrote is "how to build creative responses to patterns of self-perpetuating violence in a complex system made up of multiple actors" (Lederach, 2005: 33).

Summary

In what follows, I will try to analysis the violence that occurred in July 2016 by using some findings through the different levels proposed by Bellamy and Williams. Al local level, there are still some gaps in which the protection of civilians operates, as mentioned by interviewee CR2 the mechanisms of protection have to be more related with the community, it is not about just doing the patrol, it is about to have an integrated approach where for example includes more female peacekeepers but also interpreters. It is said that "female peacekeepers are more effective at gathering information from conflict-affected communities; at negotiating in difficult situations, such as at checkpoints; and at defusing tense situations in the field" (EPON, 2019: 50). At national level, the unwillingness of the host government is the main constraint that UNMISS had had to deal. Since the beginning the government has often constrained the ability of the mission to implement its protection mandate, which make difficult for UNMISS to access to different areas that need protection and assistance. As it occurred in July 2016, when one of the obstacles for UNMISS to deploy its troops were the constraints imposed by the government in its mobility.

At regional level, it can be observed that when the violence broke out in July 2016, it meant the collapse of the ARCSS, after all efforts made under the auspices of Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) during 18 months of negotiations, which also played a weak role during its negotiations. Al global level, it can be observed the role of the Security Council which could have been more effective, UN SC could have been provided more support in terms of human capacity and human resources. And finally at macro and structural level, the July 2016 was the result on lack of cohesion mandate, that showed that the mission was unprepared to intervene in scenarios where the state target civilians. The environment in which UNMISS operates is extremely challenging in addition to the combination of the ambitious mandate that include peacekeeping and peacebuilding alongside with the limited resources which creates large gaps, considering in a realistic way what the mission can really deliver.

Chapter 6 Conclusions

It cannot be denied that peacekeeping is considered one of the most important international mechanisms for contemporary conflict management. However, the fact that there is a lack of concrete definition of peacekeeping, resulted in a diversity of definitions from which no unified understanding could emerge. Likewise, its success and failures depend on different peculiarities and circumstances that are particular in each mission. Since its creation UNMISS has experienced a continuous cycle of intermittent violence, its mandate has changed from peacebuilding activities to peacekeeping activities and it has evolved according to the nature of the conflict, to the political landscape and to the dynamics of the violence.

The research question has explored how UNMISS contribute to peacekeeping and peacebuilding in the complex context of post-war violence in South Sudan but also it has explored which contextual and operational factors shaped the mission response in July 2016 crisis and how the mission's response has impacted in its short and long term goals of peacebuilding in South Sudan. In order to answer those questions peacekeeping and peacebuilding theories have been explored and the July 2016 crisis was analyzed through different levels. One important thing to highlight in this study is that in a multidimensional peace operation, the nexus of peacekeeping and peacebuilding embrace each other but also it creates difficulties for the mission to carry out its tasks.

The nexus of peacebuilding and peacekeeping emerged after December 2013 crisis, created a challenge for UNMISS to operate. By extending UNMISS's mandate from peacebuilding to peacekeeping, the SC had the opportunity to revise the mission's mandate and to improve for the better, however, the three settings (mandate, situation of the host country, and resources and capabilities) in which this study bases its analysis, found that the mission operates in a very challenge scenario, because the mission was established in a fragile state, with a history of violence, without the support of the host government, with a difficult terrain and with a dynamic environment. Likewise, the fact that UNMISS carries out peacekeeping and peacebuilding activities not only mean the increasing of responsibilities and capacities, but also the difficulty of implementing its activities, simply because both peace operations are distinct activities and because the SC provides little guidance on how the tasks have to be prioritized. In 2018, the SG of UN addressed the SC and requested to the member states "to sharpen and streamline mandates and put an end to mandate that look like Christmas tree" (UN SC 2018: 3). He particularly mentioned to UNMISS as a peacekeeping operation that simply cannot implement it 209 tasks.

After July 2016 crisis, there was a lot of re-thinking and re-evaluation in how to improve the way how UNMISS responses to such incidents, particularly in relation to the protection of UN staffs and civilians at UN PoC sites. The report of the independent special investigation into the violence in Juba 2016 stresses the recommendation of providing *"clear guidance and direction to the new incoming Force Commanders on the vision and expectations of United Nations Headquarters with respect to the implementation of the mandate, the rules of engagement and the use of force"*(UN SC 2016: para. 19(d)(i)). Following the 2016 crisis, UNMISS established the Operational Coordination Committee (OCC), in order to ensure that early warning signs were responded in a timely and coordinated manner, to avoid situations were conflicts reach high scales. However, the complexity of this mission makes it necessary to look beyond a real re-thinking and re-evaluation. It is not only about lack of preparedness, ineffective command and control of the operation of the mission itself, it goes more than the mission itself, it is also about the role of the SC in relation to peacekeeping operations which has been weak mainly due to the lack of political engagement. For instance, the SC cannot asks to UNMISS for the implementation of 209 tasks if there is no human and financial resources or in the

case of the violations of human rights and international humanitarian law in the host country, the SC has to be more willing to impose sanctions.

From my point of view, when UNMISS was established, the formula proposed by the troika (US, UK and Norway) in South Sudan was not the appropriate. South Sudan is a country without the minimum bases of peace and security. It is a country not strong enough to build a nation. The model of liberal peacebuilding promoted, involve western ideologies difficult to apply in contexts and scenarios completely different. Considering the political scenario in South Sudan, where none of the parties are willing to implement the R-ARCSS, and its dynamic and complex environment of violence. It is time for the SC to make a real re-think and re-build of a peacekeeping reform taking into consideration a more political engagement and the three scenarios proposed by Williams: success and security cost money; keeping the financial cost down is risky; and smaller mission does not work (Williams 2019: 15).

Appendices

Appendix 1
List of interviews

Code	Division	Date
CR1	Civil Affairs	20/08/2019
CR2	Gender	29/08/2019
CR3	Human Rights	30/08/2019
CR4	Political Affairs	03/09/2019
CR5	Human Rights	09/09/2019
CR6	Human Rights	11/09/2019

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