The African Union Mission in SUDAN (AMIS)

Experiences and Lessons Learned

ARVID EKENGARD

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FOI
Swedish Defence Research Agency
Defence Analysis
SE-164 90 Stockholm

Phone: +46 8 55 50 30 00
Fax: +46 8 55 50 31 00

www.foi.se

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Arvid Ekengard

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Avdelningen för Försvarsanalys

164 90 Stockholm

FOI, Swedish Defence Research Agency
Division of Defence Analysis

SE-164 90 Stockholm

Sammanfattning

AMIS, the African Union Mission in Sudan, verkade i Darfur från 2004 till 2007. Denna rapport syftar till att utvärdera AMIS. Härvid behandlas AMIS bidrag till fredsprocessen i Darfur, operationens försök att skydda civilbefolkningen samt dess försök att skydda humanitär verksamhet. Vidare undersöks hur erfarenheterna från AMIS har påverkat AU:s fredsoperationer i Somalia och Komorerna och uppbyggnaden av African Standby Force. AMIS var alltför liten för att nå sina mål, och led av brister i strategisk ledningsförmåga. Mandatet inkluderade att skydda civilbefolkningen, men denna uppgift var oklart formulerad. Därför tvingades befälhavare inom AMIS att själva tolka mandatet genom Rules of Engagement. För att upprätthålla tillräcklig force protection agerade AMIS mer passivt än vad mandatet tillät. AMIS närvaro förhindrade mord och fördrivning. På grund av dess begränsade resurser fortsatte dock våld mot civilbefolkningen och omfattande fördrivning, och AMIS stöd till fredsprocessen blev ringa. Operationen var beroende av stöd från omvärlden, främst EU. Utformningen av stödet gjorde dock att AMIS inte kunde planera långsiktigt. Framtida stöd till afrikanska fredsoperationer bör inriktas på att stödja både AU:s strategiska ledningsförmåga och att stödja enskilda afrikanska länder. Flera av AMIS svagheter kan observeras i senare AU-operationer. I Somalia godkände AU en alltför liten fredsoperation baserat på det felaktiga antagandet att FN skulle ta över operationen. AU:s operation i Komorerna har varit framgångsrik, men förberedelserna har liksom i AMIS-fallet påvisat splittring inom AU.

Nyckelord: AMIS, Afrikanska Unionen, Darfur, fredsoperationer, R2P

Summary

The African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) was active in Darfur from 2004 to late 2007. This report provides an evaluation of AMIS, looking at its contribution to the peace process in Darfur, its efforts with protecting civilians, and protection of humanitarian agencies. The report also covers the impact of the AMIS experience on the African Standby Force and the subsequent AU operations in Somalia and the Comoros. The report concludes that AMIS was too small to reach its objectives. The mandate included protecting civilians, but this task was formulated ambiguously. Thus, AMIS commanders were forced to decide on interpretations of the mandate through the Rules of Engagement, and acted more passively than allowed by the mandate. Where deployed, AMIS prevented murder and displacement. However, because of its limited resources, large-scale violence and displacement continued, and the mission could do little to support the Darfur peace process. AMIS was dependent on donors, especially the EU. However, the design of the support made long-term planning difficult for AMIS. For future international support to African peace operations, donors should both increase strategic command capabilities at the AU level and support individual African militaries. Several of the weaknesses of AMIS are seen in recent AU operations. In Somalia, an undersized mission was authorized based on the faulty assumption that the UN would take over. In the Comoros, the AU appears to have carried out a successful peace operation, but as with AMIS, the prelude displayed division between the AU member states

Keywords: AMIS, African Union, Darfur, peace operations, R2P

Contents

Preface

This report was written within the general framework of the FOI Studies in African Security program, a research thrust within FOI's Division for Defence Analysis. The work has taken place within the core project of this program: Project Africa, funded by the Department for International and Security Affairs (FÖ/SI) in the Swedish Ministry of Defence. Currently, one priority effort for this project is to increase knowledge and raise awareness about the African Union (AU) as a peace and security actor in contemporary Africa.

To help in providing understanding of the current capabilities and needs of the emerging AU Peace and Security Architecture, the Africa project is conducting a series of studies of the missions undertaken by the AU so far. In June 2008, a memo dealing with experiences from the African Mission in Burundi (AMIB) was published. This report, centred on the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS), will subsequently (autumn 2008) be followed by compiled experiences and evaluation of the missions to Somalia (AMISOM) and the AU Electoral and Security Assistance Mission (MAES) to the Comoros Islands.

The author would like to thank Dr. Robert Egnell, Karl Sörenson, and Emma Svensson at FOI for valuable support. Linnea Bergholm, a doctoral student at the University of Wales, Aberystwyth, gave constructive comments on an early draft and very generously shared a number of useful sources. The final result remains the responsibility of the author.

1 Introduction

Since 2003, Darfur has been the scene of unfathomable atrocities. Hundreds of thousands of people have died as a consequence of the conflict, and well over two million have been displaced from their homes. The magnitude of this human suffering is sufficient reason to investigate the international efforts at managing the conflict.

The Darfur conflict is not only a tragedy for the people living there, but is also part of a regional dynamic of insecurity, involving the whole of Sudan, Chad, Uganda, Central African Republic, Libya, Eritrea, and Egypt. Add intensified major power interest in Africa in general, and in Sudanese oil in particular, and it is evident that Darfur also has relevance for stability in Africa as a whole and for global security.

Increased involvement by regional organizations in conflict management is seen in many parts of the world. In Africa, this development is of particular interest, given the large number of conflicts on the continent. Sub-regional organizations, for instance ECOWAS, have been involved in peace operations for quite some time. However, the continental regional organization, the African Union (AU), launched its first peace operation in Burundi as late as 2003. Thus, the AU is still in the process of defining its future role in conflict management. As will be discussed below, AMIS had an impact on this process.

Evaluating AMIS can also be of use for informing Swedish policy towards African and the AU. Support for the evolving African peace and security architecture is a part of the official Swedish strategy for promoting international peace and security. The same strategy lists participating with Swedish units in AU-led peace operations as a goal.[1] The experiences drawn from AMIS can provide guidance on how to implement these policies.

1.1 Aim and Method

The aim of this report is to provide an evaluation of AMIS, and to investigate how the experience of AMIS has influenced the AU peace operations in Somalia and in the Comoros, as well as the continued build-up of the African Standby Force.

[1] Regeringen, "Nationell strategi för svenskt deltagande i internationell freds- och säkerhetsfrämjande verksamhet", Regeringens skrivelse 2007/08:51, March 13, 2008, p. 13-14, http://www.regeringen.se/content/1/c6/10/09/87/e611b8f5.pdf, last accessed July 25, 2008.

The study is largely based on secondary sources, including academic books and articles as well as newspapers. For accounts of decisions of the AU and the UN, primary sources such as official communiqués and UN Security Council resolutions are used. A small number of interviews with academics, former AU officials, and Swedish officers with experience from working with AMIS and the AU have been conducted.

For further reading, a number of sources on Darfur and AMIS can be recommended. For background on the long wars in Sudan, see *Sudan: The Elusive Quest for Peace* by Ruth Iyob and Gilbert M. Khadiagala. For a thorough treatment of the Darfur conflict, see *War in Darfur and the Search for Peace,* edited by Alex de Waal. Regarding the military experiences drawn from AMIS, see the report "The AU in Sudan: Lessons for the African Standby Force", compiled by Catherine Guicherd.

A significant source of information on the Darfur conflict in general, as well as on AMIS, is writings from humanitarian organizations and lobby groups such as Refugees International, Human Rights Watch, and International Crisis Group. While many of these studies provide detailed primary research, using such sources in a scientific setting can be problematic, since these organizations may have an interest to design their reporting in order to achieve their desired policy outcomes. Therefore, alternative sources have been used to verify the information, when possible.

1.2 Scope of the Study and Limitations

To put AMIS in perspective, the first section provides a concise background on the African Union, its role in conflict management and the AU's first peace operation in Burundi in 2003-2004. This section also covers the background to the conflict in Darfur, and an overview of the peace negotiations which led to the Darfur Peace Agreement in 2006. The second section is a largely descriptive account of the preparations for AMIS and its operations from 2004 to 2007. The third section evaluates AMIS, looking first at the mandate and the role of political decision-making within the AU for the effectiveness of AMIS. Then, the evaluation covers, in the following order, the role of AMIS in the Darfur peace process, AMIS' achievements in protecting civilians, AMIS' role in protecting humanitarian operations, and international support to AMIS. The fourth section deals with how AMIS may have influenced the AU's efforts at building up the African Standby Force, and the AU's ongoing peace operations in Somalia and the Comoros. In the fifth section, the most important conclusions from the study are summarized and discussed from the perspectives of an international division

of labor in peace operations and Western support to African peace operations capabilities.

A number of topics are dealt with only summarily. This includes the Darfur peace negotiations, which is a complex topic in itself. Also, the sections on the AU operations in Somalia and the Comoros are not meant to be comprehensive. The operation in Somalia, AMISOM, will be covered in depth in a separate forthcoming FOI report. UNAMID, the ongoing AU/UN hybrid operation which replaced AMIS on December 31, 2007 is discussed only from the perspective of how the prospect of a handover influenced AMIS.

2 Background

2.1 The African Union as an actor in the security arena

The African Union (AU) was born at the July 2001 OAU summit in Lusaka, Zambia.[2] Its predecessor, the Organization of African Unity had promoted respect for sovereignty and non-interference in the affairs of its members as political ideals for the African continent, but remained an unimportant actor in security affairs.[3] The AU, contrastingly, has taken on a dramatically changed security role. This is evident both from the Constitutive Act of the African Union, and from the AU's subsequent actions. In particular, article 4(h) of the Constitutive Act grants the AU the right to intervene without consent in a member state for three purposes: i/ to restore peace and stability ii/ to prevent war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity iii/ to respond to situations that constitute a serious threat to legitimate order. During its short history, the AU has also acted in line with its stated ambitions through the 2004 initiation of an African Standby Force and a Common Security and Defense Policy.[4] The AU has also launched peace operations in Burundi, Darfur, Somalia, and the Comoros.[5]

The African Mission in Burundi (AMIB) was the first peace operation taken on by the African Union. After a lengthy civil war, Burundi's warring parties signed the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement in August 2000. AMIB was launched in April 2003 as a substitute for an absent UN force, and was given four objectives: overseeing the implementation of the ceasefire agreement, supporting DDR initiatives, creating conditions enabling a follow-on UN peacekeeping force, and contributing to political and economic stability in Burundi. The mission was authorized a total strength of 3,335 military and civilian personnel. South Africa functioned as lead nation, and contributed the bulk of the troops together with Ethiopia and Mozambique. The South African dominance made some observers question whether AMIB really could be considered an AU

[2] Francis 2006, pp. 26-30. For an overview of the work of the African Union's involvement in conflict management see Bogland, Karin et al. "The African Union –A Study Focusing on Conflict Management". FOI user report FOI-R—2475—SE, May 2008.
[3] Francis, David J. *Uniting Africa. Building Regional Peace and Security Systems* (Ashgate 2006), pp. 11-24
[4] Francis 2006, p. 128-130
[5] The legacy of AMIS for the operations in Somalia and the Comoros is discussed below, see p 42-45

operation. The AU also received criticism for giving AMIB a weak mandate, especially with regards to the use of force. AMIB partly reached its objectives, as it managed to create the conditions necessary for it to be relieved by a UN force in May 2004. The DDR process was unsuccessful, largely due to resistance from the parties. Finance and logistics proved to be serious operational restraints.[6] Despite the difficulties in Burundi, the AU was to take on a much greater challenge in Sudan: AMIS. This became the AU's second peace operation.

2.2 The Darfur Conflict

Since independence in 1956, Sudan has seen more war than peace. Civil war raged from 1955 to 1972, and again from 1983 to 2005. These wars are generally described as a struggle over resources and power between the government in Khartoum and what eventually became John Garang's Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA). These wars are also characterized as being waged by a predominantly Arab and Muslim North and a largely African and Christian or animist South. Initially, the Southerners were primarily interested in increased influence within the Sudanese state, but as the conflict endured their demands shifted to self-determination and perhaps independence. Soon after the war resumed in 1983, several different groupings of African states tried unsuccessfully to mediate peace. These talks continued throughout the war, and created what has been called a "literature of accord" –a collection of documents which together indicated a general solution to the conflict which would be accepted by all parties. It was not until around 2001 that a number of developments changed the calculations of the parties and made a peace agreement possible. According to Morrison & de Waal, the most important of these developments was the intensified U.S. interest in the conflict following 9/11, and the resulting political pressure on Khartoum from Washington. In May 2004, the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) was signed, providing for increased power sharing between the North and the South, and an eventual referendum on self-determination for the South.[7]

[6] Svensson, Emma. "Lessons Learned from the African Union's First Peace Operation. The African Mission in Burundi". FOI memo 2471, June 2008.

[7] Morrison, J. Stephen and de Waal, Alex. "Can Sudan Escape its Intractability", pp. 161-182 in Crocker, Chester A. (Ed). *Grasping the Nettle. Analyzing Cases of Intractable Conflict* (United States Institute of Peace Press, 2005), pp. 161-164

However, the CPA did not bring peace to Sudan, as the Darfur conflict was about to reach its peak at the same time as the CPA was signed. At this point, there had already been violent conflict in Darfur for decades.

The Darfur conflict is often described in the media as being fought between "Arabs" and "Africans". This deserves some qualification. The population of Darfur is made up of several tribes. These are often characterized as being either cultivators or herders; herders are further divided into camel- or cattle-herders. The major cultivating tribes are the Fur and the Masalit, and the major herding tribes are Zaghawa, Baqqara, and Abbala. While Arabic is the lingua franca of Darfur and the mother tongue of the "Arab" tribes, the "African" tribes speak local languages as their first language.[8] Islam is the common religion of Darfur, with the majority of Darfurians belonging to a number of different Sufi sects.[9] The harsh climate of Darfur meant that these tribes had to learn to share scarce water and land for grazing and agriculture. In the early eighties, increasing desertification and severe drought strained this delicate balance. Also, Libya started to use Darfur as a staging ground for its war against Chad, which brought an ideology of Arab supremacy to Darfur. The Libyan involvement also resulted in an inflow of small arms to Darfur. These were the main elements of the eruption of violence in Darfur. In mid-1987, war broke out between the Fur and the Arab tribes. This was also the first time the word Janjaweed was used to describe Arab militias. As Khartoum largely ignored the situation, the war continued until May 1989.[10]

Ever since Sudan gained its independence, Darfur has been politically and economically marginalized by the central government. As a small Darfurian intelligentsia developed in the 1960's, a political movement aimed at promoting Darfur's position within Sudan was formed. This meant that by the late eighties, agricultural tribes such as the Fur and the Masalit faced conflict not only with their Arab neighbors but also with the central government. As a consequence, the 'African tribes' (Fur, Masalit, and Zaghawa) formed armed resistance groups in the late 1990's. By 2001, they performed sporadic attacks against police stations and army bases. In 2002, these three tribes decided to join forces against their common enemies. From the onset, there were two main rebel groups: the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A) and the Justice and Equality Movement

[8] Rolandsen, Oystein H., "Sudan: The Janjawiid and Government Militias", pp. 151-170 in Boas, Morten and Dunn, Kevin C. (eds.) *African Guerillas. Raging Against the Machine* (Lynne Rienner, 2007), p. 152
[9] Flint, Julie and de Waal, Alex. *Darfur. A Short History of a Long War* (Zed Books, 2005), p. 10
[10] Ibid., pp. 46-55

(JEM). The April 25, 2003 attack on the El Fasher airport is often pointed to as the starting point of the current civil war in Darfur.[11]

While the Government of Sudan (GoS) already had been lending support to the Janjaweed for quite some time, the increase in attacks by the rebels against government installations made Khartoum step up its support. As its army was occupied with handling the situation in Southern Sudan and elsewhere, it has been argued that the GoS enlisted the Janjaweed as a counterinsurgency force because of a lack of own military resources.[12] Indeed, Flint & de Waal claims that the rebels won 34 out of 38 engagements with the Sudanese Army during the first months of the war. The Janjaweed received small arms, communications gear, artillery, as well as military advisors from the GoS. This high level of coordination meant that it became difficult to distinguish between the Janjaweed and the paramilitary, state-controlled Popular Defence Forces (PDF).[13]

From October 2003 onwards, the Janjaweed shifted the focus of their campaign away from fighting the rebels, instead targeting civilians. By attacking and displacing villagers belonging to the ethnic groups on which the rebels were dependent for support, the Janjaweed and the GoS hoped to achieve their counterinsurgency goals.[14] The tactic of choice for the Janjaweed was combined assaults on villages. A typical assault on a village was initiated by bombing runs by fixed-wing aircraft, followed by strafings by attack helicopters. Then, the Janjaweed entered the village on foot, or mounted on camels, horses, or pickups to loot, rape, and kill. Often the villages were burned down to prevent return.[15]

By early 2005, almost 2 million people had become internally displaced, and another 200,000 had fled to Chad.[16]

2.3 The Abuja Peace Talks

Following the influx of refugees from Darfur into Chad, Chadian president Idriss Déby initiated the first foreign-led negotiations over Darfur. These negotiations led to the signing by the GoS and the SLM/A of the Abéché Agreement on September 3, 2003. The agreement provided for a 45 day ceasefire, control of

[11] Rolandsen 2007, pp. 154-159
[12] Iyob, Ruth and Khadiagala, Gilbert M., *Sudan. The Elusive Quest for Peace* (Lynne Rienner, 2006) pp. 151-152
[13] Flint & de Waal 2005, p. 101-103
[14] Ibid., p. 104
[15] O'Neill, William G. and Cassis, Violette. *Protecting Two Million Displaced. The Successes and Shortcomings of the African Union in Darfur.* Brookings-Bern Project on Internal Displacement, November 2005, p. 18
[16] Flint & de Waal 2005, p. 112

irregular groups and cantonment of SLM/A forces as well as for continued comprehensive peace negotiations. These negotiations were soon taken over by the African Union, and its seven rounds would last until May 2005. Its final result, the Darfur Peace Agreement, turned out flawed, most significantly because it was only signed by the GoS and one faction of the SLM/A, which had already disintegrated.

According to Dawit Toga, the AU entered the negotiations with the goal of preventing the Darfur conflict from spreading to neighboring countries, as well as preventing it from stalling the ongoing peace process in Southern Sudan.[17] A conceivable alternative goal would have been to *resolve* the Darfur conflict. If Toga's description is correct, this choice of a relatively low ambition on the part of the African Union can be regarded as on explanation for the limited success of the AU efforts at making peace in Darfur.

The Inter-Sudanese talks on Darfur, as the continued negotiations were called officially, were initiated in late March 2004. After initial GoS obstruction, the personal involvement of AU chairperson Alpha Konaré facilitated the Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement (HCFA), which was signed by the GoS, the SLM/A, and the JEM on April 8, 2004.[18] The parties agreed to:

1. Cease hostilities
2. Establish a Joint Commission (JC) and a Ceasefire Commission (CFC) which would be responsible for overseeing the implementation of the HCFA
3. Release prisoners of war
4. Facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance
5. Create a team of military observers, with an attached protection force, to monitor the ceasefire. This force was named the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS)

Thus, the HCFA meant the birth of AMIS. This agreement is of particular importance in connection with an evaluation of AMIS, as it came to form the basis for the initial mandate of AMIS. A major flaw of the HCFA was that is existed in two versions. The version adopted by the GoS stated that the SLM/A and JEM forces were to be assembled at designated sites, whereas the version kept by the rebels did not include this clause. Once the HCFA was concluded,

[17] Toga, Dawit, "The African Union Mediation and the Abuja Peace Talks", pp. 214-244 in de Waal, Alex (Ed). *War in Darfur and the Search for Peace* (Justice Africa/Global Equity Initiative, 2007), p. 215. Toga does not cite any source for this assertion; however as a former member of the AU negotiation team it is probable that Toga has first-hand knowledge of these issues.

[18] The HCFA is also known as the N'Djamena Agreement

AU officials raised the ambitions of the peace talks and aimed for a comprehensive peace agreement.[19]

From the second round onwards, the peace talks were held in Abuja, Nigeria, under the chairmanship of the AU. On September 1, 2004, a protocol regulating humanitarian issues was signed. This agreement called on the AU to strengthen AMIS. No agreement was reached regarding security issues. The third round lasted from October 21 to November 10, 2004. Its focus was to produce a common Declaration of Principles for a comprehensive peace agreement; however it proved impossible to make the parties sign such a document. This process continued during the fourth round, December 11 to 21, 2004. None of the modest commitments made by the parties at this round were respected. Only during the fifth round, June 10 to July 5, 2005, was the Declaration of Principles (DoP) finally signed. At this point in time, the SLM/A had already disintegrated into several factions. The DoP promoted the following principles: a federal system of government for Sudan, a clear division of power between local and national government and redistribution of national wealth. The sixth round, opened on September 15, 2005, with the aim of translating the agreed upon principles into a political framework for the resolution of the conflict. It was adjourned on October 20 without any results, largely due to a power struggle within the SLM/A. Despite intense effort by U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick and others, the seventh round was initiated without a united SLM/A leadership. Despite five months of negotiations, from November 29, 2005 to May 5, 2006, the Abuja Talks ended with the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) being signed only by the GoS and the SLM/A faction led by Minni Minawi. Neither the SLM/A faction led by Abdul Wahid nor the JEM signed the agreement. Toga argues that two factors in particular were responsible for rendering the Abuja Peace Talks unsuccessful: that the negotiations started at a point in time when all the parties believed that victory on the battlefield was possible, and the subsequent splintering within the SLM/A.[20]

The DPA quickly proved irrelevant on the ground in Darfur as violence increased shortly after the conclusion of the agreement.[21] Most of the rebel movements

[19] Abass, Ademola, "The United Nations, the African Union and the Darfur Crisis: of Apology and Utopia", pp. 415-440 in *Netherlands International Law Review*, 2007, p. 420
[20] Toga 2007
[21] Fadul, Abdul-Jaffar and Tanner, Victor, "Darfur after Abuja: A View from the Ground", pp. 284-313 in de Waal, Alex (ed). *War in Darfur and the Search for Peace* (Justice Africa/Global Equity Initiative, 2007), p. 285

were reunited in June 2006 under the name National Redemption Front (NRF), but this unity proved only temporary.[22]

Indeed, the Darfur conflict has lately grown even more complex, as Arab tribes started fighting each other in 2007, and the rebel groups kept splintering. Also, the IDP camps have become a source of insecurity as such, as several of the parties have brought arms into the camps and started recruiting fighters from among the IDP's. The Darfur conflict is increasingly destabilizing the region, most obviously in the relations between Chad and Sudan.[23]

[22] Fadul & Tanner 2007, p. 290-291
[23] International Crisis Group. "Darfur's New Security Reality", Crisis Group Africa Report no. 134, November 26, 2007.

3 AMIS

3.1 Preparing for AMIS

Following the signing of the HCFA on April 8, 2004, the Assembly of Heads of States and Governments of the African Union (commonly known as the AU Summit) authorized the deployment of AMIS. The HCFA included provisions for a Ceasefire Commission (CFC), composed of representatives of the parties as well as from the mediators (Chad and the EU). In order to get an assessment of the situation on the ground in Darfur, the chairperson of the AU Commission arranged for an AU Assessment Mission. The Assessment Mission visited Darfur May 7 to 13, and negotiated a Status of Mission Agreement (SOMA) with the Sudanese government. It was also tasked with identifying appropriate camp sites for the CFC and AMIS, to verify the positions of IDP camps, and to develop a logistics plan.[24] Based on this assessment, the Peace and Security Council of the AU decided that AMIS should be made up of an unspecified number of Military Observers (MILOBS).[25] The initial AMIS mandate was indeed limited, as it authorized AMIS troops only to monitor the ceasefire, and to protect the monitors as well as themselves.[26]

The first MILOBS arrived in El Fashir, Darfur only three weeks after the PSC had authorized AMIS, on June 4. These three officers had no vehicle, and only one Thuraya satellite phone.[27] The first Chairman of the CFC, a Nigerian general called Festus Okonkwo, declared AMIS operational on June 19, 2004. However, as the ceasefire was not respected by any of the parties, the AU Peace and Security Council asked the CFC for advice as to how to adapt the composition of AMIS to this situation.[28] As a result, AMIS was strengthened with a protection force of 300 soldiers, composed of one Nigerian infantry company and another one from Rwanda.

[24] African Union, "AU Dispatches a Reconnaissance Mission to Darfur", AU Press Release No. 039/2004, http://www.africa-union.org/News_Events/Press_Releases/039-04%20press%20release%207.pdf . Last accessed June 24, 2008.
[25] Human Rights Watch, *Imperatives for Immediate Change. The African Union Mission in Sudan.*, Human Rights Watch Vol. 18 No. 1A (January, 2006) p. 13-14 http://www.hrw.org/reports/2006/sudan0106/sudan0106web.pdf. Last accessed June 24, 2008. For an overview of the role of the PSC and crisis management decision-making in the AU, see Bogland et al 2007.
[26] O'Neill & Cassis 2005, p. 14
[27] Appiah-Mensah, Seth, "AU's Critical Assignment in Darfur. Challenges and Constraints", pp. 7-21 in *African Security Review* Vol. 14, No. 2 (2005), p. 8
[28] Human Rights Watch 2006, p. 14

The initial planning process had divided the area of operations into six sectors: El Fashir, Nyala, El Geneina, Kabkabiya, Tine, and Abeché (in Eastern Chad). When the sector commanders were ordered to deploy on July 22, they were each assigned four soft-skin vehicles, 5,000 U.S. dollars, and two Thuraya phones. When the protection force arrived in Darfur, the logistics system was severely strained. To resolve this acute situation, U.S. Department of State agreed to fund a contract with Lockheed Martin subsidiary Pacific Architectural Engineers (PAE) to handle camp construction, water and food provision, and laundry.[29] During the period June 2004 to December 2005, PAE built 32 camps around Darfur. In November 2006, total costs for PAE's work amounted to 7.8 million U.S. dollars per month.[30]

A major cause for the problems which AMIS faced during its initial deployment appears to have been deficient planning. This is repeatedly mentioned by analysts as one of the major shortcomings of AMIS. During a 2007 evaluation seminar, a former AMIS official said: "AMIS was never planned: it just happened".[31]

According to the original AMIS Concept of Operations (CONOPS), each sector was to include two MILOB group sites (MGS). At each group site, four teams of MILOBS were to be deployed. Each team was supposed to consist of ten MILOBS. As stipulated in the HCFA, these teams included representatives of the parties as well as AU and IC observers. According to Appiah-Mensah, the idea to include the parties in the observer force was a duplication of the arrangement used by the OAU in its Joint Monitoring Commission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in the late nineties. However, this meant trouble for AMIS from its inception, as the parties used their participation in AMIS as a means for collecting intelligence on their enemies.[32] Also, the parties used their presence in the CFC to block or delay investigations into alleged violations of the HCFA.[33] However, others argue that the presence of the parties in AMIS was an advantage at times, as it made it easier for AMIS to be accepted by the parties. Concretely, this advantage manifested itself for instance when a representative of the parties helped AMIS troops to negotiate passage through roadblocks

[29] Appiah-Mensah 2005, p. 9
[30] United States Government Accountability Office, *Darfur Crisis. Progress in Aid and Peace Monitoring Threatened by Ongoing Violence and Operational Challenges.* Report to Congressional Requesters GAO-07-9, November 2006. http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d079.pdf, last accessed June 26, 2008.
[31] Guicherd, Catherine (Rapporteur), "The AU in Sudan: Lessons for the African Standby Force". International Peace Academy, March 2007, p. 4
[32] Appiah-Mensah 2005, p. 14
[33] Chin, Sally and Morgenstein, Jonathan, "No Power to Protect. The African Union Mission in Sudan". Refugees International, November 2005, p. 5-7

belonging to that party.[34] The advantages of the arrangement diminished after the conclusion of the DPA, as this agreement stipulated that only the DPA signatories (the GoS and one SLM/A faction) could participate in the CFC. At that time, this meant that the majority of the rebels were blocked from CFC meetings, which contributed to the rebels increasingly seeing AMIS as taking the side of the GoS.[35]

3.2 AMIS II

The AU realized early on that AMIS did not have the resources to fulfill its tasks. A concrete suggestion for improvement was delivered in the report of the CFC Chairman to the PSC on October 20, 2004. This suggestion was to guide the composition of the expanded operation, known as AMIS II. AMIS II involved an increase in military strength to 2,341 troops, and the introduction of a civilian police (CIVPOL) component of 815 police.[36] AMIS II also received a somewhat expanded mandate from the PSC.[37]

With the new mandate as a foundation, AMIS II came to function as an "enhanced observer mission".[38] Three new sectors were added, in Kutum, Zalingue, and Al Daien. However, deployment lagged behind schedule because of poor logistics. In April 2005, only 2,200 of the mandated 3,320 personnel had arrived in the theatre of operations. Especially the civilian police component proved difficult to staff. As a measure to improve the strategic command and control capacity of AMIS, the CFC established the Darfur Integrated Taskforce within the AU headquarters in Addis Ababa.[39] Some of the major weaknesses of the preparations for AMIS I were still present during the deployment of AMIS II. For instance, there was still no pre-deployment logistics plan.[40]

After the introduction of the new sectors, the hierarchical organization of AMIS II looked as below:

[34] Johannes Saers, former UNMIS advisor to AMIS, interviewed in Stockholm, June 30, 2008
[35] Interview with Linnea Bergholm, July 23, 2008.
[36] Human Rights Watch 2006, p. 15
[37] See section 3.1 below
[38] Appiah-Mensah 2005, p. 13
[39] Human Rights Watch 2006, p. 16-17
[40] Guicherd, Catherine (Rapporteur), "The AU in Sudan: Lessons for the African Standby Force". International Peace Academy, March 2007, p. 16



Figure 1. AMIS II Mission Structure. Adapted from Boshoff, Henri,"The African Union Mission in Sudan. Technical and Operational Dimensions", pp. 57-60 in African Security Review, Vol. 14, No. 3 (September 2005), p. 58.

3.3 AMIS IIE

Early 2005 saw a continuation of ceasefire violations and human rights abuses in Darfur. As a reaction, the AU together with UN launched an assessment mission to Darfur in March 2005, with the purpose of investigating means of strengthening AMIS. This mission did not recommend changing the mandate, but pointed to weaknesses in command and control capabilities and logistics. It also recommended a phased expansion of AMIS. After the Military Staff Committee of the PSC revised the assessment mission's suggestion for the composition of the expanded force, this eventually became AMIS IIE. The expanded AMIS was authorized a total strength of 6,171 troops plus 1,560 personnel in the civilian police component. Again, poor logistical capacity delayed the deployment. Especially aviation fuel and camp construction proved to be limiting factors.[41]

[41] Human Rights Watch 2006, p. 30-31, 51

The increase in authorized troop strength meant that there should be roughly one infantry battalion in each sector. The revision also called for an expansion of the number of MILOBS Group Sites from fifteen to twenty-nine. The protection force was largely composed of troops from the following countries:

- Nigeria: 3 infantry battalions
- Rwanda: 3 infantry battalions
- South Africa: 1 infantry battalion, FHQ Reserve, 1 engineer company
- Senegal: 1 infantry battalion
- Kenya: 1 Military Police Detachment
- Gambia: 1 FHQ company[42]

The expansion did not significantly change the AMIS modus operandi. Patrols by MILOB teams with section- to platoon-sized escorts remained the preferred mode of operations. AMIS also engaged in escorts of AU and humanitarian convoys, and provided protection for the unarmed civilian police.[43]

The civilian police component, introduced in AMIS II and expanded with AMIS IIE, has received both praise and criticism. Its task came to be an odd combination of working together with the Sudanese police to strengthen its capacity and trust among Darfurians, while at the same time monitoring the Sudanese police and reporting breaches of the HCFA committed by the Sudanese police. To be able to work closely with the Sudanese police, the AMIS CIVPOL adapted its organization to the administrative boundaries of Darfur. Thus, CIVPOL deployed not only together with the military component of AMIS, but also maintained regional offices in each of Darfur's three states. As violence increased in IDP camps, the CIVPOL eventually established permanent police posts in the most sensitive camps. This process was delayed because of a lack of accommodations in the camps. As of March 2006, 26 out of 65 identified sensitive villages had permanent CIVPOL presence.[44] The civilian police component was as challenged as the military component when it came to logistics. The first 250 police that arrived in Darfur had only four cars to share between them. Since the civilian police component was multinational at the lowest organizational level, language barriers caused friction.[45]

[42] Appiah-Mensah, Seth, "The African Mission in Sudan: Darfur Dilemmas", pp. 2-19 in *African Security Review,* Vol. 15, No. 1 (March 2006), p. 4
[43] Appiah-Mensah 2006, p. 7
[44] Appiah-Mensah 2006, p. 9
[45] Cohen & Kälin 2005, p. 30

Another novelty in AMIS IIE was the introduction of a human rights and humanitarian affairs component. This component is not well covered in the literature on AMIS, but seems to have focused on coordination with humanitarian agencies.[46]

As AMIS expanded, its capacity for mobility kept lagging. Throughout the entire active life of AMIS, aid from international donors was necessary to keep AMIS mobile. For land movement, AMIS has relied on four-by-four vehicles for the bulk of its transports. In December 2004, the British government provided 143 vehicles. In 2005, British contractor Crown Agents was set to provide another 476 vehicles. The company also provided communications equipment, in particular Thuraya satellite phones and satellite data transfer systems (VSAT).[47] All in all, Crown Agents delivered over 1,000 vehicles to AMIS.[48]

In June 2005, Canada made available to AMIS 105 AGVP Armoured Personnel Carriers (APC's). However, the GoS did not allow the APC's to enter Sudan until October 2005, when 35 APC's were allowed in.[49] Not until December 2005 had all of the APC's arrived in Darfur.[50]

As for tactical air mobility, AMIS relied heavily on contracted civilian helicopters. In mid-2005, AMIS had access to eighteen Mi-8 medium transport helicopters, paid for by Canada and the Netherlands. These were all unarmed, had no tactical communications gear, and could only fly during daytime. These deficiencies severely limited the helicopters' usefulness as force enablers in a military operation. For fixed-wing aircraft, AMIS relied on three aircraft, two An-26 and one An-24, which PAE rented on AMIS's behalf on an ad hoc basis.[51]

On June 8, 2005, NATO decided to launch an operation to airlift AU troops into Sudan. This became NATO's first operation on African soil.[52] The operation lasted until AMIS was transformed into UNAMID on December 31, 2007.

[46] Appiah Mensah 2006, p. 9
[47] Appiah-Mensah 2005, p. 16
[48] Crown Agents, "Supporting the African Union in Darfur", http://www.crownagents.com/projects.asp?step=2&contentID=288&sectorID=11&serviceID=8&regionID=6, last accessed July 2, 2008
[49] Chin & Morgenstein 2005, p. 14
[50] Human Rights Watch 2006, p. 34
[51] International Crisis Group, "The AU's Mission in Darfur: Bridging the Gaps", Africa Briefing No. 28, July 6, 2005, p. 7-8. An-24 and An-26 are turbo-prop aircraft with a maximum payload of 5.5 metric tons, or about 40 passengers.
[52] Piiparinen, Touko, "The Lessons of Darfur for the Future of Humanitarian Intervention", pp. 365-390 in *Global Governance*, Vol. 13 (2007), p. 371

Eventually, 31,500 troops were airlifted by NATO. The NATO support also included training and mentoring of AU officers.[53]

Another critical area was intelligence. For an operation such as AMIS, a well-functioning intelligence component could have worked as a force multiplier, allowing the Force Commander to use his limited manoeuvre units proactively. Preventive deployments, in which AMIS deployed to an area where an attack on the civilian population was anticipated, proved effective in deterring attacks on several occasions. Unfortunately, the AMIS intelligence apparatus was inadequate. The only intelligence collection tools available were MILOBS and limited helicopter reconnaissance. The quality of the MILOBS reporting was uneven, and there was no common report format. When the MILOBS sent their reports through the chain of command, the reports were frequently distorted before reaching the Force Headquarters. As a consequence, the Force Commander did not fully trust AMIS' own reporting.[54] Qualified intelligence collection can be politically sensitive, but such assets would nevertheless have been invaluable to AMIS. Human Intelligence (HUMINT) assets together with modern aerial reconnaissance would have particularly useful, as it would have given AMIS information about the intentions of the parties as well as about troop movements.

In October 2005, AMIS suffered its first combat deaths, when two Nigerian soldiers were killed in an ambush together with two civilian contractors.[55] On October 9, 18 AMIS troops were kidnapped by members of a JEM splinter fraction. When AMIS sent a rescue force, they too were taken hostage. While JEM officially denied involvement in the incident, its leader Mohammed Saleh warned AMIS from operating in JEM-controlled territory.[56] The majority of the hostages were released shortly afterwards, but the incident is portrayed by many analysts as indicative of the weakened position of AMIS. In late August 2006, the GoS launched an offensive against the rebels in Darfur.[57] This was coupled with further attacks against AMIS by rebels groups, which caused AMIS to adopt

[53] NATO, "NATO Supporting African Union's Missions", Press Release, February 1, 2008. http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2008/p08-018e.html. Last accessed July 3, 2008.
[54] Interview with Johannes Saers, June 30, 2008.
[55] BBC, "Peacekeepers Die in Darfur Ambush", October 8, 2005. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/4323288.stm. Last accessed July 3, 2008.
[56] BBC, "Darfur rebels release AU hostages", October 10, 2005. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/4325822.stm. Last accessed July 3, 2008.
[57] Associated Press, " Darfur rebels say Sudanese government forces are pursuing offensive", September 3, 2006.

a more passive stance than before. As a result, the trust of the local population in AMIS was damaged.[58]

In 2007, AMIS came to suffer even worse losses. On September 29, an AMIS base in Haskanita in southern Darfur was attacked. Ten AMIS soldiers died in the fighting, while three went missing and another ten were wounded. The Haskanita attack was interpreted by analysts as a sign of AMIS being incapable of doing its job. The attack was also a strike against the unity of the AMIS troop-contributing countries, evident through the subsequent threat by the Senegalese president to withdraw the Senegalese contingent unless force protection levels were improved.[59] All in all, 59 soldiers died while serving in AMIS.[60]

In parallel to the ongoing work of AMIS, there had been a lengthy campaign in New York and elsewhere aimed at getting Khartoum to accept a UN force in Darfur. In November 2006, agreement was reached in negotiations involving the GoS, the permanent members of the UN Security Council (UNSC), the AU, and others to establish a hybrid AU-UN force. However, due to continued obstruction from Khartoum, it was not until July 31, 2007 that UNSC Resolution 1769 formally established UNAMID, the United Nations-African Union Mission in Darfur. As part of the preparations for the transformation into a hybrid operation, the UN established a two-pronged program for beefing up AMIS. The 'Light Support Package' was composed of technical assistance in the shape of military, police, and civilian advisors. The 'Heavy Support Package' consisted of additional troops, including a 300 strong Chinese engineering unit.[61]

The history of AMIS ended on December 31, 2007, when the UNAMID Joint Special Representative of the UN and the AU, and Head of Mission, Rodolphe Adada, took up his command at a ceremony in Addis Ababa.[62]

[58] Ferris, Elizabeth, "Internally Displaced Persons in Darfur: Taking Stock", Brookings Institution, May 2008. This view was also put forward by Saers, interview in Stockholm June 30, 2008.
[59] Aboagye, Festus and Boshoff, Henri, "16 October 2007: ISS Responds to Attack on AMIS Peacekeepers", Institute of Security Studies, October 16, 2007. http://www.iss.co.za/index.php?link_id=29&slink_id=5076&link_type=12&slink_type=12&tmpl_id=3, last accessed July 7, 2008.
[60] AMIS Information Office, "Mission Accomplished Darfur Integrated Task Force (DITF)", p. 3 in AMIS News Bulletin Issue 19 (December 2007).
[61] International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance 2008* (Routledge 2008), p. 275
[62] UNAMID, "UNAMID Takes over Peacekeeping in Darfur", Press Release, December 31, 2007. http://unamid.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?tabid=56&ctl=Details&mid=393&ItemID=28. Last accessed July 4, 2008.

4 Evaluating AMIS

4.1 The mandate: one step behind the realities on the ground

The insufficiency of the mandate given to AMIS is one of the most frequent criticisms raised against the mission. As the legal basis for military actions, the mandate is the natural benchmark to judge any peace operation against. Weak, unrealistic mandates have plagued peace operations since the birth of the concept. The first half of the nineties saw a sudden surge in the demand for peacekeeping, as well as in the supply of operations. A few of these become much-remembered failures, like the operations in Bosnia and Rwanda.[63] As attempts were made to improve the international response to civil war, there emerged a consensus view that the political bodies authorizing peace operations had a responsibility to equip the forces sent to make peace with "clear, credible, and achievable mandates", to use the language of the Brahimi Report.[64] This report was tasked with evaluating UN peace operations, which means that it focuses to some extent on the particularities of the UN system. However, many of its recommendations are applicable also to AMIS.

As mentioned above, the initial mandate of AMIS was derived from the provisions in the Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement. According to O'Neill & Cassis, the AU did consider a more robust mandate for AMIS, which would have included disarming the Janjaweed and protecting the civilian population. Instead, AMIS was initially authorized to i/ monitor the ceasefire and report violations of the HCFA and ii/ protect itself.[65] In the brief period from the deployment of AMIS I until the reinforcements authorized as AMIS II started arriving, there seems to have existed two main problems with the mandate. First, while the mission was to monitor a ceasefire, the ceasefire was not respected by the parties. Second, the resources available to AMIS was far from enough to fulfil the very limited mandate entrusted to the mission, as around 60 MILOBS were tasked to monitor an area the size of France.

[63] Durch, William J. and Berkman, Tobias C, "Restoring and Maintaining Peace. What We Know So Far", pp. 1-48 in Durch, William J. (Ed.), *Twenty-First-Century Peace Operations* (USIP 2006)., p 3-5

[64] United Nations Security Council/General Assembly, *Report of the Panel on UN Peace Operations,* p. 10-12. UN Document A/55/305 (also labelled S/2000/809), December 2000. http://www.un.org/peace/reports/peace_operations/docs/a_55_305.pdf, last accessed July 7, 2008. This document is commonly referred to as the Brahimi Report.

[65] O'Neill & Cassis 2005, p. 14

With the introduction of AMIS II, the PSC also introduced a new mandate. Whereas AMIS I had a straightforward mandate, the AMIS II mandate was a lengthy list filled with reservations. The mandate was formulated as follows:

- "To monitor compliance with the HCFA
- To assist in the process of confidence building
- To contribute to a secure environment for the delivery of humanitarian relief and the return of IDP's and refugees"[66]

The PSC specified how AMIS II was to achieve its mandate through a list of tasks. The most controversial part of this list concerned the protection of civilians and humanitarian operations. The PSC formulated AMIS II's tasks in this regard as being:

- "To protect civilians whom it encounters under imminent threat and in the immediate vicinity, within resources and capability, it being understood that the protection of the civilian population is the responsibility of the GoS
- To protect both static and mobile humanitarian operations under imminent threat and in the immediate vicinity, within capabilities."[67]

The mandate of AMIS II was still based on the HCFA, which meant that the operation came to continue to suffer from the fundamental weakness that its official task was to monitor a ceasefire agreement when there was no ceasefire to monitor. However, the introduction of the protection of civilians as a task for AMIS also reintroduced another weakness, namely a severe mismatch between resources and tasks. Thus, the AMIS II mandate was not 'achievable'. While the mandate included language about protection of civilians, it rested on the assumption that the Government of Sudan would bear the primary responsibility for the protection of civilians. As pointed out by many observers, this was not the case, as the GoS actively, as well as indirectly through its support to the Janjaweed, was taking part in the violence against civilians.[68] This introduced an element of confusion, and meant that the responsibility to interpret exactly what the respective responsibilities of AMIS and of the GoS were was left to the AMIS leadership. In the language of the Brahimi Report, this meant that the mandate was not clear. In addition, the lack of clarity regarding who was responsible for protecting civilians allowed for uncertainty about the goals of the mission within the ranks of AMIS.

[66] Williams, Paul D, "Military Responses to Mass Killing: The African Union Mission in Sudan", pp. 168-183 in *International Peacekeeping*, Vol. 13, No. 2 (June 2006), p. 176
[67] Ibid., p. 176
[68] O'Neill & Cassis 2005, p. 15

From comparing the writings of military officers who served with AMIS with the official communications of the AU, it appears that the issue of the mandate has been used as a batting tool in a blame game of sorts, where AU officials have argued that what was needed was not a new mandate but a more flexible interpretation of the mandate. According to this line of argument, the responsibility falls not on the political decision-makers but on the implementers. The military leaders, on the other hand, have stressed the need for a more robust mandate, perhaps hoping that additional resources would be following in that case.[69] Generally, academics and Western advocacy groups joined the calls for a stronger mandate.

The weakness of the mandate can partly be attributed to resistance from Khartoum. The GoS has throughout the process emphasized that its sovereignty must be respected, and that the protection of civilians mainly is a national responsibility. When Rwanda sent troops to AMIS in August 2004, Rwandan president Paul Kagame stated that his soldiers would act to protect civilians in danger. In response, Sudanese Foreign Minister Abdelwahad Najed reiterated that the job of the protection force within AMIS was to protect themselves and the MILOBS.[70] During the negotiations in the PSC over what mandate to give AMIS II, Khartoum was able to draw support from fellow Arab African states like Egypt and Libya, as well as smaller powers that feared the dominance of Nigeria and South Africa in the PSC. According to Kagwanja & Mutahi, this resulted in that the PSC stopped its campaign to persuade Khartoum to accept a force with a strong protection mandate.[71] Kwesi Aning underscores that Sudan as a relatively wealthy, functioning state was quite capable at influencing decision-making regarding Darfur both at the AU and at the UN.[72]

Once concluded, the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) widened the mandate somewhat. The new tasks included for AMIS to:

- "to 'increase the number of its military observers … [and] military observer sites'
- deploy 'Civilian Police … in IDP camps and areas of civilian habitation controlled by the Movements
- 'not tolerate gender-based violence and abuse of women and children'

[69] For examples of this phenomenon, compare Appiah-Mensah 2006, p. 10-12 with International Crisis Group, "To Save Darfur", ICG Africa Report No. 105, March 17, 2006, pp. 15-16
[70] O'Neill & Cassis 2005, p. 16-17
[71] Kagwanja, Peter and Mutahi, Patrick, "Protection of Civilians in African Peace Missions. The Case of the African Union Mission in Sudan, Darfur", ISS Paper No. 139 (May 2007). Institute for Security Studies, Pretoria, p. 6
[72] Interview with Kwesi Aning, July 28, 2008.

- ‘communicate to the Parties’ representatives in the Ceasefire Commission and commanders in the field that any Party that denies AMIS access to any area under its control is in violation of the ceasefire”[73]

Meanwhile, the DPA included provisions for the GoS to provide landing facilities for AMIS aircraft, and for the signatories to the DPA to allow AMIS unlimited freedom of movement in Darfur.[74] These new provisions did not fundamentally alter the mission of AMIS, but introduced another element of confusion, as only the GoS and the SLA/M faction led by Minni Minawi were signatories to the DPA.

The criticism of the AMIS mandate is usually based on the assumption that the AU was in a legal position to authorize a humanitarian military intervention (HMI) in Darfur, and the critics have repeatedly called for forceful intervention, sometimes to be led by NATO.[75] However, the assumption of the legality of intervention has been questioned by Ademola Abass, a law professor at Brunel University, who argues that the Constitutive Act of the AU does not authorize the PSC to deploy peace operations of enforcement character, only consensual peace operations. According to Abass, this was the view taken by members of the Peace and Security Directorate during public hearings regarding AMIS conducted in Addis Ababa in 2005 and 2006.[76] However, other legal scholars disagree, and claim that the AU very well could have authorized a military operation with an enforcement mandate in Darfur.[77] In either case, political expediency seems to have been equally important as international legal considerations.[78] Also, it is unlikely that the AU would have been able to muster the military resources required to launch a military operation without consent from Khartoum.

The debate over the adequacy of the mandate and the sufficiency of the force levels to fulfil that mandate frequently ignores a fundamental question: what the purpose of a stronger mandate and a larger, better equipped force would have been. As Alex de Waal points out, the strategic purpose and concept of operations for the imagined beefed-up force was not discussed by its protagonists.[79]

[73] Darfur Peace Agreement, Article 25, Paragraphs 230 to 238, cited in Abass 2007, p. 420
[74] Ibid.
[75] See for instance ICG 2005
[76] Abass 2007, p. 422-427
[77] Udombana, Nsongurua J, “When Neutrality is a Sin: The Darfur Crisis and the Crisis of Humanitarian Intervention in Sudan”, pp. 1149-119 in *Human Rights Quarterly*, Vol. 27 (2005), pp. 1167-1169
[78] Interview with Kwesi Aning, July 28, 2008
[79] de Waal, Alex, ”Darfur and the Failure of the Responsibility to Protect”, pp. 1039-1054 in *International Affairs*, Vol. 83, No. 6 (2007), p. 1044

Some analysts have argued that one needs to scrutinize not only the mandate, but also the Rules of Engagement (ROE). In UN peace operations, the ROE have repeatedly acted to constrain the actions of peacekeepers more than what is stipulated for the mission as a whole through the mandate, especially in operations with a civilian protection mandate.[80] Human Rights Watch specifically criticizes the AMIS ROE for being unclear on how to act when AMIS came across civilians in danger. The ROE did not allow for the use of deadly force in such circumstances, only the use of non-deadly force. HRW also criticizes the system in which decisions on the use of force was delegated through the chain of command. Since AMIS had poor communications systems in general, acquiring permission to use force often took an unacceptably long time. Another problem was that the ROE was not sufficiently well known at the lower levels of the AMIS hierarchy, which resulted in that AMIS actions depended to a large extent on the interpretation of the ROE made by the individual commanders.[81]

Based on interviews with MILOBS and senior AMIS commanders in Darfur in November and December 2006, Linnea Bergholm draws the conclusion that frustration over the lack of resources caused the senior leadership within AMIS to act more cautiously than allowed by the mandate. The AMIS leadership feared that if they took a proactive stance in protecting civilians, AMIS might be targeted by the parties. In interviews with Bergholm, Swedish civilian police who served in AMIS and II voiced criticism against the AMIS Force Commander for continuing to run AMIS as an observer mission even after the mandate had expanded in October 2004 to include protection of civilians.[82] This suggests that the mandate was not the main limiting factor in AMIS's work with protecting civilians.

4.2 To what extent did AMIS contribute to moving Darfur towards peace?

More than four years after AMIS troops arrived in Darfur, there is still no viable peace to be found there. It is evident that the combined efforts to create peace have failed. Clearly, the efforts of AMIS have not been sufficient. However, a nuanced evaluation requires looking into how AMIS' activities have influenced the peace process.

[80] Holt, Victoria K. and Berkman, Tobias C.,"The Impossible Mandate? Military Preparedness, the Responsibility to Protect and Modern Peace Operations", Henry L. Stimson Center, September 2006, pp. 79-99

[81] Human Rights Watch 2006, p. 23-29. It should be noted that the AMIS ROE have been kept confidential, but HRW reportedly possessed a copy of the ROE dated February 2005.

[82] Interview with Linnea Bergholm, July 23, 2008.

As noted by Williams, there was no room in the mandate for AMIS to take on the underlying political causes of the conflict in Darfur, the marginalization of Darfur as a region or the politically induced ethnic tensions.[83] Nevertheless, a few accomplishments are worth mentioning.

The monitoring, observation and reporting on compliance with the HCFA could potentially have contributed to the peace process. AMIS reporting could provide accurate information on the situation on the ground, which would have been useful for the mediators. Accurate information could also contribute to creating trust at the negotiating table. However, the presence of the parties in the Ceasefire Commission, as well as in AMIS, seriously reduced the usefulness of this aspect of AMIS' work.

The security situation did improve in Darfur in the early summer of 2005, at least security understood as the absence of large-scale attacks against civilians. However, it has been frequently pointed out that this could be explained by a lack of available targets, as approximately 75 percent of all villages in Darfur had been burned by February 2005.[84]

After the conclusion of the Darfur Peace Agreement, the impression of AMIS among the local population changed. Based on extensive interviews in Darfur during the fall of 2006, Fadul & Tanner write: "*In 2006, the strong consensus among non-Arab Darfurians was the African Union Mission, AMIS, was unable to protect people from violence –though some contingents did receive praise from local people, for instance the Rwandan forces in Kabkabiya. Not only was AMIS weak but it was increasingly seen as partisan*".[85]

The mandate instructed AMIS to "assist in the process of confidence building". This was operationalized by AMIS commanders into a number of initiatives. One example of this is attempts at mediation and conflict resolution. Concretely, this was done through arranging meetings between AMIS patrols and local leaders, and listening to the concerns of the locals.[86] These initiatives received praise from many outsiders. However, it is difficult to give an estimate on what impact such initiatives have had to reduce tensions in Darfur. Also, rather than being part of a coherent plan, mediation and conflict resolution initiatives were often taken in a decentralized manner, which meant that their impact was dependent on resourcefulness of individual AMIS officers.

[83] Williams 2006, p. 179
[84] O'Neill & Cassis 2005, p. 18
[85] Fadul & Tanner 2007, p. 308
[86] O'Neill & Cassis 2005, p. 36

In sum, AMIS contribution to the peace process in Darfur has been limited. Despite its deployment, fighting between government-sponsored militia and the rebels continued and intensified, and during the later part of AMIS' existence the conflict took on another dimension as some of the rebel groups started fighting each other.

4.3 AMIS and the protection of civilians

The protection of civilians is the aspect of AMIS that has received the most attention. In Western media, the Darfur conflict has largely been portrayed as being waged by the Janjaweed against civilians.[87] When evaluating the accomplishments of AMIS in this regard, one must remember that the protection of civilians was only partly within the mandate. Specifically, AMIS II was mandated to "To protect civilians whom it encounters under imminent threat and in the immediate vicinity, within resources and capability, it being understood that the protection of the civilian population is the responsibility of the GoS".[88]

Ironically, AMIS received most credit for protecting civilians during the first years of its operations, when the mission was at its weakest in terms of manpower. The civilian protection responsibility increased for AMIS with the signing of the DPA, which contained provisions for the demobilization of IDP camps and the establishment of a new community police force which would be responsible for maintaining order inside the camps. AMIS was tasked to provide perimeter security outside the demilitarized camps. Also, the DPA called for AMIS to protect humanitarian supply routes.[89]

AMIS used a number of methods to protect civilians. Occasionally, AMIS deployed troops to villages where attacks were expected, thereby managing to deter a planned attack. One successful example of this was the preventive deployment to Labado in South Darfur in January 2005. These deployments were sometimes done through consciously violating the mandate. For instance, the Labado deployment was done with under the pretext of protecting a construction project, whereas the real purpose was to prevent an expected attack on the town.[90]

[87] Murphy, Deborah, "Narrating Darfur: Darfur in the U.S. Press, March-September 2004", pp. 314-336 in de Waal, Alex (Ed). *War in Darfur and the Search for Peace* (Justice Africa/Global Equity Initiative, 2007), p. 314-317
[88] See note 64 above
[89] de Waal 2007, p. 1052
[90] O'Neill & Cassis 2005, p. 35

One particularly disturbing aspect of the atrocities directed by the Government of Sudan, and carried out by the Janjaweed, is the instrumental use of rape and sexual violence against women. The systematic use of rape and sexual violence has been verified through UN investigations as well as by independent humanitarian organizations. Members of the rebel movements also perpetrated such crimes, albeit reportedly not on a systematic scale.[91]

AMIS undertook a number of initiatives to protect women from sexual violence and rape. One such initiative was to arrange 'firewood patrols', which were operations to escort mostly women on expeditions from IDP camps into the bush to collect firewood. Without protection, women were routinely raped while moving outside the camps. The firewood patrols seem to have been an effective counter-measure, but they were not carried out systematically. In certain camps, the presence of AMIS during firewood patrols meant that upwards of 800 women gathered to participate in the patrols.[92]

Once the CIVPOL component of AMIS was introduced, the presence of AMIS civilian police in IDP camps increased security in the camps. Their presence is credited with having a positive effect on the behavior of the Sudanese police, which had the responsibility for maintaining law and order in Darfur. In a few instances, AMIS offered to patrol areas where IDP's had returned to their homes.[93]

These accounts show that AMIS has managed to protect civilians –but the extent of the protection is impossible to estimate based on this anecdotal evidence. At best, the accomplishments of AMIS within this area appear to have been limited.

In order to arrive at quantitative results, it is necessary to look into the admittedly flawed mortality statistics for Darfur. The Bureau of Intelligence and Research at the U.S. Department of State published a synthesis of the available information regarding mortality in Darfur from the eruption of the conflict in 2003 up until January 2005.[94] A number of observations can be made based on these statistics. First of all, there is considerable uncertainty in the estimates. Second, mortality

[91] See for instance International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur, "Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur to the United Nations Secretary-General", January 25, 2005, http://www.un.org/News/dh/sudan/com_inq_darfur.pdf, last accessed July 21, 2008, p. 87-95 and Human Rights Watch, "Sexual Violence and its Consequences among Displaced Persons in Darfur and Chad", HRW Briefing Paper, April 12, 2005, http://www.hrw.org/backgrounder/africa/darfur0505/darfur0405.pdf, last accessed July 20, 2008

[92] O'Neill & Cassis 2005, p. 44-45

[93] Ibid., p. 36-40

[94] U.S. Department of State, "Sudan: Death Toll in Darfur", Bureau of Intelligence and Research Fact Sheet, March 25, 2005. http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/45207.pdf, last accessed July 11, 2008, p. 2

owing to the conflict was at its peak before AMIS was deployed, meaning that its most serious deficiency was that the mission arrived too late. Third, since excess deaths continued to rise as AMIS I deployed during the summer of 2004, it appears that AMIS I had no significant result on mortality. It should be noted that there are other ways, most notably displacement, in which the conflict could have impacted on the lives of civilians, which are not included in the statistics. Also, it is conceivable that even more people would have died during this phase, should AMIS not have been present. Fourth, there is a notable decrease in mortality coinciding with the deployment of AMIS II from the fall of 2004 and onwards. This observation is compatible with the qualitative judgment presented by several scholars that AMIS achieved tangible results in protecting civilians during its first year of operations.[95] The second half of 2004 also saw an increased presence of humanitarian agencies, which probably also helped to decrease mortality.

To get a more complete picture, one should also consider population displacement. As a result of the continuously increasing humanitarian presence, there is better data available. The statistics on displacement tell a story similar the interpretation of mortality data above. Displacement was increasing when AMIS deployed to Darfur, and continued to rise until April 2005, when AMIS had been on the ground for almost a year. From the spring of 2005 until late 2005, the number of displaced people actually decreased marginally. After that, new displacement kept the total number of displaced persons rising continuously, reaching 2.44 million in April 2008.[96] It is conceivable that AMIS did not achieve a noticeable effect on net displacement until it had been reinforced to have the manpower to sustain a sufficient presence in the area of operations, something which might have happened in early 2005. However, an alternative explanation is that Khartoum's counterinsurgency objectives had been reached by the spring of 2005, and that the lull in displacement was the result of decreased hostilities rather than AMIS' presence. The observation that displacement kept increasing throughout 2006 and 2007 can be interpreted as AMIS being unsuccessful in protecting civilians for the last two years of its operations.

The challenge which AMIS faced with regards to protecting the civilian population in Darfur is further underlined if one compares with the force levels used in other peace operations. It should be noted that there is no quick formula for calculating how many troops that will be required to solve a specific task; this

[95] See for instance de Waal 2007, p. 1041, Ferris 2008, p. 2, and O'Neill & Cassis 2005, p. 12
[96] UNOCHA, "Sudan-Darfur: Humanitarian Profile –June 2, 2008. http://www.unsudanig.org/library/mapcatalogue/darfur/data/dhnp/Map%201226%20Darfur%20Humanitarian%20Profile%20June%203%202008.pdf, last accessed July 11, 2008.

will obviously depend on a number of factors, such as the size and war-fighting abilities of any opposing forces, the size and terrain of the country in question, the willingness to take casualties et cetera. Still, a comparison is useful to put the composition of AMIS in historical perspective. In a 1996 study, James T. Quinlivan with the RAND Corporation compared force levels in what he referred to as 'stability operations' from World War II and onwards. In order to maintain stability in peacetime, Western countries typically employ an average of about 3 security personnel per thousand of population.[97] For stability operations, force levels have often been as high as 10 per thousand population, with outliers such as the British counterinsurgency campaign in Malaysia in 1952, which reached over 20 security personnel per thousand population.[98] As the population of Darfur is judged to be about 6 million people, the lower of Quinlivan's benchmarks, three per thousand inhabitants, would yield a force requirement of 18,000. The higher benchmark of ten troops per thousand population would mean a requirement of 60,000 troops. As a comparison, AMIS numbered around 7,000 at its peak in late 2007.[99]

Another way of estimating force requirements is to link the size of the intervening force to the warring partners, requiring troop levels which are at least as large as the size of the largest warring faction in the country in question.[100] Applied on Darfur, this would mean that AMIS would have had to number somewhere in the range 80,000 to 220,000. The Sudanese Army consists of about 200,000 troops, but only has logistical capacity for 60,000, and the Janjaweed number roughly 20,000.[101] Bearing the reservations about these estimation methods in mind, the under-sizing of AMIS is still apparent.

In sum, AMIS did achieve modest accomplishments in the area of civilian protection, mostly due to initiatives at the lower levels of the AMIS hierarchy. However, large-scale displacement and violence against civilians continued throughout AMIS' existence.

[97] Including police officers and civilian support personnel
[98] Quinlivan, James T., "Force Requirements in Stability Operations", pp. 59-69 in *Parameters: U.S. Army War College Quarterly*, Vol. 25, no. 4 (Winter 1995).
[99] International Institute for Strategic Studies 2008, p. 275.
[100] O'Hanlon, Michael and Singer, P.W., "The Humanitarian Transformation: Expanding Global Intervention Capacity", pp. 77-100 in *Survival,* Vol. 46, No. 1 (Spring 2004), p. 79 and note 7.
[101] Gompert, David C.- Richardson, Courtney - Kugler, Richard L.- Bernard, Clifford H., "Learning From Darfur. Building a Net-capable African Force to Stop Mass Killings", National Defense University Center for Technology and National Security Policy, July 2005, p. 10

4.4 AMIS and the protection of humanitarian assistance

Once the Darfur conflict gained international attention in 2004, humanitarian assistance started arriving in large quantities. The number of relief workers in Darfur increased from 230 in April 2004 to 17,093 in April 2008.[102] However, the security situation prevented the efficient delivery of aid to the population in need. In 2005, humanitarian organizations started being targeted directly, primarily through robberies and intimidation.[103] Cooperation between military organizations and the humanitarian community has historically been characterized by mutual suspicion.[104] AMIS did not prove an exception.

As noted above, part of AMIS' mandate was to "to protect both static and mobile humanitarian operations under imminent threat and in the immediate vicinity, within capabilities".[105] As a result, AMIS engaged in cooperation with the humanitarian community. For instance, AMIS agreed to provide escorts for UN human rights observers from July 2005 and onwards. AMIS also participated in information sharing and joint planning through the Protection Working Groups, where UN agencies and NGO's coordinated their work. While criticized for inconsistent participation, the AMIS presence contributed to increased information sharing and confidence building between AMIS and those tasked with the delivery of humanitarian assistance.[106]

To some extent, the deficiencies in the cooperation between AMIS and the humanitarian community stemmed from resistance from the humanitarians. In some parts of Darfur, AMIS was not invited to coordination meetings, or was only welcomed sporadically. In other instances, NGO's refused AMIS escorts out of fear of being associated with the military operation and thereby loosing their neutral stance.[107]

[102] UNOCHA, "Sudan-Darfur: Humanitarian Profile –June 2, 2008. http://www.unsudanig.org/library/mapcatalogue/darfur/data/dhnp/Map%201226%20Darfur%20Humanitarian%20Profile%20June%203%202008.pdf, last accessed July 11, 2008

[103] Chin & Morgenstein 2005, p. 2

[104] Winslow, Donna, "Strange Bedfellows in Humanitarian Crises: NGOs and the Military", pp. 113-129 in Mychajlyszyn, Natalie and Shaw, Timothy M., *Twisting Arms and Flexing Muscles. Humanitarian Intervention and Peacebuilding in Perspective*. Ashgate, 2005.

[105] See note 65 above

[106] O'Neill & Cassis 2005, p. 38, 40

[107] Chin & Morgenstein 2005, p. 19-20

4.5 International support to AMIS

AMIS could not have been realized without support from the outside world. This support came mostly from the EU, and from its member states bilaterally. Canada, Norway, the U.S., and the UN also provided different types of support. While vital for sustaining the operation, the way in which outside support was provided to the AU sometimes became a constraining factor.

EU support for what was to become AMIS was initiated in January 2004.[108] This assistance was formalized into the 'AMIS EU Supporting Action' on July 18, 2005, and lasted until AMIS was relieved by UNAMID on December 31, 2007.[109] In addition to supporting the peace process through participation in the Abuja peace process, the EU provided military and police support. In 2005, the military component included 19 operational and logistics planning officers, which were attached to the Darfur Integrated Task Force in Addis Ababa, the mission headquarters in Khartoum, and the Joint Logistics Operations Center in El Fashir. The EU also provided strategic and tactical air transport, and movement coordination services through the European Airlift Center. In-kind support consisted of vehicles, communications equipment, and other types of equipment. The EU Military Staff provided advice to the AMIS operational planners. The Vice-Chairman of the Ceasefire Commission was appointed by the EU, as well as 11 MILOBS.

The EU's largest contribution came as financial contributions to cover most of AMIS' costs. All in all, this support amounted to about 300 million euro, taken partly from the EU program, the African Peace Facility. The African Peace Facility was established in 2004 as a mechanism to support peace operations led, operated, and staffed by African countries on the African continent.[110] In addition, the EU member states contributed 200 million euro through bilateral channels.[111]

[108] Council of the European Union, "Darfur - Consolidated EU package in support of AMIS II", Factsheet, October 2005, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/AMIS_II_October.pdf, last accessed July 14, 2008.
[109] Council of the European Union, "EU Support to the African Union Mission in Sudan –AMIS", no date of information available, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/showPage.asp?id=956&lang=EN&mode=g, last accessed July 14, 2008.
[110] Piiparinen 2007, p. 385-386
[111] Council of the European Union, "EU support to the African Union Mission in Darfur – AMIS", Factsheet, January 2008. http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/declarations/97865.pdf , last accessed July 14, 2008.

While EU financial support was indispensable for sustaining AMIS, the ad hoc manner in which it was disbursed also created a measure of uncertainty. In August 2005, the financial situation became so acute that AU officials chose to raise their concerns over the lack of funding in the press, begging the donor countries to come up with more money.[112]

Like the EU, the UN also supported AMIS in various ways. The UN's work in Sudan was initially focused on the North-South conflict. In 2004, the United Nations Advance Mission in Sudan (UNAMIS) was launched, concentrating on facilitating the peace negotiations regarding that conflict. As violence erupted in Darfur, the UN authorized UNAMIS to assist the AU with mission planning through resolution 1556. Later on, the UN established a planning cell in Addis Ababa to help the Darfur Integrated Task Force with strategic planning for AMIS.[113] On March 24, 2005, the UNSC adopted UNSC Resolution 1590, which established UNMIS, the United Nations Mission in Sudan. The main task for UNMIS was to oversee the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) which had been concluded between the government of Sudan and the Sudanese People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) on January 9, 2005.[114] This agreement was supposed to end the long conflict between Khartoum and rebels in Southern Sudan. However, UNMIS was also tasked with assisting AMIS. Resolution 1590 states that UNMIS was to "closely and continuously liaise and coordinate at all levels with the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) with a view towards expeditiously reinforcing the effort to foster peace in Darfur, especially with regard to the Abuja peace process and the African Union Mission in Sudan".[115]

UNMIS suffered an immediate setback when long-time leader of the SPLM/A, John Garang, died in July 2005. This created a potential for a revival of the North-South conflict, and increased the uncertainty facing UNMIS. Consequently, the UN Secretary-General wrote in his report dated May 3, 2005 regarding the UNMIS 'force reserve': "it is required to ensure the safety and

[112] IRIN, "Sudan: African Union short of funds for Darfur mission", August 18, 2005. http://www.irinnews.org/report.aspx?reportid=55894, last accessed July 14, 2008.
[113] United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, "Sudan - UNMIS – Background", no date of information available, http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/unmis/background.html, last accessed July 15 2008.
[114] Iyob & Khadiagala 2006, p. 185
[115] United Nations Security Council, "Resolution S/RES/1590 (2005)", http://www.unmis.org/english/documents/resolutions/res1590.pdf, last accessed July 14, 2008, p. 3

security of UNMIS personnel and cannot be diverted to Darfur".[116]

Nevertheless, the UN extended some useful support to AMIS. During the period August 18 to 27, 2005 the UN together with the EU, NATO and the U.S. undertook a map exercise (MAPEX) at AMIS force headquarters in El Fashir. In 2005, the UN also arranged training for AMIS personnel covering human rights, policing, rule of law and gender-based violence, and deployed 49 human rights officers to Darfur.[117]

In 2006, UN support to AMIS shifted in character to become a method for transforming AMIS into the hybrid UN-AU force UNAMID. In November and December 2006, the UN and the AU agreed on a three-phased approach for accomplishing the transformation. The GoS expressed its approval of the plan.[118] The first phase consisted of the UN sending a 'Light Support Package' to AMIS, consisting of UN advisors and equipment such as GPS devices, night vision goggles, tents, and generators. In April 2007, 186 personnel were attached to AMIS as part of the Light Support Package, whereof 105 military, 33 police, and 48 civilians.[119] The implementation of the Light Support Package seems to have had some impact on the effectiveness of AMIS, but suffered from interruptions. For instance, a Swedish UNMIS officer spent seven months building up an UNMIS intelligence cell which would support the intelligence work of the AMIS Force Headquarters. After those seven months, no replacement arrived to continue that support.[120]

The second phase was labelled the 'Heavy Support Package', and meant reinforcing AMIS considerably with military, civilian, and police units. The plan called for sending an additional 2,250 soldiers, 721 police, and 1,136 civilians, all to be funded by the UN. The third and last phase was the formal transformation of AMIS into UNAMID. Due to obstruction from the GoS, the techni-

[116] United Nations Security Council, "Report of the Secretary-General on United Nations assistance to the African Union Mission in the Sudan", May 3, 2005, S/2005/285. http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N05/321/37/PDF/N0532137.pdf?OpenElement, last accessed July 15, 2008, p. 4

[117] United Nations Security Council, "Report of the Secretary-General on the Sudan", September 12, 2005, S/2005/579. http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N05/482/07/PDF/N0548207.pdf?OpenElement, last accessed July 15, 2008, p. 1-12

[118] United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, "Darfur – UNAMID – Background", no date of information available, http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/unamid/background.html, last accessed July 16, 2008.

[119] Aboagye, Festus, "The Hybrid Operation for Darfur. A Critical Review of the concept of the mechanism", Institute for Security Studies Paper No. 149 (August 2007), p. 14.

[120] Interview with Johannes Saers July 30, 2008.

calities of this phase were not agreed on until May 12, 2007, when the GoS gave its approval.[121]

AMIS also received support from the United States and from Canada. The U.S. efforts in Darfur focused on humanitarian aid, providing almost half of the total funding for humanitarian aid from the international community in the period 2004 to 2006.[122] Related to AMIS, the U.S. contribution was mainly funding the contractor PAE, which provided logistics support to AMIS, and sending a few military observers.[123] As noted above, Canada provided AMIS with 105 armoured personnel carriers.

[121] United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, "Darfur – UNAMID – Background", no date of information available, http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/unamid/background.html, last accessed July 16, 2008.
[122] U.S. Government Accountability Office 2006, p. 21
[123] Ibid., p. 54-55

5 The impact of the AMIS experience on the African Union

Being the AU's second peace operation, and the most scrutinized operation to date, AMIS has shaped the continued work of the AU in conflict management in several ways. These will be dealt with below under three headings: first, the impact of AMIS on the build-up of the African Standby Force. Second, how the lessons of AMIS are reflected in the AU Mission in Somalia, AMISOM. Third, how these lessons are reflected in the AU-led operation in the Comoros.

5.1 The importance of lessons learned from AMIS for the African Standby Force

As could be expected for an organization as young as the AU, a complex operation such as AMIS has inspired reflection on how that experience can guide future operations. By examining the initiatives related to peace operations undertaken by the AU subsequent to the launch of AMIS, it is possible to distinguish the impact of the AMIS experience. One important initiative is the creation of the African Standby Force (ASF). ASF is an attempt to create a robust rapid-reaction capability to deal with crises on the African continent. The foundation of ASF is five standby brigades, one each for the five major regional African organizations, with attached civilian police and other capabilities. The protocol establishing ASF entered into force in December 2003.[124] Thus, work was already underway on ASF when AMIS was launched.

In October 2006, the International Peace Academy arranged a seminar in Accra, Ghana where senior military and police officers, currently or formerly serving with AMIS, reflected on what the AMIS experience meant for the continued development of the African Standby forces. The participants found the following to be the most serious shortcomings of AMIS:

- Insufficient planning early on in the mission
- Lack of clarity in the mission structure, especially with regards to coordination of the military, civilian, and police components
- Weak strategic command capabilities
- Weak operational command capabilities

[124] Cilliers, Jakkie, "The African Standby Force. An Update on Progress". Institute for Security Studies Paper No. 160 (March 2008), p. 1-2

- Insufficient capacity to deal with external actors, such as the GoS, donor countries, and UN agencies
- Insufficient logistics resources and logistics management capability
- Insufficient communications and information systems
- Slow force generation and weak personnel management
- Strong financial dependence on partner countries and over-dependence on technical advice from partner countries[125]

It is notable that these weaknesses all relate to the command and control capabilities of the higher levels of the AMIS hierarchy. This may be a consequence of the fact that the participants had been working in relatively senior positions, but the lack of criticism is consistent with the bulk of the literature on AMIS, which generally gives credit to AMIS's work at the tactical level and below.

Acknowledging past mistakes does not necessarily mean introducing the necessary reforms to avoid them in the future. However, there are signs of the AU acting on its weaknesses. According to LtCol Percy Hansson, the Swedish military attaché in Addis Ababa, it is evident that the AU has learned from AMIS, and has taken measures to prevent the same mistakes from happening again. For instance, senior officials in the Peace Support Operations Division in the AU secretariat routinely talk about the importance of incorporating military, police, and civilian components in peace operations. Also the importance of a clear division between strategic, operational, and tactical levels of command is often talked about among senior AU officials. However, these officials are also frustrated by the lack of resources to implement improvement in these areas. This means that the AU with a pragmatic attitude seeks bilateral support, while trying to maintain the appearance of 'African solutions to African problems'. These observations indicate that AMIS meant a forced learning process for the peace operations wing of the AU. On the other hand, in some instances resources were diverted from the development of the regional brigades to AMIS, and later to UNAMID. This is evident in the case of EASBRIG, the standby brigade maintained by the East African regional organization Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), from which command and control resources were diverted to AMIS and UNAMID.[126]

[125] Guicherd 2007, p. 3-4. This report provides a detailed description of the lessons learned from AMIS.
[126] Interview with Percy Hansson, July 15, 2008.

5.2 AMIS and AMISOM: structural weaknesses remain

In 2007, AMISOM in Somalia became the third AU peace operation. AMISOM was formally established on January 19, 2007 by the Peace and Security Council of the AU. By March 2007, 1,700 troops from Uganda had arrived, operating mainly in Mogadishu and Baidoa. Funding for AMISOM came partly from the EU, and the AU asked NATO to provide air transport.[127] In March 2008, AMISOM comprised 2,450 troops from Uganda and Burundi.[128]

The AU peace operation in Somalia adds a bleak perspective regarding how the AU has incorporated the lessons of AMIS. The problems with force generation persisted, as only 2,450 troops had arrived in Somalia by March 2008.[129] This should be compared with the pledges from the troop-contributing countries, which totalled 9,000 soldiers in January 2007. These troops are supposed to replace the Ethiopian forces which helped the Somali interim government to oust the Islamist coalition, the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC).[130] UIC stated already in 2005 that they would consider an AU force their enemies and wage war against them, should the AU decide to intervene.[131]

Problems with strategic level management of the operation caused the UN to send a ten-man assistance team to AU headquarters to help with strategic planning.[132] While AU officials still express the desire to provide an African solution to the Somali problem, the AU's stated ambition with AMISOM is to prepare the ground for a future UN mission.[133] UN Secretary-General instructed

[127] Murithi, Tim, "The African Union's Evolving Role in Peace Operations: the African Union Missions in Burundi, the African Union Mission in Sudan and the African Union Mission in Somalia", pp. 70-82 in *African Security Review*, Vol. 17, No. 1 (January 2008), p. 80-81

[128] Opérations de Paix. "Mission de l'Union Africaine en Somalie", http://www.operationspaix.net/-AMISOM-. Last accessed July 3, 2008.

[129] See notes 5 and 6 above

[130] BBC, "Five killed in Mogadishu attacks", January 26, 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/6301809.stm, last accessed July 17, 2008. The 9,000 troops pledged according to the article includes a promised contribution from Malawi which subsequently was withdrawn by the president of Malawi

[131] BBC, "Somali 'jihad' on foreign troops", March 25, 2005, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/4382311.stm, last accessed July 17, 2008.

[132] Ramsbothan, Alexander, "Peacekeeping Mission Updates: April–September 2007", pp. 268-282 in *International Peacekeeping,* Vol. 15, No. 2 (April 2008).

[133] Interview with Percy Hanson, July 15, 2008.

the UN DPKO to initiate planning for such an operation in April 2007.[134] As of May 2008, there was no indication that such a mission would become reality.[135]

Thus, the situation the AU is facing in Somalia is similar to Darfur: a complex humanitarian and political emergency, where there is strong opposition to an intervention from at least one party to conflict. As in Darfur, the UN is talking about a robust military intervention, but dragging its feet when it comes to launching such an operation.

Another parallel between AMIS and AMISOM is found at the political level. AMISOM was given the following mandate by the PSC: "(i) to provide support to the TFIs in their efforts towards the stabilization of the situation in the country and the furtherance of dialogue and reconciliation, (ii) to facilitate the provision of humanitarian assistance, and (iii) to create conducive conditions for long-term stabilization, reconstruction and development in Somalia". To fulfil the mandate, AMISOM was authorized a strength of nine infantry battalions, totalling 7,650 troops.[136] This balance between tasks and resources could have been reasonable, should the AU mission have been replaced by the UN after six months, as was the original intention of the AU.[137] However, when the UN did not show up, AMISOM remained far too small to accomplish its tasks, just like AMIS did.

Also in other areas, the problems facing AMISOM are similar to those experienced by AMIS. In a report dated March 14, 2008, the UN Secretary-General pointed to finance, logistics, and force generation as the main constraints for AMISOM. Sweden has pledged to provide AMISOM with a level-II hospital. The EU, China, the Arab League, and individual European countries are making financial contributions. The U.S. is funding the Ugandan contribution, and is providing airlift together with NATO. Still, this aid is judged by the UN as far from enough to make AMISOM viable.[138]

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[134] Ramsbothan 2008, p. 268

[135] Security Council Report, "Update Report No. 1 –Somalia", May 2, 2008, http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/site/c.glKWLeMTIsG/b.4096805/, last accessed July 17, 2008.

[136] Peace and Security Council of the African Union, "Communiqué of the 69th Meeting of the Peace and Security Council", PSC/PR/COMM(LXIX), January 19, 2007, http://www.africa-union.org/root/UA/Conferences/2007/janvier/PSC/19%20jan/Communiqu%C3%A9%20Somalia%2069th%20Eng%2019jan07.doc, last accessed July 17, 2008, p. 2

[137] Ibid., p. 3

[138] United Nations Security Council, "Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Somalia", March 14, 2008, S/2008/178, http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N08/264/17/PDF/N0826417.pdf?OpenElement, last accessed July 17, 2008.

5.3 AMIS and the AU operation in the Comoros

The March 2008 AU operation in the Comoros, 'Democracy in Comoros', is a rather different type of African peace operations. The Comoros, a three-island state outside of the coast of Mozambique, has throughout its history been plagued by instability and repeated coups. After former rebel leader Mohamed Bacar seized power over one of the three islands, Anjouan, in 2001 and subsequently rigged an election to legitimize his rule, the AU became involved in supporting the legitimate government of the Comoros in regaining control over the country. On May 9, 2007, the PSC authorized the setting up of the African Union Electoral and Security Assistance Mission to the Comoros (MAES), initially for the period May 13 to July 31, 2007.[139] The mandate has since been continually renewed. In October 2007, the PSC introduced a travel ban against Bacar, and froze funds belonging to him and his associates held in AU member states' banks.[140] As Bacar showed no sign of holding new, fair elections, nor accepted the deployment of MAES to Anjouan, the AU stepped up its public denunciation of the rogue regime.[141] On February 20, 2007, the PSC mandated MAES to deploy in Anjouan "in order to facilitate the restoration of the authority […] in Anjouan". France offered to transport the AU troops as far as to the other islands of the Comoros, but not to Anjouan itself.[142]

On March 25, 2008, an invasion was launched. 1,350 troops from Tanzania and Sudan seized the island together with troops from the Comoros. South African president Thabo Mbeki publicly voiced criticism over the decision to use force, since South Africa had been involved in ongoing mediation attempts.[143] After the invasion, the PSC gave MAES a new mandate, involving collecting arms in Anjouan, assisting in the organization of new elections, helping to establish a new internal security force, and assisting with improving governance and rewriting the constitution of the Comoros.[144] On June 15, 2008, the first round of

[139] Peace and Security Council of the African Union, "Communiqué", PSC/PR/Comm(LXXXIV), July 31, 2007.
[140] Peace and Security Council of the African Union, "Communiqué of the 95th Peace and Security Council Meeting", PSC/PR/Comm(XCV), October 10, 2007.
[141] AllAfrica.com, "Comoros: African Union Flies in to Demand Elections", June 25, 2007, http://allafrica.com/stories/200706250188.html, last accessed July 18, 2008.
[142] IRIN, "COMOROS: On the edge of a 'military solution' ", February 22, 2008, http://www.irinnews.org/Report.aspx?ReportId=76898, last accessed July 18, 2008.
[143] The Guardian, "African Union troops quell Comoros rebellion", March 26, 2008. http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/mar/26/1. Last accessed July 3, 2008.
[144] Peace and Security Council of the African Union, "Communiqué of the 124th Meeting of the Peace and Security Council", PSC/PR/Comm(CXXIV), April 30, 2008.

presidential elections was held in Anjouan. The elections appear to have worked out smoothly so far.[145]

The AU involvement in the Comoros is very different from AMIS. One obvious difference lays in the complexity of the mission: whereas Darfur is an area the size of France, with rough terrain and vast distances, Anjouan is a small island measuring roughly 40 by 40 kilometres, with a population of about 300,000.[146] The armed resistance facing the AU troops was negligible compared to that in Darfur or Somalia. This observation has led some analysts to claim that the Comoros operation was initiated so that the AU could add a successful peace operation to its resume, after the mixed results of its previous operations.[147]

Still, the AU was dependent on France and the U.S. for airlifting its troops to the islands. On the political level, the Comoros operation displays improvement compared with AMIS. MAES did not suffer from the major flaws of AMIS, unachievable mandates and poor strategic planning. However, it is notable that South Africa, a major player in African politics, did not approve of the invasion. This curious circumstance was possible since both the Peace and Security Council and the Assembly of Heads of State, which decides on intervention in AU member states, can make decisions by two thirds majority.[148]

In sum, MAES and operation 'Democracy in Comoros' represent a different type of AU peace operation. The challenges facing the AU in the Comoros were different from those in Darfur – in many ways, the operating environment was more conducive than in Darfur. Therefore, it is difficult to use the Comoros as a tool for measuring how much the AU has implemented the lessons from AMIS. Still, MAES should rightfully be considered an AU success story, at least so far. This might prove very important for the African Union's and its member states' continued willingness to engage in peace operations.

[145] The Ethiopian News Agency, "AU Commission Chairperson commends smooth conduct of first round presidential election in Anjouan", June 18, 2008, http://www.ena.gov.et/EnglishNews/2008/Jun/18Jun08/60635.htm, last accessed July 18, 2008.
[146] CIA World Factbook, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/cn.html, last accessed July 18, 2008 and The Guardian, March 26, 2008
[147] The Guardian, March 26, 2008
[148] Bogland et al 2008, p. 17, 22

6 Conclusions

The African Union's attempts at making peace and protecting civilians in Darfur should not be seen as an isolated operation, but rather as an important chapter in the evolution of international peacekeeping. As such, the AMIS experience has had important repercussions on a range of topics. These include the evolution of the 'responsibility to protect' as a norm in international relations, and more importantly its concrete operationalization. Furthermore, AMIS has had an impact on the security culture of the African Union, and particularly on the AU's willingness and capacity for peace operations. Lastly, AMIS illustrates the importance of outside support for African peace operations, and provides lessons for the continued work in this area.

AMIS made an invaluable but insufficient effort in Darfur. In those places where AMIS deployed, its presence prevented attacks on civilians, and thus decreased the level of human suffering. However, the extent of this contribution was limited because of a number of constraining factors. The most important of these factors were poor coordination between political and military tools of statecraft on the behalf of the African Union's member states, and insufficient military capabilities. The poor coordination at the political level is partly outside the scope of this study, but is evidenced by the AU initially deploying AMIS to Darfur without a proper strategic plan, as well as by its unwillingness to expand the mandate when so required.

With regards to military capabilities, three deficiencies stand out as critical. First, the incapability to raise sufficient number of properly equipped and trained personnel, especially military and police. Even at its peak in terms of manpower, the 7,000 people serving in AMIS were not enough. This is clear from comparing with the force levels used in earlier operations. The operational effect of these 7,000 men and women was reduced by the fact that they relied on unarmoured pickup trucks for the bulk of their mobility needs, and had no tactical air support. Secondly, the lack of expertise regarding strategic and operational military planning and command and control. This weakness did not arise from a lack of competence in African militaries in general, but because the skills and the manpower were lacking within the AU secretariat and at the AMIS Force Headquarters. This made AMIS dependent on advisors from donor countries, and further reduced the operational effect. Of particular importance was the lack of experience in multidimensional peace operations, which impeded coordination between the military, police, and civilian components of the mission. The third important area of weakness was a number of important military specialities and technical capabilities, such as logistical planning and transport capability, intelli-

gence, and communications. Some of these were slowly augmented with the help of the UN and Western partners.

A striking observation is the short time period which passed between the PSC's decision to launch AMIS and the arrival of the first MILOBS in Darfur – less than a month. Slow deployment has repeatedly been highlighted as a deficiency of peace operations in the past. For instance, the Brahimi report mentioned the need for being able to deploy within six to twelve weeks after a ceasefire or a peace agreement.[149] However, in the case of AMIS, it is conceivable that the swift initial deployment was counter-productive. The short time span between the PSC decision and the launching of the operation meant that there was no time for proper strategic planning. As a consequence, AMIS became from its inception burdened with a heritage of confusion about its role, which threatened its credibility. As in many other cases, the political process took much longer time than the strategic-level military planning. This underlines the need for the African Union to streamline its political planning process for peace operations. Another conclusion is the need to further improve the permanent strategic military planning capacity of the Peace Support Operations Division within the AU secretariat. This would enable the AU to increase the scope and quality of contingency planning, which can greatly shorten the time needed from a political decision to the launch of a mission while maintaining high standards.

In the few years since its birth in 2001, the African Union has started a forced learning process in the area of complex peace operations. The Darfur crisis put the AU before what seemed an impossible situation. A member state was actively directing murder and displacement of parts of its own population, while the outside world called for the AU to launch a military operation against the will of the state in question. At that time, the AU was still in the process of designing its fundamental architecture for conflict management. When evaluating AMIS, this perspective should be kept in mind. A comparison with the evolution of the EU's recent explorations in peace operations is appropriate. The European Defence and Security Policy was established with the Nice Treaty in 2001. Since then, the EU has engaged in a number of peace operations. All of these have either been relatively small and limited in time, or deployed in a conducive environment, despite that the EU member states includes some of the richest countries in the world as well as some of the major military powers. Thus, the work of the AU on peace operations could be seen as more ambitious than the EU's.

[149]United Nations Security Council/General Assembly 2000, p. 15

AMIS is also relevant for the discussion of an international division of labour for peacekeeping. This idea has been voiced in a number of versions. An example of this is an influential article by Gompert et al, which argues for the creation what they label 'a net-capable African Force'. This entails Western support for training and equipping African militaries, which would provide the bulk of the manpower, with a special focus on introducing network-centric tactics. Furthermore, the West would provide tactical airpower, C4ISR (command, control, communications, computing, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance) and maybe also special operations forces.[150]

The West is already providing support to African countries through a number of programs. The flagship U.S. program is the Global Peace Operations Initiative, which aims to, among other things, train 40,000 African peacekeeping troops in the period 2004 to 2009. The EU is mainly working through the African Peace Facility. A range of countries, including the UK, France, and Canada are running additional programs. Most of these are focused on strengthening the peace operations capacities of individual African militaries.[151] While these initiatives might be well needed, the AMIS experience illustrates two weaknesses. With regards to Gompert et al's net-capable force, it is based on the assumption that there are available African soldiers to serve as peacekeepers. However, AMIS shows that it can be very cumbersome to come up with these troops. In fact, African armies are suffering from an overstretch resembling that of major Western militaries.[152]

With regards to the ongoing international support, the lesson of AMIS is that while capacity-building on the level of individual African countries can be productive, it creates a complex web of dependency and makes it difficult to coordinate capacity building on the AU level. As many of the critical weaknesses of AMIS were found at the AU headquarters level, it follows that actions to strengthen African militaries must be complemented by efforts aimed at enhance the capacity for effective management of peace operations at the AU level.

[150] Gompert, David C.- Richardson, Courtney - Kugler, Richard L.- Bernard, Clifford H., "Learning From Darfur. Building a Net-capable African Force to Stop Mass Killings", National Defense University Center for Technology and National Security Policy, July 2005, p. 28-30

[151] Scourge, Lindsay, "Building African Peacekeeping Capacity: Donors and the African Union's Emerging Peace and Security Architecture", Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Center Occasional Paper No. 16, April 2007, p. 13-21. It should be noted that part of the funds in the African Peace Facility are earmarked for boosting AU strategic command and control capabilities.

[152] Christian Science Monitor, "Eager to Quell its Own Conflicts, African Union Fells Overstretched", August 22, 2007, http://www.csmonitor.com/2007/0822/p04s01-woaf.html, last accessed July 23, 2008.

Finally, AMIS shows that the discussion of an international division of labour in peacekeeping and the principles along which that division should be organized must not be allowed to take precedence over a pragmatic view aimed at addressing the specific circumstances of the conflict in question.

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Dr. Kwesi Aning, Head of the Conflict Prevention Management and Resolution Department at the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre (KAIPTC) in Accra, Ghana and formerly Expert on Counter-terrorism, defense and security at the African Union, telephone interview, July 28, 2008.

Linnea Bergholm, Doctoral student at the Department of International Politics, University of Wales, Aberystwyth, focusing on AMIS and the protection of civilians, telephone interview, July 23, 2008.

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Acronyms

ASF	African Standby Force
AMIB	African Union Mission in Burundi
AMIS	African Union Mission in Sudan
AMISOM	African Union Mission to Somalia
APC	Armoured Personnel Carriers
AU	African Union
C4ISR	Command, Control, Communications, Computing, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance
CFC	Ceasefire Commission
CIVPOL	Civilian Police
CONOPS	Concept of Operations
CPA	Comprehensive Peace Agreement
DDR	Demobilization, Disarmament and Reintegration
DoP	Declaration of Principles
DPA	Darfur Peace Agreement
DPKO	United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations
EASBRIG	Eastern Africa Standby Brigade
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
FHQ	Field Headquarters
GoS	Government of Sudan
HCFA	Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement
HMI	Humanitarian Military Intervention
HRW	Human Rights Watch
ICG	International Crisis Group
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
JC	Joint Commission

JEM	Justice and Equality Movement
MAES	African Union Electoral and Security Assistance Mission to the Comoros
MAPEX	Map Exercise
MGS	MILOBS Group Site
MILOBS	Military Observers
NRF	National Redemption Front
OAU	Organization of African Unity
PAE	Pacific Architectural Engineers
PSC	Peace and Security Council of the African Union
PSO	Peace Support Operation
PDF	Popular Defence Forces
ROE	Rules of Engagement
SLM/A	Sudan Liberation Army/Movement
SOMA	Status of Mission Agreement
SPLA	Sudan People's Liberation Army
TFI	Transitional Federal Institution
UNAMID	African Union/United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur
UNAMIS	United Nations Advance Mission in Sudan
UIC	Union of Islamic Courts
UNMIS	United Nations Mission in Sudan
UNSC	United Nations Security Council